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Abstract 
  Following the global oil crisis of October 1973 the UK government funded and 
administered a range of R&D programmes in renewable energy. Despite the discoveries of 
large deposits of oil and gas in the North Sea during the late 1960s and continuing faith in 
nuclear energy the government was keen to explore the potential of renewable energy as 
what it described as an ‘insurance technology’. This thesis examines the creation and 
evolution of the UK renewable energy programme from 1974 until its demise prior to the 
privatisation of the UK’s nationalised energy industries in the late 1980s. The thesis shows 
the important role that social movements - in this case, the new environmentalism - played 
in the promotion of renewable energy in the UK. This will suggest that the programme can 
be  seen  in  some  senses  as  a  tokenistic  gesture  by  the  government  acting  within  the 
uncertain political, social, and economic landscape of the 1970s. This thesis shows that 
government  decisions  on  renewable  energy  were  continually  driven  by  socio-political 
factors which overwhelmed the unreliable economic case for renewables at that time. This 
is achieved by a close historical account of the two key elements of the wider programme: 
the  Wave  Energy  Programme  and  the  Wind  Energy  Programme.  Using  a  mix  of  the 
existing literature, historical archive and interviews this thesis builds a historical account 
of renewable energy R&D in the UK between 1974 and 1988. 3 
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Introduction 
 
In  sum,  it  is  difficult  to  change  the  direction  of  large  electric  power 
systems - and perhaps that of large sociotechnical systems in general - 
but such systems are not autonomous. Those who seek to control and 
direct them must acknowledge the fact that systems are evolving cultural 
artifacts  rather  than  isolated  technologies.  As  cultural  artifacts,  they 
reflect the past as well as the present. Attempting to reform technology 
without systematically taking into account the shaping context and the 
intricacies of internal dynamics may well be futile. If only the technical 
components  of  a  system  are  changed,  they  may  snap  back  into  their 
earlier shape like charged particles in a strong electromagnetic field. The 
field  also  must  be  attended  to:  values  may  need  to  be  changed, 
institutions reformed, or legislation recast.
1 
 
In recent times renewable energy development is increasingly advanced by politicians and 
commentators as a key ingredient in addressing the future of both domestic and global 
economies.
2  The terms ‘green economy’ and ‘green jobs’ have become commonplace and 
in the public mind these are closely associated with renewable energy sources. Speaking in 
June 2010, US President Barack Obama said, 
 
Each of us has a part to play in a new future that will benefit all of us. As 
we recover from this recession, the transition to clean energy has the 
potential to grow our economy and create millions of jobs - but only if 
we accelerate that transition. Only if we seize the moment…
3 
 
However, renewable energy represents a dilemma for modern society.
4 On one hand, as 
well as the much-touted aid to economic recovery, it also offers solutions to many of the 
challenges  that  face  present  and  future  civilisations  by  providing  energy  that  is  both 
infinite and benign. On the other, it presents massive technological and social challenges 
that are only now becoming fully understood. The dilemma arises because, on the surface, 
                                            
1 Hughes, T. P., Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1983) p.465 
2 LoBianco, T., ‘Obama’s budget focuses on renewable energy’, The Washington Post, 27 February 2009, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/27/obamas-budget-focuses-on-renewable-energy/ [accessed 
11 July 2010]; Vinod, T., and Chomitz, K. ‘From crisis to opportunity’, The Guardian, 16 February 2009. 
This is a comment piece by senior officials of the World Bank; Adam, D., ‘Nicholas Stern: Spend billions on 
green investments now to reverse economic downturn and halt climate change.’ The Guardian,  11 February 
2009.  
3 The White House website, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/energy-and-environment [accessed 9 July 
2010]  
4 For an excellent discussion of this dilemma from a current US perspective, Sovacool, B. K., The Dirty 
Energy Dilemma: What’s Blocking Clean Power in the United States (London: Praeger, 2008) 10 
the way forward in energy terms appears to be straightforward. Steadily depleting reserves 
of oil and gas, and to a lesser extent coal, should gradually and incrementally be replaced 
with  wind  farms  and  other  now  familiar  renewable  options  in  order  that  our  growing 
energy needs remain fulfilled in the future. This path to the energy future was officially 
considered by the government in Britain for the first time in the 1970s following the first 
oil price shock. In more recent years the gradual acceptance of the facts of climate change 
have placed an even greater emphasis on the need to find an alternative to fossil fuels. 
However,  the  process  of  displacement  and  replacement  anticipated  by  some  has  been 
characterised  by  a  painfully  slow  rate  of  progress  towards  these  goals.  Advocates  of 
renewable energy became increasingly frustrated as the UK lurched back and forward from 
nuclear energy to renewables programmes and back again. This pattern, in general terms, 
has been echoed around the developed world.  In the UK in 2007, nearly thirty-five years 
after the need to develop renewable energy had been officially recognised by the creation 
of a dedicated R&D programme, renewable sources accounted for just over 3% of total 
final  energy  consumption  and  less  than  5%  of  total  electricity  generated.
5  What  can 
explain this lack of progress toward such apparently obvious goals?  
 
   In recent decades there have been numerous attempts to account for the slow and 
uncertain adoption of renewable energy sources, both in the UK and worldwide. Typically 
these have fallen within one of two disciplines - science (broadly defined) and political 
science.
6 Not surprisingly these studies have tended to suggest explanations that coincide 
with their field of study. This is not to suggest that the conclusions reached within either 
discipline are necessarily flawed, but rather that they understandably give less attention to 
perhaps equally compelling factors derived from within alternative narratives. We have 
many technical studies dating back to the beautifully illustrated 1894 study by Wolff
7 that 
focus  on  the  technological  challenges  that  confronted  the  inventors  and  innovators  in 
renewable sources of energy. These offer some insights into the alleged ‘reverse salients’ 
of science and engineering that slowed the development of renewable energy sources but 
                                            
5 BERR (Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform), Energy in Brief July 2008, National 
Statistics Publication. These figures for renewables include hydropower.  
6 For a clear example of this see, Grubb, M. J., ‘The Cinderella options: A study of modernized renewable 
energy technologies: Part 1 - A technical assessment’, Energy Policy, 18:6, July-August 1990, pp. 525-542; 
Grubb, M. J., ‘The Cinderella options: A study of modernized renewable energy technologies: Part 2 - 
Political and policy analysis’, Energy Policy, 18:8, October 1990, pp. 711-725. Here the author deals with 
technical issues and policy issues in separate articles.  
7 Wolff, A. R., The Windmill as a Prime Mover (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1894) 11 
show less interest in the impact of the ‘decision-makers’.
8 We also have a number of 
generally more recent studies that examine renewables within the broadly political context 
of  energy  ‘policy’.
9  At  this  time  no  book-length  treatment  of  the  development  of 
renewables within this perspective exists for the UK other than Ross’s 1981 study which 
concentrates exclusively on wave power. However Ross (a journalist) was an energetic 
campaigner for wave energy and his output - which included a number of similar articles 
10 
- has been criticised, with some justification, for presenting a rather partial account.
11 A 
number of these studies have utilised policy-network theories to emphasise the importance 
of power and influence in advancing or retarding renewables and many conclude that the 
overwhelming power of the established energy industries (particularly nuclear) and lack of 
government will was responsible for slowing the adoption of renewables during the 1970s 
and  1980s.
12  Similarly,  in  these  accounts,  very  little  attention  is  directed  towards  the 
technical challenges of renewables such as grid connection. What is clearly missing from 
the literature is an explicitly historical account of the development of renewable energy in 
the UK which includes some consideration of both of these elements combined with a 
broader social and political context which this thesis will seek to provide. 
 
   
                                            
8 Some examples include, Loferski, J. J., ‘The First Forty Years: a Brief History of the Modern Photovoltaic 
Age’, Progress in Photovoltaics: Research and Applications, 1:1, pp. 67-78; Smith, C., ‘Revisiting Solar 
Power’s Past’, Technology Review, 98:5 (July 1995) pp. 38-48; Shaw, R., Wave Energy: A Design 
Challenge (Chichester: Ellis Horwood, 1982); Simeons, C., Hydro-Power: The Use of Water as an 
Alternative Source of Energy (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980); Barrows, H. K., Water Power Engineering, 
3rd ed. (London: McGraw-Hill, 1943); Golding, E. W., The generation of electricity by wind power 
(London: Spon, 1955); McGuigan, D., Small Scale Wind Power (Dorchester: Prism Press, 1978); Musgrove, 
P. (ed.), Wind Energy Conversion 1984: Proceedings of the Sixth BWEA Wind Energy Conference, 
University of Reading, 28-30 March 1984 (Cambridge: CUP, 1984): Musgrove, P., Wind Power (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
9 Just some of the examples include, Watt, R. N., ‘Towards a synthesised network approach: an analysis of 
UK nuclear and renewable (wave) energy programmes 1939-85’, (University of Birmingham, 1998, PhD 
thesis);  McInnes, D., ‘Policy Networks within the Department of Energy and Energy Policy’, Essex Papers 
in Politics and Government, No. 82, University of Essex ; Ayling, G., Renewable Energy and Sustainable 
Energy Policy in the UK, (University of Birmingham, 1994, MPhil thesis); Connor, P. M., ‘UK renewable 
energy policy: a review’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 7 (2003) pp. 65-82.; Brown, A., ‘The 
UK Renewable Energy Programme’, Renewable Energy, 3: 2/3, (1993) pp. 279-288; Elliott, D., ‘Renewable 
Energy R&D in the UK: A Strategic Overview’, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 1:2 (1989) 
pp. 223-237; Elliott, D., Renewables: Past, Present and Future: The UK Renewable Energy Programme, 
NATTA (Milton Keynes, 1997); Elliot, D., ‘UK Energy Policy’ in P. Cunningham (ed.) Science and 
Technology in the UK, 2nd ed. (Cartermill, 1998); Ross, D., Energy from the Waves (Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, 1981) 
10 Ross, D., ‘The Parting of the Waves’ The Guardian, 16 February 1990; ‘On the Crest of a Wave’, New 
Scientist, 19 May 1990; Ross, D., ‘Scuppering the Waves’, Network for Alternative Technology and 
Technology Assessment, Energy and Environmental Research Unit, Faculty of Technology, The Open 
University (Milton Keynes: May 2001) 
11 Watt, ‘Towards’, p.57 
12 In particular see, Watt, ‘Towards’: McInnes, ‘Policy networks’. 12 
The basic features of the course of demand for energy are fairly simple and so 
is the chronology of the emergence of competing sources of supply.  Much 
more complexity appears when one seeks the determinants of the relative 
strength  of  the  various  components  of  the  market,  especially  those  which 
stimulated demand in one direction rather than another and those which bore 
upon the relation between cost and price.
13 
 
The  central  hypothesis  proposed  by  this  research  is  that  decisions  taken  by  the  UK 
government  on  the  development  of  renewable  energy  are  driven  primarily  by  socio-
political factors; this is illustrated by the quotation above from Ashworth. Consistently, 
from the oil crisis of 1973 until the present day, the UK government has reacted to social 
movement pressure (both domestic and global) in formulating policy on alternative forms 
of energy. In recent years this response has been created and encouraged by the growing 
realisation of the impact of climate change, but in earlier decades the social and political 
pressures were more varied. In the period, which this thesis examines, the issues of energy 
security,  problems  with  the  nuclear  programme,  the  development  of  renewable  energy 
sources in other countries (most notably the United States), and the emergence of the ‘new 
environmentalism’ compelled the government to respond. The suggestion of this thesis is 
that the UK renewable energy programme was this response.  
 
  This thesis, therefore, is a work of historical enquiry which seeks to place much of 
the existing non-historical literature on renewable energy during the period within a more 
reliable  and  robust  empirical  narrative.  It  will  seek  to  question  the  ‘tepid  pursuit’  of 
renewable energy programmes through a chronological historical narrative set within the 
social, political and economic context of the period, and show how socio-political concerns 
dominate.
14 As noted above there are very few purely historical accounts of renewable 
energy.
15  Indeed  we  may  perhaps  have  the  feeling  that  renewable  energy  has  not  yet 
accumulated  any  history.  Clearly  this  notion  is  undermined  by  the  general  sense  that 
renewables have not fulfilled their potential in the UK and elsewhere: this suggests that a 
history for renewables in the UK should in fact exist.
16 The extant accounts of renewable 
energy development in the UK tend to be partisan in nature (see above) and a focused 
                                            
13 Ashworth, W., The History of the British Coal Industry: Volume 5:  1946-1982: The Nationalized Industry 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 
14 Bobrow, D. B., and Kudrle, R. T., ‘Energy R&D: In Tepid Pursuit of Collective Goods’, International 
Organisation, 33:2 (Spring 1979) pp. 149-75 
15 Certainly insofar as we understand ‘renewable energy’ today. There does exist a great many studies of 
windmill and watermills, many of which emphasise the symbiotic relationship between society and 
technology.  
16 Although this is largely seen in terms of the ‘failure’ of renewables as an energy source, it is also 
increasingly understood as ‘failure’ in exploiting renewables as an economic opportunity. 13 
scholarly history remains to be written. This thesis intends to begin the process of building 
that work of historical scholarship in this important area. The advantage of the historical 
approach is that a very wide range of documentary evidence has accumulated and this can 
now be utilised along with valuable interview material from many of the key individuals 
involved in renewable energy in the UK from the 1970s onwards. The aim is that this will 
create an account of renewable energy development in the UK during the period 1974-88 
which will then provide a basis for future historical enquiry and scholarship.  Moreover, it 
is hoped that this work can help to inform future energy policy by providing a reliable 
historical record of previous attempts at renewable energy development.  
 
  Ultimately the main feature of the programme in 1970s – wave energy – was closed 
down  in  controversial  circumstances.  The  government  at  the  time  opted  to  justify  the 
closure on economic grounds. This thesis will contend that the closure had little to do with 
the unreliable and inaccurate costings for wave power generation. Instead, once again, 
social and political imperatives demanded that the UK be seen to be not just developing 
but  demonstrating  renewable  energy.  This  is  the  face  of  a  burgeoning  wind  energy 
programme  in  the  United  States.  This  caused  a  Conservative  government,  pledged  to 
cutting R&D expenditure, into the political shift to wind energy.   
 
Renewable Energy 
Renewable energy appears to many to be a relatively modern concept. Wind ‘farms’ and 
tidal barrages are often presented as new and uncertain technologies, ‘alternatives’ vying 
for adoption next to the more ‘traditional’ fossil fuels of coal, oil and gas and the now 
familiar ‘modern technology’ of nuclear energy. However, renewable sources of energy 
have an ancient history.
17 They represent the first example of humanity using non-human 
and non-animal effort as a source of power for human endeavour. Beginning with water 
power, in the form of the water wheel, it was recognised that the ceaseless flow of rivers 
and streams could supplement and replace the human and the ox in the milling process. As 
Lynn  White  Jr.  has  pointed  out,  this  took  place  in  conjunction  with  technological 
innovation in engineering that made this new transmission of power possible.
18 Eventually 
the potential of the wind as a power source was also recognised (probably from sail) and 
early windmills began to appear based on the same principles as the water wheel. The 
                                            
17 Sørensen, B., ‘A history of renewable energy technology’, Energy Policy (January/February 1992) pp. 8-
12 
18 White Jr., L, Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962) 14 
development  of  wind  and  water  power  took  place  over  centuries.  It  always  depended 
heavily  on  innovation  and  improvement  in  engineering  which  achieved  incremental 
increases  in  the  efficiency  of  energy  capture.  Indeed,  such  was  the  efficiency  of  the 
watermill that by the nineteenth century at the height of the age of steam power water 
power remained a key source of energy for many industries, particularly in the United 
States.  Beginning  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  in  Britain,  the  pace  of 
industrialisation had forced the development of the steam engine and coal also began to be 
used as a fuel input to generate motive power.
19  The technological focus was concentrated 
on improving the steam engine which had many clear advantages over site-specific water 
power  and  gradually  the  widespread  industrial  application  of  the  watermill  all  but 
disappeared.
20  
 
  This  thesis  will  seek  to  explain  the  historical  lack  of  progress  in  harnessing 
renewable  energy  sources  in  the  UK  by  examining  Britain’s  renewables  programmes 
between 1974 and 1988. It will propose the oil price shock of October 1973 as the pivotal 
event  in  the  modern  technological  development  of  renewable  energy  in  the  UK.  This 
caused economic and political turmoil on a global scale which had an important impact on 
conventional - fossil-fuel based - thinking about energy policy in Britain. Certainly, this 
was certainly not the first energy shock that was felt in the UK in the post-war era.  The 
first global postwar energy crisis occurred as a result of the Suez crisis of 1956, and a 
contrast can be drawn between the reaction to this first energy crisis and the later shock of 
1973.
21  In the 1950s concern over ‘energy security’ was a new and disturbing concept to 
Britain and it resulted in a massive up-scaling of the civil nuclear power programme. This 
was at a time when the capital costs of nuclear power stations were more than three times 
                                            
19 P. Mathias, The First Industrial Nation: An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1914, 2
nd ed.  (London: 
Routledge, 1983) pp. 121-25. 
20 Musson argues that steam power grew gradually in nineteenth century Britain. A. E. Musson, ‘Industrial 
Motive Power in the United Kingdom, 1800-70’, The Economic History Review, New Series, 29:3 (Aug., 
1976) pp. 415-439. A perhaps wider range of sources deals with this transition in the United States. Among 
these are: L. C. Hunter, A History of Industrial Power in the United States, 1780-1930, Volume One: 
Waterpower in the Century of the Steam Engine (Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1979); J. 
Atack, F. Bateman, and T. Weiss, ‘The Regional Diffusion and Adoption of the Steam Engine in American 
Manufacturing’ The Journal of Economic History, 40, 2 (June 1980) pp. 281-3; D. E. Nye, Consuming 
Power: A Social History of American Energies (London: The MIT Press, 1999); P. Temin, ‘Steam and 
Waterpower in the Early Nineteenth Century’, The Journal of Economic History, 26:2, (June 1966) pp. 187-
205.  Each of these accounts point out that this was a much slower process of change from water and wood to 
steam power in what soon became the world’s largest consumer of energy, the United States.  Atack et al 
estimate that even by as late as 1870 waterwheels outnumbered steam engines in the US by 5 to 4. 
21 For a brief account of  the Suez crisis see, Stokes, R. G., ‘Oil as a Primary Source of Energy’, in Fink, C., 
Hadler, F., and Schramm, T. (eds.) 1956 - European and Global Perspectives (Leipzig: Leipziger 
Universitatsverlag, 2006) p.250-252; Chick, M., Electricity and Energy Policy in Britain, France and the 
United States since 1945 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007) pp. 22-23 15 
that of traditional coal-fired stations.
22 Therefore, massive capital investment in a largely 
untried technology was seen as the solution to Britain’s energy needs. The uncertain nature 
of this technology and the massive economic cost did not deter the government in a period 
characterised by an unshakable faith in ‘big science’.
23  In the 1970s continuing faith in the 
promise of nuclear technology was a key reason that a similar leap of technological faith 
for renewable energy was absent.
24  One purpose of this thesis is to uncover some of the 
explanations for this.  
 
  This thesis will argue that in this period the UK was perhaps the first developed 
nation to fully uncover the dilemma that has impeded the global progress of renewable 
energy: renewable energy sources cannot simply replace fossil fuels. There are a number 
of reasons for this. Firstly, and most fundamentally, renewables do not represent the store 
of  energy  that  fossil  fuels  offer  (see  Appendix  II).  Renewable  energy  provides  an 
intermittent and site-specific energy source that relies by definition on the vagaries of 
nature. The development of fossil fuels as an energy source since the end of the eighteenth 
century  occurred  largely  because  they  offered  a  solution  to  this  ancient  problem. 
Therefore,  in  a  sense  the  acceptance  and  adoption  of  renewable  energy  represents  a 
symbolic reversal of progress and a failure of human endeavour. This helps to explain the 
continuing  commitment  to  civil  nuclear  power  despite  the  many  problems  that  this 
technology had experienced since the 1950s. However, despite the overwhelming reality of 
this  fundamental  difference  in  storage  capacity  this  thesis  will  focus  on  another 
explanation for the lack of development in renewable energy: dominant systems of power. 
 
Dominant systems of power 
Central to the development of electrical mains power in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century was the introduction of electrical power systems: electricity networks and grids. 
The history of this process has been charted in meticulous detail by a range of eminent 
                                            
22 Hannah, L., Engineers, Managers and Politicians; The First Fifteen Years of Nationalised Electricity 
Supply in Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982) pp. 178-9; 
23 Freeman, C. and Soete, L., The Economics of Industrial Innovation, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
Press, 1997) pp. 373-395.  
24 In particular the possibility of nuclear fusion was held many to offer the solution to all future energy needs. 
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scholars.
25  For  the  UK,  Hannah’s  meticulously  researched  two  volumes  provide  a 
compelling account of the scale of the engineering and institutional challenge in the UK. 
Conceived by Thomas Edison, amongst others, these grids grew rapidly from the 1880s 
based mainly on the properties of fossil fuels as an energy source and the steam turbine as 
prime mover.
26 Coal had been used extensively as a source of primary energy since the 
development  of  the  Watt  steam  engine  in  the  late  eighteenth  century  and  remains  the 
dominant fuel in the production of electricity today.
27  Oil was discovered in the USA in 
the mid-nineteenth century, but was considered initially as a luminant rather than a fuel 
until the development of the internal combustion engine.  As time passed the actual fuel 
utilised in the generation of electricity shifted to include oil, natural gas and nuclear, but 
each  shared  the  same  essential  characteristic  of  fungibility:  a  flexible,  in  most  cases 
transportable, store of energy that could be utilised in the sites where it was needed most 
(and people were willing to pay for it). By the 1970s in the UK the electricity grid was 
mature, extensive and central to modern developed society. The oil price shock of October 
1973 then combined, and as Beckerman pointed out, was to some extent confused with the 
growing awareness of the impending exhaustion of fossil fuels.
28 This was highlighted 
most famously in 1972 by the stark warnings of The Club of Rome’s study The Limits to 
Growth  and  the  official  recognition  of  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  the  Human 
Environment  (UNCHE)  held  that  same  summer  in  Stockholm.
29  Both  of  these  hugely 
influential events followed the publication success in Britain of A Blueprint for Survival 
from The Ecologist magazine.
30   
 
  In the 1970s (and still today) many thought that renewable energy sources could be 
‘plugged in’ to these complex and demanding systems. This was mistaken and represents 
                                            
25 Examples include, Hughes, Networks; Hannah, L., ‘A Pioneer of Public Enterprise: The Central Electricity 
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27 In the UK in 2006, coal-fired power stations accounted for 37.5% of electricity production. The equivalent 
figure for coal in the US in 2008 was 48.2%. BERR, Energy 2008; Sovacool, Dirty, fig. 1, p.3  
28 Beckerman, W., In Defence of Economic Growth (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974) pp.249-50 
29 Meadows, D. et al., The Limits to Growth (London: Pan Books, 1974).  
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of environmental awareness in the period see, Wilson, J. C., ‘Energy and the New Environmentalism: the 
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one explanation for the lack of success in renewable energy programmes in the UK during 
the period, and perhaps to this day. This thesis will suggest that the successful adoption of 
renewable  energy  sources  required  a  much  more  fundamental  shift  in  thinking  about 
energy: one that both the developers and the policymakers either failed to fully understand 
at the time, or shied away from. It required, among other things, a paradigm shift away 
from centralised energy supply. This would demand both a fundamental reorganisation of 
the National Grid and a massive investment in more localised energy systems on a scale 
similar to that which had taken place in the 1950s to extend and standardise the national 
grid.
31 This was not something that could ever be achieved by developing renewables as an 
‘insurance’ technology, as it was described by the government through the 1970s.
32 It also 
required a shift away from the pervasive notion that a single dominant source of fuel 
should provide the bulk of Britain’s electricity-generating energy needs. The result was 
that the public investment in renewable energy was misguided and inadequate. It is no 
surprise therefore that some commentators judge that the adoption of renewable energy 
technology  ‘failed’  in  this  period  and  beyond.
33  However,  this  thesis  will  propose  the 
counter argument that it was the dominant system that ‘failed’ the successful adoption of 
renewable energy. 
 
  This thesis will focus on the more recognisable aspects of renewable energy; wave 
and  wind  energy.
34  These  two  energy  sources  represented  the  most  ancient  forms  of 
renewable energy and dominated the 1974-88 UK renewables programme. The study will 
conclude in 1988 as this coincides with a major shift in UK energy policy. At that point the 
free-market, liberalisation drive of the Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher 
resulted in the privatisation of British Gas in 1986 and the electricity industry followed 
soon  after.
35  In  1988  the  government  produced  a  key  statement  on  renewable  energy, 
Renewable Energy in the UK: The Way Forward.
36 This paper proposed a new incentive-
based scheme to promote renewables which has shaped the policy response of successive 
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32 TNA, EG 16/1, Department of Energy, ‘Energy Prospects: A Background to Research and Development’, 
Advisory Council on Research and Development for Fuel and Power, undated (1975), p.8. The report goes 
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35 Elliott, D., ‘Renewables and the privatisation of the UK ESI: A case study’, Energy Policy, 20:3 (March 
1992) pp. 257-268 
36 Department of Energy, Renewable Energy in the UK: The Way Forward, Energy Paper 55 (London: 
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UK  governments  to  the  present  day  and  signalled  a  move  away  from  Government-
sponsored RD&D (research, development and demonstration) programmes.
37 
 
  The  most  common  application  for  renewable  energy  in  modern  times  is  in  the 
production  of  electricity  and  consequently  this  thesis  will  concentrate  entirely  on  that 
particular aspect of energy history. It is also the case that electricity provides one of the 
most visible manifestations of growing energy consumption in the twentieth century and is 
a clear example of our overwhelming demand for energy. Attention will be given to the 
evolution  of  electricity  networks  since  the  late  nineteenth  century  in  order  that  the 
challenges to renewable energy can be more fully understood. Electricity has helped to 
shape the world that we occupy, and the systems that have grown since their introduction 
in  the  1880s  are  now  seen  as  essential.  Both  domestically  and  in  industry  there  is  a 
fundamental reliance on electricity to provide instant and reliable energy at the flick of a 
switch.
38 The pervasiveness of this understanding is crucial in beginning to understand the 
apprehension that arises when fundamental change is suggested. The dominance of the 
electricity grid network in the UK acted as a barrier to any serious attempt to integrate 
renewable energy sources into the National Grid during the 1970s and 1980s. However, 
this thesis will show that the emergence of ‘energy morality’ in the 1970s, through the 
emergence of the new environmental movement in the UK, helped to create a different 
context in which that struggle took place.  I will return to this theme.  
 
Themes  
A central theme of this thesis is the impact and extent of government involvement and 
intervention  in  energy  matters  in  the  UK,  with  the  emphasis  on  renewable  energy.  In 
Britain  the  central  importance  of  the  rapidly  developing  grid  network  was  quickly 
recognised by the UK government in the first half of the twentieth century and after the 
Second World War the electricity industry was nationalised; followed soon after by the 
coal and gas industry. Additionally, as a relic of Churchill’s decision in 1914 the UK 
government owned a majority stake (51%) in the major international oil company, British 
Petroleum.
39  Furthermore  the  1950s  saw  the  development  of  Britain’s  civil  nuclear 
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programme  paid  for  and  controlled  (for  obvious  strategic  and  defence  reasons)  by  the 
government.
40 Therefore by the mid-1950s virtually all of Britain’s energy production and 
consumption was coordinated - in theory at least - by the government. This means that any 
consideration of UK energy in the postwar age must necessarily pay attention to the role of 
government  and  the  impact  of  nationalisation.  The  work  of  Kelf-Cohen,  Millward  & 
Singleton,  and  Tivey  on  Britain’s  nationalised  industries,  and  Hannah,  Chick,  and 
Hausman et al on the electricity industry, all provide useful and reliable accounts of this 
aspect of the history.
41  
 
  Hannah and others have shown that the extent of nationalisation was not unique to 
Britain in the postwar period. However, the dominance of government control in energy 
through nationalisation is central to historical development of renewable energy in Britain. 
The control of all of Britain’s energy providers by the government had a profound impact 
on the evolution of renewable energy. At one level, this manifested itself in multiple layers 
of bureaucracy that many of the innovators found stifling.
42 More crucially though it also 
meant that the path and pace of innovation in renewable energy was set by the government 
mainly  by  means  of  the  budget  that  was  allocated  to  the  programme.  This  thesis  will 
concentrate on the example of Britain’s wave and wind power programmes in the 1970s 
and 1980s to examine the attitude of the government towards renewable energy in the 
period. There will be a particular focus on wave energy as this was the first large-scale 
renewable energy programme undertaken by the UK government.
43 Between 1975 and 
1982, when the programme was effectively closed down (amid controversy) the majority 
of the UK budget for renewable energy R&D was devoted to wave power programmes. 
Previous scholarly studies of wave power have been produced, most notably by Watt and 
McInnes, as well as the aforementioned contribution of Ross.
44  However, in the case of 
Watt and McInnes, these contributions seek to use the example of wave power to explore 
the existence of policy networks within government in the period from a wider political 
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science perspective. Whereas Ross, as previously mentioned, uses his study as a largely 
unsubtle device to advocate wave power take-up in Britain.  This thesis will instead place 
the story of the wave power programme within the broader unfolding of renewable energy 
development during the two decades.  
 
  Crucial to understanding government involvement in energy is a discussion of the 
economic assessment of energy technologies in the period. Although the facts of carbon 
emissions and climate change were not widely known at the time (certainly during the 
1970s) there were other environmental pressures growing at the time which insisted that 
the energy debate be widened beyond the purely economic. Despite these demands, both 
government and the dominant energy industries remained impassive, and were fixated on 
their own economic assessment of renewable energy technologies on a strict cost per kWh 
(kilowatt hour) basis.  This cost was calculated on the basis of capital costs (annuitized 
over the lifetime of the plant), fuel costs, and the operation and maintenance costs. This 
approach caused a number of challenges for renewables as this thesis will show. Firstly, 
although renewable ‘fuel’ is effectively free, the capital costs of establishing renewable 
generation can be high. This makes renewable energy particularly sensitive to the cost 
accounting methods used in assessing potential energy developments.  Both the discount 
rate used and the investment period selected are crucial to the decision to invest (or not) in 
alternative  energy  projects.  Furthermore,  this  initial  barrier  to  renewable  energy 
development  severely  hampered  any  possibility  of  cost  reductions  through  the  well-
recognised processes of scale economies, ‘learning by doing’, and ‘learning by using’ that 
was so instrumental in the development of the incumbent energy technologies. Chapter 7 
will discuss these issues in some more depth.  
 
  This  leads  to  a  second  theme  that  will  be  explored  -  the  evolution  of  energy 
technology;  and  more  specifically,  renewable  energy  technology.  Despite  its  apparent 
novelty  renewable  energy  technology  has  a  significantly  longer  history  than  the  more 
‘traditional’ fossil fuel or nuclear technologies alluded to above. Many have explored this 
history of renewable energy technology and more recently Vaclav Smil has extended his 
authoritative energy histories to include the evolution of wind, water and solar power.
45 
This  thesis  will  focus  on  the  accelerated  evolution  of  the  technology  after  1973.  In 
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particular, it will use a case study of Stephen Salter at the University of Edinburgh, and the 
invention of ‘Salter’s Duck’ to explore some of the technological challenges that faced the 
renewables community in the period.
46 This study of renewable energy technology will be 
delineated  within  the  broader  understanding  of  technological  development  and  its 
interaction with society advocated by Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) School. 
As Callon stated‘... the development of scientific knowledge and technical systems cannot 
be understood unless the simultaneous reconstruction of the social contexts of which they 
form part is also studied.’ 
47 Already mentioned is the seminal contribution of Hughes on 
electrical  power  systems  which  demonstrates  in  meticulous  detail  how  modern  power 
systems  grew  out  a  combination  of  technical,  economic,  political  and  social  factors. 
Hughes presented an account of technological development that challenged the determinist 
view that saw technology as driving historical change. Much of this crude determinism 
emerged from postwar neo-classical economic theory where ‘technology’ became the key 
variable in economic growth and influential studies such as Mokyr’s The Lever of Riches 
and Landes’ The Unbound Prometheus appeared to confirm the relentless influence of 
technological advances on economic growth.
48 Historians of technology and society such 
as  Bijker  and  Pinch  came  to  challenge  this  straightforward  account  as  they  presented 
technological innovation in terms of its negotiated evolution within society.
49 Of particular 
interest  to  this  thesis  is  the  work  of  Langdon  Winner  who  has  made  a  significant 
contribution within this field to the specific study of energy choices.
50 He argued that, 
‘Choices about supposedly neutral technologies – if “choices” they ever merit being called 
– are actually choices about the kind of society in which we shall live’.
51  
 
  Closely  related  to  the  above  is  another  theme  that  will  be  explored;  the 
phenomenon of what I will term ‘energy morality’. This describes a view of energy policy 
that  extended  beyond  technical  considerations  and  extended  into  a  broader  critique  of 
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western capitalism. I will argue that this represents an example of Winner’s argument, 
alluded  to  above,  that  ‘artifacts  have  politics’.
52  This  broader  consideration  of  the 
implications of energy choices emerged in the 1960s, but found its first full expression in 
the 1970s. In Britain energy morality was most closely identified with the rise of the new 
environmentalism,  which  had  grown  from  a  mixed  bag  of  influences  ranging  from 
Victorian amenity societies to the US counter culture movement. During the early part of 
the 1970s the new environmental movement was concerned with a range of issues from 
pollution to nuclear disarmament. Closely related to both of these issues, the question of 
energy came to occupy a central role in environmental action and debate. What began as 
‘Ban  the  Bomb!’  marches  in  the  1950s  widened  to  include  active  opposition  to  civil 
nuclear power. The founding of Friends of the Earth UK (FoE UK) in 1972 and the output 
of the influential magazine The Ecologist ignited the energy debate in the UK and in the 
view of Williams forced what had been a private discourse into the public arena.
53 
 
  The final theme that this thesis will explore is the attempted commercialisation of 
renewable energy technology. Chapter 5 will feature a case study of Sea Energy Associates 
Ltd (SEA), the short-lived commercial collaboration between Stephen Salter and Ready 
Mixed Concrete Ltd (RMC).  A strong feature of the current dominant perceptions of 
renewable energy in Britain is that industry has ‘missed’ opportunities to take a lead in the 
global development of this technology. These are familiar criticisms to the ears of the 
economic  historian  and  arguably  have  their  roots  in  the  alleged  lag  that  the  UK 
experienced from the time of the Second Industrial Revolution.  Furthermore, as Edgerton 
pointed  out,  it  is  a  common  view  among  nations  that  they  themselves  ‘are  good  at 
inventing, but bad at developing and using technology’.
54 It is not the intention of this 
thesis to examine the veracity of the claims, or the extensive literature on Britain’s relative 
economic  decline  in  the  post  war  era.  Rather,  this  research  will  primarily  outline  the 
relationship between business and renewable energy technology between 1973 and 1988. 
At present there is no standalone account of the evolution of this important relationship for 
the  UK  for  this  formative  period.  Vietor  and  Sovacool  both  pay  some  attention  to 
commercial developments in the US, where government policy encouraged private capital 
from the outset. John Berger provides a useful analysis of the ‘business’ of renewable 
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energy in the US which this thesis will use to tease out some essential contrasts in the 
UK.
55  
 
  It is not the intention of this thesis to develop its argument within a single dominant 
theoretical  perspective.  Rather,  it  will  employ  a  number  of  theoretical  devices  as 
appropriate. These will be utilised primarily as organisational tools rather than any attempt 
to prove their inherent explanatory power. Watt has previously explored both wave energy 
and  nuclear  programmes  through  a  ‘synthesised  network  approach’  within  a  broadly 
political  discourse.
56  His  thesis  adopted  a  meso-level  analysis  of  the  wave  energy 
community in the 1970s to reach conclusions about the effectiveness of energy policy 
communities during that time. McInnes undertook a similar exercise, employing the policy 
network theories of Marsh and Rhodes to explore the structure of the UK Department of 
Energy.
57  This  thesis  will  draw  on  some  of  the  conclusions  of  this  previous  valuable 
research and will use network theories insofar as they help to explain the relationships 
within  the  broader  energy  community.  Of  particular  interest  to  this  thesis  will  be  an 
examination  of  the  particular  interest  groups  that  contributed  directly  or  indirectly  to 
energy policy.  
 
  The examination of these themes will be based on a wide reading of the existing 
literature, a close examination of primary source material, and a selection of interviews 
with some of the key individuals involved in energy during the period.  The primary source 
material is drawn mainly from government records held at the National Archive at Kew. 
This has involved a great number of Freedom of Information requests to access relevant 
material that nestles within the thirty-year rule. In addition to this a significant amount of 
primary source material was very generously made available to the author by Professor 
Stephen Salter who has built a detailed (and extensive) personal archive of his involvement 
in renewable energy since 1973. Whilst undoubtedly the historian of more recent events 
faces many challenges as these events are still to a large extent unresolved, it also provides 
tremendous  opportunities.  In  methodological  terms,  this  thesis  is  able  to  develop  the 
interplay between documents and individual interviews. This allows the often neutral tone 
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of official records to be enhanced by personal recollection and interrogated by historical 
enquiry.  
 
Organisation of thesis 
The material will be presented in two main parts and these will follow a chronological 
narrative based on the wide range of source materials. The parts reflect a chronological 
order that coincides with moments of change in the development of renewable energy in 
the UK.  Part one will encompass a fairly broad historical sweep of the period leading up 
to  the  1970s,  concluding  at  the  end  of  the  Golden  Age  and  the  changed  social  and 
economic context of Britain in the 1970s. The first part will include two chapters. Chapter 
1 will summarise the development of renewable energy and electricity until the 1974. The 
aim of this is to demonstrate continuity in many of the issues that confront renewable 
energy innovation and development. Chapter 1 will also address the evolution of mains 
electricity and will focus heavily on the development of electricity grids in the UK. This 
chapter will consider the nationalisation of the UK’s energy industries after the war, and 
will  examine  the  significance  of  Britain’s  civil  nuclear  programme  from  the  1950s, 
drawing particular attention to the impact that the Suez crisis had on UK energy policy.  
According to the central theme of this thesis this discussion will be primarily focussed on 
the theme of government involvement in energy policy and technology.  
 
  Chapter  2  will  examine  the  growth  and  spread  of  the  new  environmental 
consciousness in the early part of the 1970s in the context of the period and will show the 
significance of this for energy policy in Britain. This chapter will develop and discuss the 
theme  of  energy  morality  in  the  period.  This  describes  a  sense  in  which  debates  over 
energy, for so long confined to government and the nationalised energy industries, spread 
out to encompass the general public. This was encouraged by the re-emergence of the 
debates over reactor choice and the industrial unrest in the coal industry, but this chapter 
emphasises the key role that the new environmentalism occupied in forcing energy into the 
mainstream. A key conclusion of this thesis is that the 1974-88 UK renewables programme 
was in many senses a tokenistic gesture, responding to the new social movement pressure.  
Therefore, the examination and explanation of the role of a new energy consciousness 
propagated by the 1970s environmental movement helps in understanding just why such a 
gesture was deemed necessary.  25 
  The  second  part  of  the  thesis  will  concentrate  on  the  period  1974-88,  and  will 
include four chapters.  Chapter 3 sets the context for the creation of the UK renewables 
programme.  It  includes  a  discussion  of  the  role  that  Lord  Rothschild’s  Central  Policy 
Review Staff (CPRS) played in encouraging the development of renewable energy in the 
UK. This chapter will describe the development of the infrastructure of the UK renewable 
energy programme, which emerged immediately following the 1973 oil crisis. This will 
establish the important institutional background to renewables development in the UK.  
Chapter 4 then focuses on an analysis of the major UK renewables initiative during the 
1970s, as recommended by Lord Rothschild, the Wave Energy Programme (WEP). This 
chapter highlights the tremendous enthusiasm that existed for wave energy during the early 
part of the programme. Between 1974 and 1978, renewable energy in the form of wave 
power was regarded as a serious aspect of Britain’s energy future. However, this chapter 
will also show how this initial fervor was rapidly deflated by the economic and technical 
challenges unveiled during the first Wave Energy Conference at Heathrow in November 
1978. Thereafter, as this thesis shows, amidst dwindling government support (accelerated 
by the election of the Thatcher Government in 1979) renewable energy faced a much more 
troublesome passage.  
 
  The  central  figure  in  wave  energy  development  was  Stephen  Salter  of  the 
University of Edinburgh, and therefore Chapter 5 is a case study of his involvement in the 
UK renewable energy programme.  This chapter brings together several of the themes of 
this research. It will discuss the impact of the new environmentalism on forming Salter’s 
motivation  to  develop  a  source  of  ‘clean  energy’,  the  role  of  the  renewable  energy 
institutions in managing the device teams, and finally, the attempted commercialisation of 
renewable energy through partnership with industrial partners. Chapter 6 will explore the 
shift in renewables policy in the UK at the end of the 1970s. This centred on the abrupt and 
controversial closure of the Wave Energy Programme and a move to develop wind energy. 
This chapter will consider the influence of developments in the US, where a new package 
of  financial  incentives  encouraged  the  Californian  wind  rush  of  the  early  1980s.  This 
stimulated an explosion in wind energy projects that, during the period, culminated in the 
massive  3MW  wind  turbine  in  Orkney  at  a  cost  of  £17M.  Chapter  7  will  revisit  and 
summarise some of the key economic aspects of renewable energy development during the 
period.  This  will  help  to  emphasis  the  more  minor  role  allocated  to  wider  economic 
considerations in the period before the science of climate change was widely known.  This 26 
channeled any economic assessment of renewable energy sources into a rather narrow 
calculation of the capital costs of the technology.27 
Chapter 1 
Energy and Electricity in the UK before 1974 
 
  This chapter will help to set the background for the UK energy scene in the 1970s, 
which will be dealt with in Chapter 2, through a brief examination of the development of 
electrical networks. The main aim of this chapter is to explain how electrical systems grew 
from  uncertain  beginnings  in  the  1880s  to  dominate  national  energy  distribution  and 
consumption by the mid-twentieth century through the National Grid. As well dealing with 
the evolution of the grid this chapter will also briefly outline the growth and change in the 
patterns of energy consumption in the UK in the post-war period.  
 
  The story of early enterprise in electrical lighting systems has some interesting 
parallels with the attempts to develop renewable energy later in the twentieth century that 
forms the focus of this thesis. The early innovators in electric lighting in Britain were faced 
with a network (in their case, gas lighting) which was well-developed and widely used 
particularly in urban settings, and a gas industry that, in the UK, was efficiently managed.
1 
Lighting faced a number of serious hurdles in developing into a competitive alternative not 
least of which was the fact that gas lighting remained roughly one third cheaper than 
electric lighting in Britain until the outbreak of the First World War.
2  The electrical power 
industry of the late nineteenth century was therefore confronted by many technical, legal, 
financial,  and  social  barriers  which  I  suggest  were  in  some  ways  similar  to  the 
impediments  that  renewable  energy  development  was  to  encounter  in  the  1970s  and 
beyond.  
 
   In nineteenth-century Britain the demand for all those things that we would now 
call ‘energy’, both in domestic and commercial terms, was being almost entirely met by 
coal.  In  the  home,  cooking  and  heating  were  both  achieved  by  burning  coal
3  whilst 
artificial light was traditionally provided either by whale oil lamps or tallow candles until 
the introduction of gas lighting (also derived from coal) in the early part of the century.
4 
                                            
1 Byatt, I. C. R., The British Electrical Industry 1875-1914: The economic returns to a new technology  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) p.3 
2 Byatt, British Electrical; Wilson, J. F., Ferranti and the British electrical industry, 1864-1930 (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1988) p.7 
3 Oil was not discovered until 1867.  
4 Rendered animal fat 28 
The spread of gas lighting in the first half of the century was partly encouraged by the 
changing work patterns of industrialisation as the demands of the new factories changed 
the  definition  of  the  working  day  and  stretched  it  into  the  hours  of  darkness.  Factory 
owners faced large bills for candles and whale oil in the period before gas lighting was 
introduced  -  not  to  mention  the  frequent  and  expensive  fires  that  damaged  property, 
delayed  work,  and  often  ended  in  human  tragedy.
5  Therefore  the  commercial  demand 
(market pull) for a cheap and safe alternative prompted innovation and development in gas 
technologies. This eventually led to almost every town in Britain having a domestic gas 
supply by the middle of the century as economies of scale then successfully encouraged 
the shift from dedicated gas-lighting systems in factories, commercial premises and large 
homes to a wider public supply.
6 Generally a new gas mains network would initially be 
built to supply a town with street lighting and then this could easily be extended to include 
new  domestic  consumers  as  the  supply  costs  fell.
7  This  model  of  distribution  was  an 
important development in public utility systems and electrical power networks adopted it 
later in the century. However, the ‘lusty infant’ of electricity would first have to dislodge 
mains gas-lighting from its dominance in UK illumination.
8 
 
  Within this early period in the development of electricity there are two aspects that 
are  particularly  relevant  to  this  thesis.  The  first  concerns  the  involvement  of  the 
government in the provision of electricity in Britain.
9 From the earliest days of electrical 
developments, legislation has helped to shape the rate and direction of progress in the 
industry. This started in the late 1870s and continued the pattern of state involvement in 
energy matters that had begun with the gas industry. Initially this was a practical and 
technical  interest  in  the  breaking  of  roads  and  the  safety  of  the  public  from  swaying 
overhead cables, but it soon was to develop into an ideological interest in electricity as a 
public good. Coming as it did at the end of the nineteenth century, electricity was added to 
the list of public utilities that municipal socialism would seek to control to ‘protect’ the 
                                            
5 Falkus, M. E., ‘The Early Development of the British Gas Industry, 1790 -1815’, The Economic History 
Review, New Series, 35:2 (May 1982) p.219.  Falkus quotes the example of the Manchester firm of 
McConnel & Kennedy which ‘burned an average 1,500 candles each night for 25 weeks in the year and 
consumed more than 1,500 lbs. of tallow.’  The annual cost of this in 1806 was about £750.  
6 Ibid. p.217. ‘During the first half of the nineteenth century gas supplies were brought to all major towns and 
even to must small centres numbering no more than three thousand or so inhabitants.’  
7 Falkus, M. E., ‘The British Gas Industry before 1850’, The Economic History Review, New Series, 20:3 
(Dec 1967) pp. 494 - 506 
8 Hughes, T. P., ‘British Electrical Industry Lag: 1882-1888’ Technology and Culture, 3:1, (Winter 1962), 
pp. 27-44. Hughes quotes this description of electricity from the Paris Exhibition of 1881.  
9 Hausman et al, Global, pp. 23-24 29 
public from exploitation and monopoly power.
10 Related to state involvement in electricity, 
another  aspect  of  the  early  period  of  development  that  is  crucial  to  this  thesis  is  the 
evolution of central station electricity. As the potential scale of electrical networks grew 
after the invention of the incandescent bulb the potential (which Edison had anticipated) 
for large central generating systems offering a public supply also increased. Despite slow 
and unsteady progress central station electricity became the natural choice for electrical 
networks in the UK due to the economies of scale and the largely urbanised population.
11   
 
Central Generating Systems 
Prior to the invention of the incandescent bulb, arc lighting systems had mainly been sold - 
and regarded - as independent, dedicated (self-contained) systems; similar to the early gas-
lighting systems. Each installation would have its own generator and formed a complete 
system within itself.
12  Much of the reason for the adoption of this approach is explained 
by the limited and site-specific applications of arc lighting, the technical limits on lamps, 
and the economic limits to demand imposed by cost. However with the invention of the 
incandescent bulb many of the limits to electrical systems were transformed. Now that 
electrical lighting could actually be used in an interior setting, the possibility of selling the 
light to a large number of ordinary domestic consumers opened up. Even more crucially it 
now became a technical possibility - and economically desirable - to run huge numbers of 
lamps  from  a  single  generator.  Just  as  the  gas  industry  had  shown,  central  generating 
systems  offered  an  opportunity  to  drive  down  the  costs  of  generating  electricity  by 
achieving the economies of scale necessary.
13  
 
  The  key  figure  in  the  development  of  central  station  electricity  in  the  UK  was 
Thomas Edison. Although popular legend tells of the ‘heroic’ inventor Edison obsessed 
with creating a light bulb (his team of scientists and engineers had indeed been focused on 
developing a reliable incandescent light bulb) the overarching goal for Edison was the 
potential that an electrical network offered.
14 From his earlier experience of developing the 
telegraph and his interest in the telephone and an awareness of the way in which gas 
networks had grown, Edison was convinced that the future for electricity lay in developing 
                                            
10 Ibid. p.67 
11 A further crucial factor was the technical imperative; load factor. As electrical networks developed it 
became essential that central generating plant was used efficiently. One example of how this could be 
achieved was by combining domestic demand (mostly evenings) with industrial demand (mostly daytime).  
12 Hausman et al, Global, p.10 
13 Falkus, ‘Early Development’, pp. 229-31 
14 Hausman et al, Global, pp. 11-12 30 
a similar system. Hughes has shown clearly that rather than setting out to confront the 
purely scientific and technical barriers that this entailed Edison also had a keen awareness 
of  the  economic  aspects  of  the  challenge;  he  described  Edison’s  general  approach  as 
‘econotechnical’.
15 Edison was among the first to recognise that electrical light would have 
to be sold in significant volume in order to compete with the well-established gas networks 
if it were ever to be any more than a ‘luxury’ light.  
 
  By the end of the First World War electrical networks had become well established 
in  the  UK,  particularly  in  urban  settings.  However,  these  systems  had  developed  in  a 
haphazard  way  offering  consumers  a  bewildering  variety  of  supply-led  options  to  the 
consumer;  AC  and  DC  systems  operating  at  a  range  of  voltages  and  frequencies.  As 
Hughes noted wryly, 
 
Londoners who could access electricity, toasted bread in the morning with 
one kind [of electricity], lit their offices with another, visited associates in 
nearby office buildings using still another variety, and walked home along 
streets that were illuminated by yet another kind.
16 
 
   
Though according to Hannah, 
 
The  fragmented  nature  of  the  British  supply  industry  had  not  proved  an 
unbearable handicap in the early stages of development, but by the end of the 
first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  a  new 
strategy was required and that the existing structure of the industry was not 
conducive to the development of large central stations and bulk supply. 
17 
 
   During the war the importance of electricity to the economy and society was made 
plain, and its many flaws exposed.  Political attention was turned towards the industry once 
more  as  numerous  ‘Reconstruction’  Committees  began  to  consider  the  future  of  the 
electricity industry.
18 Although the scale of the problem was exaggerated in London, a 
similar problem operated throughout the country. There was little regional interconnection 
as  municipal  electrical  enterprises  often  resisted  expanding  their  networks  through 
integration with contiguous enterprises, and as such the national picture was fragmented. 
                                            
15 Hughes, Systems, p.29 
16 Hughes, Systems, p.227  
17 Hannah, Electricity, p.51 
18 Wilson, Ferranti, p.124; Self and Watson, Electricity . Around the same time in 1916 the two committees 
were set up, one under Lord Haldane and the other under Charles Parsons to consider manufacturing. The 
Williamson Committee arose as a recommendation of the Parsons Committee.  31 
This had resulted in the UK falling behind its competitors, mainly Germany and the US, in 
terms of development and scale in electricity. This was not just a matter of national pride 
however  as  by  the  second  decade  of  the  twentieth  century  three  of  the  UK’s  biggest 
electrical firms were subsidiaries of German or US firms.
19 The habit of having one eye 
fixed on the other side of the Atlantic was something that also had an impact later, in the 
1980s,  when  Britain  shifted  its  renewables  programme  to  wind  energy  to  follow  the 
American lead (see chapter 6).  
 
The Weir Committee and the National Grid 
In October 1924 a Conservative government was returned to power in Britain under Prime 
Minister, Stanley Baldwin. By this time it was clear that electricity supply was really in 
desperate  need  of  reorganisation  and  the  short-lived  Labour  government  (elected  in 
January 1924) had begun to address some of these problems through a committee for Coal 
and Power set up under ex-Prime Minister, Lloyd George.
20 Hughes advanced the view 
that the barrier to change in the UK since the earliest days of electrical supply had been 
‘primarily political’ and it was clear that by this time ‘politics’ was beginning to take some 
notice  of  the  challenges.
21  By  1924  the  damaging  economic  consequences  of  the  war, 
increasing  trade  union  activity,  and  a  first  Labour  administration  under  Ramsay 
MacDonald had arguably weakened much of the more entrenched political impediments to 
change. The new Conservative government rather surprisingly found itself supporting state 
involvement  in  electricity  as  the  only  possible  solution  to  the  problems,  and  Baldwin 
immediately made this a key priority for the new administration.
22 
 
  The report of the Weir Committee was signed on 14 May 1925 only five months 
after  its  establishment  and  its  recommendations  were  bold.  Undoubtedly  the  speed  at 
which the committee reached its conclusions was helped in large part by the accumulated 
output of the various committees on electricity set up by the government since the First 
World War and the five years of experience gathered by the Electricity Commissioners, a 
creation of one of these earlier committees. From the start the Weir Committee regarded 
Britain  as  ‘an  ideal  electrical  area’  and  accordingly  its  report  was  focussed  on  the 
                                            
19 Hannah, Electricity, p.37 
20 Self & Watson, Electricity, pp. 51-54; Hannah, Electricity, pp. 88-89. The Lloyd George committee 
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21 Hughes, Networks, p.351 
22 Hannah, Pioneer, p.209 32 
challenges of national interconnection.
23 The Weir Committee quickly reached conclusions 
that  were  largely  similar  to  those  of  the  Williamson  Committee  some  years  earlier, 
although  they  went  much  further  in  proposing  national  (rather  than  regional) 
interconnection that formed the core of their recommendations. The committee envisaged a 
future where there would be,   
 
...generation in large stations, favourably situated as regards fuel, water and 
load  with  units  of  comparatively  large  capacity;  the  minimum  legitimate 
amount of stand-by plant; and the highest obtainable load factor, to secure 
which stations should be inter-connected with one another. 
24  
 
 The Weir Committee also recommended the establishment of area boards, but it proposed 
that these would be organised under a central body, the Central Electricity Board (CEB).  
Weir  foresaw  that  the  entire  country  should  form  one  large  integrated  network  of 
generation and distribution - facilitated by an interconnected ‘gridiron’ - operating on a 
single standardised frequency and voltage.
25  
 
  It is some indication of the awareness of the poor state of electricity in the UK and 
the perceived impact that this was having on international competitiveness that this time 
around  the  proposals  of  a  government  electricity  committee  were  accepted  largely 
unaltered  by  the  government.
26  Despite  some  initial  hesitancy  from  the  government  in 
publishing  the  Weir  Report  due  to  the  radical  nature  of  its  proposals  (and  the  likely 
reaction of vested interests), the Electricity Supply Act (1926) created the CEB and set 
plans for a national grid in action.
27  According to Hannah, the Weir Committee had, 
 
...indulged in sensationalism and exaggeration - perhaps necessarily - in order 
to emphasise the seriousness of the problem and to encourage the adoption of 
their recommendations.
28   
 
  Weir had promised Baldwin that the proposals would require ‘courage and possibly 
a considerable financial investment’, and accordingly the committee had estimated (based 
                                            
23 Hannah, Electricity, p.91 
24 Hughes, Networks, p.353 
25 Ibid. Merz coined the term ‘Grid’ because the proposed pattern of transmission lines reminded him of a 
gridiron.  
26 Hannah, Electricity, p.96. Furthermore, it is also some indication of the influence of Lord Weir.  
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published until March 1926.  
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on the commissioned reports) that their proposals, including the cost of new power stations 
and distribution systems, would cost £250m over fifteen years to implement but that this 
would  result  in  annual  consumer  savings  of  £44m  by  1940  through  lowered  prices.
29  
These ‘fragile’ savings estimates convinced the government that action was required. The 
creation of the CEB signalled a significant new direction in state enterprise in the UK 
which  would  foreshadow  much  of  the  subsequent  nationalisation  of  key  industries.  
However, this thesis is particularly interested in the establishment of the national grid. The 
government had accepted the economies of scale that a national grid could offer and the 
structure of the UK’s electricity networks was to be radically re-ordered through a massive 
engineering project to create an interconnected national electrical network.  
 
The National Grid: ‘...power, in the service of the people…’ 
30 
The National Grid was begun in Central Scotland in December 1927. Through that year the 
newly formed CEB was assisted by the Electricity Commission in formulating plans for 
how the challenges of grid construction would be met. It was decided that the industrial 
areas such as South Wales, Central Scotland, and the Midlands should be tackled first. 
Given the preponderance of Scots in the CEB and Electricity Commission it was perhaps 
no surprise that Scotland was chosen first: many of the senior engineers had previous 
experience  of  the  existing  electrical  networks  in  this  area.
31  The  physical  scale  of  the 
challenge was huge; the construction of a network of transmission lines snaking around the 
nation;  the  standardisation  of  frequency,  voltage,  and  current;  and  the  drastic 
rationalization of the existing generating capacity.
32  Leaving aside the construction of new 
power stations, the 3,000 miles of planned transmission lines would require 150,000 tons 
of steel and 12,000 tons of aluminum. 28,000 pylons were erected and the system required 
200,000 porcelain insulators. After some research into systems abroad the CEB decided to 
standardise the frequency of the grid at 50Hz and this required that more than twenty per 
cent of the installed capacity be converted.
33 The erection of the ‘ugly’ pylons stirred up 
some opposition from those who felt that they ‘disfigured’ the landscape 
34 - and the CEB 
had to deal with 22,000 affected landowners on the issue of wayleaves. Chapter 6 shows 
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32 Self & Watson, Electricity, p.60 
33 Hughes, Networks, p.358; Hannah, Electricity, pp. 116-118 
34 Some examples include, ‘Pylons in Kent: new threat to Pilgrims’ Way’, The Times, p,11, 17 January 1930; 
‘Pylons And The New Forest: The Alternative Routes‘ (Picture Gallery) The Times, p.14,  5 November 1932 34 
how this environmental opposition created a painful memory for the electricity industry 
that  would  resurface  during  the  late  1970s  when  the  CEGB  was  considering  the 
development of wind turbines in the UK.    
 
  Fortunately for the CEB it had two great advantages. The first of these was that 
despite the physical challenge that the grid presented it never represented a technological 
challenge. Hughes in particular is clear in stressing that the CEB was able to use existing 
technology  in  constructing  the  grid.  ‘Britain’s  engineers  concentrated  on  a  host  of 
relatively routine problems that were complicated more by their number, a tight schedule, 
and economic dimensions than by technical challenge.’
35 The second advantage enjoyed 
by the CEB was that the construction of the grid coincided with the Depression in the UK. 
This gave the construction project access to large volumes of skilled labour and materials 
and avoided the costly delays that might otherwise have afflicted the programme.
36  Less 
quantifiable but equally important was the associated benefit that this gave the CEB and 
the grid in being seen in positive terms as a job creator at a time of economic hardship.
37 
The CEB was quick to claim that the construction of the grid created 120,000 jobs, either 
directly or indirectly.
38 This access to existing technology and labour helped to ensure that 
the national grid was completed on schedule. The last pylon was erected at Fordingbridge 
in  the  New  Forest  on  5  September  1933.
39  By  the  end  of  1935  general  trading  was 
underway  in  most  of  the  UK  and  by  this  time  there  were  2880  miles  of  primary 
transmission lines in operation.
40 The grid had been completed within schedule and within 
budget. The Weir Committee estimated that it would cost between £24-29m to construct 
the grid - and the final cost was an impressively accurate £29m.
41  
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Energy and Electricity during the golden age 
Economic historians, ever drawn to themes of continuity and change, have viewed the 
three  decades  beginning  after  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  as  Les  Trentes 
Glorieuses.
42 The unprecedented period of sustained economic growth, which occurred 
after the Second World War, led to a ‘golden age’ of higher living standards, and the 
inevitable corollary of increased consumption, for most of the citizens of the developed 
nations.
 43 Britain also enjoyed a period of sustained growth during this time, but at growth 
rates somewhat more modest than its competitors.  
 
  As  demonstrated  by  the  work  of  Darmstadter,  economic  growth  and  energy 
consumption enjoy a close relationship, and one important result of the increasing wealth 
of  individuals  during  this  period  was  the  increasing  consumption  of  energy,  both  by 
industry and households.
44 Between 1950 and 1970 the total world consumption of energy 
increased  by  151  per  cent,  from  2059  to  5170  million  metric  tonnes  oil  equivalent 
(mmtoe).
45  Within  this  global  aggregate  figure  many  of  the  industrialised  nations, 
particularly those that had suffered infrastructure damage during the war, accounted for 
even greater rises in demand.  As Clark put it ‘a handful of nations consumed the bulk of 
the world’s energy’.
46  Japan, which accounted for only 2 per cent of world consumption in 
1950,  was  by  1970  consuming  6  per  cent  of  a  much  increased  total,  as  its  per  capita 
primary  energy  consumption  rocketed  over  the  twenty  years  (Table  1.1).  France  and 
Germany also witnessed massive increases in energy consumption as they rebuilt their 
damaged economies following the war.  Despite the less spectacular incremental increases 
in the US in this period, the energy consumed was on a scale with no equal anywhere else 
in the world, at more than double the per capita consumption of Britain and Germany. 
Somewhat less dramatic was the rise in consumption in Britain during this period. 
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Table 1.1  
Per Capita Consumption of energy, selected years (mmtce) 
  1950  1960  1970 
UK  4.4  4.9  5.4 
Germany  2.5  3.7  6.0 
France  1.9  2.6  5.0 
Japan  0.6  1.2  4.0 
USA  7.9  8.6  12.5 
World  1.0  1.4  1.9 
 
Source: Clark, World Energy, p.188, Table 6.1 
 
  Some  of  the  explanation  for  what  Clark  termed  a  ‘negligible’  rise  in  Britain’s 
energy  consumption  during  this  period  can  be  attributed  to  economic  factors,  and  this 
forms part of a wider debate on relative economic decline in the post war period which 
falls outside the constraints of this research. However – leaving the US aside – it can be 
seen that the UK was the leading per capita consumer in the developed world in 1950 and 
was overtaken only by Germany by 1970.  Therefore it could be argued that earlier growth 
had limited the potential for UK consumers (both domestic and industrial) to increase their 
energy consumption. Despite this possibility, the period was witness to huge growth in the 
demand, availability and consumption of electricity in Britain (Table 1.2).  The boost that 
this gave to the newly nationalised industries of coal and electricity was seen only in the 
most positive of terms.  Similarly, though perhaps more of a concern for the ongoing 
British preoccupation with the balance of payments, the steady growth in car ownership in 
the period led to increasing imports of foreign oil to the UK.  
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Table 1.2 
UK electricity, 1950-74 (GWh) 
Year  Production  Consumption 
(total) 
Consumption 
(per capita 
kWh) 
Installed 
capacity per 
1,000/pop. 
(kWh) 
1950  66  66  1309  376 
1955  94  94  1834  531 
1960  137  137  2601  697 
1965  196  197  3604  906 
1970  249  250  4473  1200 
1974  273  273  4873  1418 
 
Source: Chick, Electricity, Appendix A1, Table A1.1, p.147  
 
  Despite the rather modest increases in total primary energy demand compared with 
the other industrialised nations, Britain did reflect the shifting pattern of global energy 
consumption after 1950.  By 1945 oil accounted for 23 per cent of world primary energy 
consumption; by 1970 the figure was 45 per cent.  Coal which had provided 66 per cent of 
primary  energy  in  1945,  had  by  1970  slipped  to  providing  only  33  per  cent  of  world 
primary energy requirements.
47  Of course, primary energy needs were not provided by 
coal and oil alone in the golden age.  But despite the massive attention and capital invested 
in nuclear energy in the period, it did not play a significant role in world energy by 1970; 
accounting for less than 1 per cent.  Indeed, the only ‘renewable’ of any significance in the 
period, hydroelectricity, was providing more than twice this amount of primary energy in 
1970. Much more significant was the increase in the consumption of natural gas in the 
period.  Gas  remained  almost  unnoticed  amongst  what  Yergin  showed  as  the 
swashbuckling allure of the international oil industry and the technological attraction of 
nuclear power.
48 However, from a share of only 10 per cent of world requirements in 1945, 
natural gas doubled to provide 20 per cent in 1970.  
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UK Balance of Trade in Fuel, 1947-88 
In 1936 (in terms of the balance of trade) the UK became a net importer of fuel.  Up until 
this point the nation had through virtue of its huge coal reserves and well-developed export 
networks made a profit on fuel. The one exception to this had been during the General 
Strike of 1926 when it was necessary to import £66.6m of fuel to replace the disrupted 
supply.  From the mid-thirties the gradual decline in coal exports combined with increasing 
imports of petroleum meant that a net national outlay for fuel would become a feature of 
the  overall  economic  position  of  the  UK.    Furthermore,  this  deficit  steadily  increased 
through time.  Chart 1.1 shows the balance of trade in fuel from 1947 until the oil crisis of 
1973.
49 
 
Chart 1.1 
 
Sources: Ministry of Power, Statistical Digest 1965 (London: HMSO, 1966); Ministry of Power, Digest of 
Energy Statistics, 1968 and 1969, (London: HMSO, 1969); Department of Energy, Digest of United 
Kingdom Energy Statistics 1974 (London: HMSO, 1975) 
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  Chart 1.1 shows an inexorable decline in the balance of trade in fuel in the UK 
during  the  golden  age.  This  net  cost  of  fuel  increased  steadily  during  the  1950s  and 
gathered pace through the early 1960s; eventually showing dramatic shifts in the second 
half of the 1960s and early 1970s.  The growing cost of fuel to the country reflects the 
concomitant shift from coal to oil that was taking place after the war.  From its position of 
dominance, supplying over 90 per cent of fuel needs in the UK in 1947, coal was quickly 
being replaced by oil as the dominant fuel.  Much of this growth was explained by the 
growth in transport from the 1950s onwards.  
 
Electricity in the postwar era: changing inputs 
The final section of the chapter will look at one aspect of the evolution of electricity in the 
UK from the time of nationalisation in 1948 until the early 1970s. Therefore, it is not 
intended  as  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  industry  within  the  context  of  nationalisation  as 
Hannah and Chick have already admirably served this task.
50 Rather the focus will be on 
the growth of consumption in the period and the changing pattern of inputs within the 
electricity  generating  industry.  The  CEGB  was  the  coal  industry’s  largest  customer 
through the postwar period, and it was the only customer for nuclear power. This meant 
that the decisions that the CEGB took with regard to fuel were crucial in shaping the 
development of energy sources within the UK.  This is of particular interest to this thesis as 
later chapters will show that the interest and enthusiasm of the CEGB had a direct impact 
on the success of renewable energy sources - particularly wind energy - during the 1970s 
and 1980s.  
 
  The British Electrical Authority (BEA) was created in April 1948 under its first 
chairman Lord Citrine. During the 1950s the choice of fuel became a political issue, and 
Hannah notes that throughout this time, despite the supply difficulties, the BEA believed 
that coal would continue to be the ‘fuel of choice’ for electricity generation.
51  However, 
coal shortages prompted the Government and the BEA to consider alternative fuels, such 
as oil and nuclear as the NCB officially informed the BEA that they would be unable to 
meet the rising demand for coal by the 1960s.
52 During this period the BEA had also 
investigated the potential of wind power, with proposals to build an experimental turbine 
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in Wales.
53 These plans were ultimately shelved amid local opposition on environmental 
grounds. At this point the BEA only operated one oil-fired power station at Bankside in 
London and nuclear energy was yet to make any contribution to electricity generation.  
However the warning from the NCB over future coal supplies encouraged the BEA to 
reach an agreement with ESSO on oil supplies to the new oil-fired plant at Marchwood at 
an annual loss (relative to coal) of £1.6m on the expectation that oil prices would continue 
to decline.
54  
   
  The BEA was also attracted to the potential of nuclear energy. It had ‘the technical 
appeal  of  the  new’  and  the  BEA  which  sought  a  central  role  in  its  development  was 
disappointed by the creation of the UKAEA in 1953. Clearly, the electricity industry would 
be  the  sole  commercial  customer  for  nuclear  energy  but  sensitivity  over  the  weapons 
aspect of nuclear technology caused the government to separate its operation from the 
BEA.  Ultimately  this  decision  would  cause  repeated  tension  over  almost  four  decades 
between the UKAEA, the government, and the electricity industry over the scale of the 
various nuclear programmes and the perennially thorny question of reactor choice (see 
chapter 2). In the 1970s this would have consequences for the development of renewable 
energy as the CEGB operated largely outside of the official government programme. In 
1957, following a report by the Herbert Commission, the UK electricity supply industry 
was restructured as the supply constraints began to ease.  At this point the new authority - 
the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) - controlled a vast industry with net 
assets of £1000m employing 53,000 people; this included 262 power stations and the 6000 
miles of the National Grid. The electricity Boards were selling more than half a million 
appliances annually, as the dominance of electricity for lighting was extended to space 
heating also. Massive investment in distribution and connection continued as the Grid was 
upgraded through the 1950s.
55   
 
  The reorganisation of the electricity industry coincided with the first major postwar 
energy crisis in the UK - the Suez crisis - and this period provides a useful insight into 
British attitudes to the future of inputs for electricity generation during the period. 
56 The 
events surrounding the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the subsequent disruption to 
                                            
53 TNA, FG 5/330, CEGB, England, G., ‘Power in the Wind’, A talk to the British Wind Energy Association 
at their annual conference at Cranfield, Bedfordshire, 9 April 1981 
54 Hannah, Engineers, p. 170  
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world oil supplies prompted what Chick and others have suggested was an over-reaction 
by the UK government in a massive expansion of the proposed nuclear programme.
57 This 
has to be seen in the context of a planned shift within the UK energy mix from coal to oil.  
The minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet in February 1957 summarised the situation as it 
appeared at the time.  
 
The Minister of Power said that, if we were to keep pace with a demand for 
electricity which was increasing at a rate of 7 per cent per annum, the total 
electricity output capacity installed by 1970 would need to be of the order of 
51,000 MW. There was no prospect that supplies of coal would match an 
acceleration of demand at this rate, and since it would clearly be unwise, from 
every point of view, to rely too heavily on oil-burning plant, a considerable 
expansion of the existing nuclear power programme was indicated.
58 
 
  Chick  points  to  the  ‘large  psychological  impact  on  the  geopolitical  mindset  of 
politicians’ that this (and the later Tapline crisis in 1967) had. Accordingly, in 1957 the 
new Prime Minister Harold Macmillan ordered a trebling of the nuclear programme from 
1,500 - 2000MW to 6000MW. National energy security dominated the fuel choices of the 
UK government, and by implication the CEGB, as nuclear energy moved to represent the 
key long-term fuel choice for the UK as the Government sought to ‘liberate’ themselves 
from oil ‘to the fullest possible extent’.
59 In this way the pattern of fuel choice was set for 
electricity generation in the UK for decades to come. Despite the CEGB’s attempts to 
introduce a gradual switch-over to oil-burning power stations (or dual-fire, coal and oil 
plants) the government imposed protectionist fuel tariffs that would force it to continue to 
build  coal-fired  power  plant  and  to  burn  coal.  The  government  recognised  the  coal 
industry’s reliance on the CEGB, and as Ashworth put it ‘There was thus erected a very 
special market relationship between the coal industry and the electricity supply industry’. 
60In addition, the dramatic up-scaling of the nuclear programme in 1957 (much against the 
wishes of the CEGB) would also constrain the Board’s future fuel choices.  
 
  Although  coal,  and  to  some  extent  oil,  would  continue  to  account  for  the  vast 
majority of electricity generation through to the 1970s and beyond, nuclear power came to 
dominate energy thinking in the UK to a disproportionate degree. In 1964 coal accounted 
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for 88% of electricity generation, and oil was 11%. The new chairman of the CEGB after 
1957  was  Lord  Hinton  who  had  come  to  the  Board  from  the  UKAEA.  This  was  the 
beginning of a close relationship between the two organisations, and during the period on 
which this thesis focuses, Walter Marshall moved from the UKAEA to assume control of 
the CEGB. Again, this was a somewhat unrepresentative arrangement and a similar pattern 
of related appointments did not take place with the NCB. Vast amounts of government 
money were invested by the UKAEA and the CEGB into nuclear R&D, and slowly in the 
latter part of the 1960s it began to make some contribution to electricity generation, though 
this remained a small percentage of overall energy consumption.  
 
  This section has shown how unshakeable faith in the nuclear future shaped the 
development of electricity generation in the UK from the 1950s. This grew from a delight 
in  the  new  technology  in  the  immediate  postwar  years  to  an  issue  of  national  energy 
security from the time of Suez. Awareness that coal could not meet the rising demand of 
electricity  consumption  coupled  with  unwillingness  to  depend  on  foreign  oil  supplies 
compelled the government and the CEGB to rely on coal-burning and focus on a nuclear 
energy future. In this period renewable energy made little progress in the UK other than 
the isolated attempt by the CEGB to experiment with wind energy on the Lleyn Peninsula 
in Wales during the 1950s.
61 As usual, the only exception to this was the continued and 
growing contribution of hydroelectricity. It would not be until after the first oil crisis of 
1973  that  national  governments  across  the  developed  world  would  turn  some  of  their 
attention to the ‘alternative’ energy sources.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to set the scene for the main focus of this thesis - the development 
of renewable energy technology in the UK after 1973.  In this regard it has been necessary 
to examine two key issues that influenced the period 1974-88. The first issue that this 
chapter examined is the development of electricity in the UK, from the late nineteenth 
century  and  through  the  twentieth  century.  This  has  served  to  emphasise  the  gradual 
development of a national electricity distribution system based on large, centrally-located, 
fossil-fuelled power stations, which, by the 1970s, would prove to be a massive barrier to 
the introduction of renewable sources of energy. This also emphasised the disproportionate 
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attention given to the nuclear industry during this period – and the distorting effect that this 
had on the mindset of politicians. The second issue discussed was the increase in energy 
consumption during the post-war golden age and the attendant shift in the patterns of that 
consumption. In primary energy, the move away from coal and towards oil was reflected 
throughout the developed world, as was the attempts to develop nuclear energy. 44 
Chapter 2 
Energy and Environmentalism into the 1970s 
 
In Chapter 1 the development of electricity and the growth in energy consumption 
in the UK is marked by a sense of continuity.  Coinciding with the post-war ‘golden age’ 
of economic growth and prosperity energy supply grew to meet increasing demand for 
electricity along a largely uninterrupted path of development within the National Grid. But 
by the beginning of the 1970s this pattern was beginning to unravel. In the UK, exogenous 
shocks - most significantly for this thesis the 1973 oil crisis combined with a long list of 
internal socio-economic factors to create a new set of imperatives for energy in the UK. 
For energy these internal factors included political upheaval, repeated industrial unrest in 
the coal industry, the discovery of North Sea oil and gas, decisions over the choice of 
reactor  for  the  new  nuclear  programme,  and  the  emergence  of  the  ‘new 
environmentalism’.
1  This  chapter  will  set  the  context  for  the  remainder  of  this  thesis 
through a brief examination and evaluation of how these individual factors combined to 
create the conditions for the creation of the UK renewable energy programme after 1974, 
with a particular focus on the crucial impact of the new environmentalism.   
 
   Although subsequent chapters will show that renewable energy was subsequently 
judged within a dominant and rigid energy paradigm in the UK, this thesis argues that 
increasing social pressure from the new environmentalism in the UK was an important 
factor in explaining the creation of a UK renewable energy programme. Moreover it is also 
clear that much of the motivation for many of the developers within, and outwith, the 
programme was founded on environmental concern. Recent work by Sine and Lee has 
explored the effect of social/environmental movements on the creation of new industries 
(mainly  in  renewable  energy).
2  They  produce  compelling  evidence  that  wind  energy 
development in the United States was legitimised and advanced through environmentally-
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focused social pressure groups acting as ‘disrupters of institutionalised arrangements’.
3 I 
suggest that a similar process took place in the UK, particularly for wave and wind power.  
The broad coalition of interest groups that formed the new environmental movement in the 
UK was the only social grouping that demonstrated any interest in energy matters during 
the period and through newly-formed organised campaigning groups such as Friends of the 
Earth  UK  (FoE  UK),  Greenpeace  and  the  Socialist  Environment  and  Resources 
Association (SERA) it exerted telling social pressure on government.
4 
 
This  period  was  prior  to  any  widespread  awareness  of  the  effects  of  carbon 
emissions  and  climate  change,  and  as  will  be  seen  this  concern  was  focused  on  an 
opposition to nuclear power, industrial pollution, and the depletion of fossil fuels. This 
chapter will use a brief case study of the coverage given to energy by the most influential 
environmental publication of the period, The Ecologist magazine, and will also consider 
the related emergence of the Alternative Technology movement in the UK. This will give a 
flavour of environmentalists’ views on energy in the UK and will show how these views 
had an influence on the development of renewable energy after 1974.  
 
UK energy in the seventies 
At the end of October 1973, the Golden Age, which had limped on through a declining 
world  economy  finally  collapsed.
5  In  1971  the  end  of  the  post-war  Bretton  Woods 
agreement of fixed exchange rates had seemed to confirm that the world was entering a 
new and less certain era.
6  It has now become the customary historical periodisation to end 
the Golden Age in 1973 as the first oil crisis of the 1970s hit.
7  This had had the effect of 
creating  an  intuitive  causative  link  between  much  of  the  turmoil  of  the  1970s  to  the 
decision by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to raise the price 
of  crude  oil.  Whilst  there  were  undoubtedly  other  factors  to  blame  for  the  general 
economic decline (particularly since many of the problems pre-date the oil crisis) it is right 
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to conclude that the oil crisis heightened awareness of energy issues in general.
8  However, 
‘energy’ as an issue had already begun to creep up the political agenda in Britain and 
elsewhere.  Although I will show that the growth in new environmentalism accounts for 
much of this heightened awareness, it was also in some part due to the upward spiral of 
wages and prices and the government’s controversial and complex Industrial Relations Act 
which provoked confrontation with the unions.
9 Strike action by miners in 1972, targeting 
power stations, resulted in power cuts that both emphasised to consumers an overwhelming 
reliance on energy and highlighted its vulnerability.  
 
  By 1970 oil had overtaken coal as the main source of fuel in the UK accounting for 
nearly 48 per cent of primary energy consumption against just over 44 per cent for coal. 
Natural gas had risen from 0.7 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 1965 to 10.2 Mtoe 
in 1970 and now made up nearly 5 percent of energy consumption.
10 This was due mainly 
to the discovery of oil in the North Sea in the 1960s.
11 Nuclear power had also grown, to 
nearly  3  per  cent  of  primary  energy  consumption,  as  the  reactors  of  the  UK’s  second 
nuclear programme went critical. In twenty years, from a time when British coal supplied 
over 90 per cent of fuel needs, Britain had become overwhelmingly dependent on imports 
for  its  energy  needs.  By  1970  imports  constituted  107.4  per  cent  of  primary  energy 
consumption in the UK.
12  In the era of cheap energy this was seen as little problem, but as 
the economic climate began to worsen in the early 1970s this sanguine outlook changed. 
Energy consumption in Britain, which had grown by over 10 per cent since 1965, began to 
stagnate as Table 2.1 illustrates. Between 1970 and 1971 coal consumption dropped by 
nearly 11 Mtoe, a gap that was filled mostly by natural gas from the North Sea.  
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Table 2.1 
UK Primary Energy Consumption, 1965-1975 (Mtoe) 
  1965  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975 
Oil  74.2  103.6  104.3  110.5  113.2  105.3  92.0 
Coal  117.4  96.0  85.1  74.5  80.7  71.1  71.5 
Natural Gas  0.7  10.2  16.4  23.3  25.2  30.1  31.6 
Nuclear  3.4  5.9  6.2  6.6  6.3  7.6  8.2 
Hydro  1.1  1.3  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1 
Total consumption  196.8  216.9  213.0  216.0  226.5  215.1  203.1 
 
Source:  BP,  Statistical  Review  of  World  Energy  2007, 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical
_energy_review_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/spreadsheets/statistical_review_full_report_workb
ook_2007.xls [accessed 20 June 2007] 
 
 
A detailed analysis of the economic turmoil in the 1970s lie outwith the scope of 
this thesis but some sense of the scale and impact of high inflation and high unemployment 
is  essential.  Table  2.2  summarises  two  of  the  key  economic  indicators,  inflation  and 
unemployment, which when considered together offer evidence of the precarious position 
of the UK economy in the first part of the 1970s. It is clear that even before the inflation 
increases  caused  by  the  rise  in  oil  prices  after  1973  that  the  Golden  Age  was  rapidly 
grinding to a halt. 
 
Table 2.2 
UK inflation and unemployment, 1970-1975 (annual rate) 
  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975 
Inflation rate  7.2  9.3  8.5  7.0  15.0  27.2 
Unemployment rate*  17.6  15.9  20.4  26.9  21.6  13.7 
 
* Long term – defined as in excess of 12 months 
Sources: Schulze, M., and Woodward, N., ‘The emergence of rapid inflation’ in Coopey, R., and Woodward, 
N., (eds.) Britain in the 1970s: The Troubled Economy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); Woodward, N., 
‘The retreat from full employment’ in Coopey, R., and Woodward, N., (eds.) Britain in the 1970s: The 
Troubled Economy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996) 
 
 
The oil price shock   
On  October  16  1973,  ten  days  after  the  outbreak  of  the  fourth  Arab-Israeli  war,  the 
members  of  OPEC  met  in  Kuwait.  The  Yom  Kippur  War  was  to  have  the  most  far-
reaching  consequences  of  any  of  the  previous  conflicts  coinciding  as  it  did  with  the 48 
increasing shift in power away from the oil companies and towards the oil-producing Arab 
States.
13 OPEC was keen to flex its muscles and punish the West (though mainly the 
United States) for the support it was giving Israel in the conflict. At the meeting Iran 
pushed for an immediate hike in the price of crude oil and the other members agreed. The 
increase agreed was 70 percent on the posted price, taking the cost per barrel from $2.90 in 
mid-1973  to  $5.12.
14  The  next  day  the  members  of  OAPEC  (Organisation  of  Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) decided to increase the impact of the price increase by 
simultaneously reducing production by 5 percent a month, and applying an embargo on 
selected countries that were seen to be offering significant support to Israel. In theory these 
measures were to apply until Israel returned behind its pre-1967 borders. In December 
OPEC met again and once again prompted by Iran the price was raised to $11.65. This 
then constituted a four-fold increase in the price of crude oil over a matter of months.
15 Just 
as James Akins and others had predicted earlier, it seemed that this time the ‘Wolf’ had 
most definitely arrived.
16  
 
    By early November 1973 the government had drawn up contingency plans 
for petrol rationing following an 18 per cent drop in the amount of Arab oil reaching the 
world’s market.
17 They also urged motorists to comply with a voluntary 50 mph speed 
restriction. Petrol rationing was not introduced officially though many retailers imposed 
their own systems in order to conserve stocks.
18 In January the government announced the 
creation of a new Department of Energy (DoEn) under Lord Carrington.
19 The concerns 
over oil prices were overtaken in February 1974 by political events in the UK, as Heath 
once again facing down the mineworkers asked the country with palpable exasperation, 
‘Who Governs Britain?’
20 The resulting defeat for the Tories provided the answer. The 
new  Labour  Energy  Minister,  Eric  Varley,  announced  in  March  1974  that  the  energy 
restrictions that had been placed on industry were to be lifted.
21  Despite large increases in 
the cost of energy to the final consumer in 1974 (see Chart 2.1) the interruption to supplies 
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proved  to  be  a  temporary  phenomenon.  Varley,  who  was  closely  associated  with  coal 
mining, (he was sponsored by the National Union of Mineworkers)
22 was now faced with 
the ‘impossible nuclear decision’.
23  
 
Chart 2.1  
Per capita expenditure on energy by final consumers, 1970-75 (annual percentage 
increase) 
 
Source: abstracted from, DTI/DoEn, Digest of Energy Statistics, 1971-76 
 
 
Nuclear energy: the CEGB reactor decision 
The day before OPEC met in Kuwait, the Guardian carried a story on its front page by its 
energy  correspondent,  Peter  Rodgers.  Rodgers  wrote  that  the  CEGB  was  planning  to 
abandon the British Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor (AGR) and import the controversial 
American Light Water Reactor (LWR) for its future programme of reactor development.
24 
This ‘calculated leak’
25 was a complete reversal of its earlier position, which had rejected 
the  American  reactor  on  economic  and  safety  grounds;  although  Arthur  Hawkins, 
chairman of the CEGB, had earlier expressed disappointment in the AGR in terms of cost 
and construction difficulty.
 26 The appearance of the story caused an immediate reaction.
27 
During the 1960s the nuclear industry and the government had carried on a lengthy debate 
barely reported by the press and largely ignored by the public about the choice of reactor 
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for Britain’s second nuclear programme. The debate had split broadly between those that 
favoured  the  British  designed  AGRs  and  those  that  wanted  to  import  the  newer  US 
designed LWR. The arguments ebbed and flowed over several years in the 1960s before 
the government arrived at a decision to support the British designed reactor. This design of 
reactor and the extent of the programme to build them was then more or less set for the 
coming  years.  Earlier,  in  August  1972,  Hawkins  had  appeared  before  a  government 
committee and summarised the Board’s future requirements. 
 
If we take 3 ½ per cent annum growth – which, as I remind you, is a little 
higher than the average over the last three to four years – we should only 
require 19,500 megawatts of additional plant, of which 15,500 have already 
been  committed.  Therefore  we  would  only  require  4,000  megawatts  more 
plant. That would mean in this period for commissioning until after 1980 only 
three  new  station  starts,  of  which  one  would  probably  be  nuclear    -  and 
probably the fast breeder. 
28 
 
A range of concerns about the LWR had surfaced during the 1960s that remained 
unresolved  in  the  1970s,  not  least  of  which  was  safety.  Therefore  the  British  nuclear 
programme had avoided consideration of the US designed LWR built by Westinghouse in 
favour of British designed reactors. It was a shock, therefore, when Rodgers uncovered 
news of this complete change of heart at the CEGB and this was exacerbated by the OPEC 
announcement  that  followed  within  days.  Therefore  an  issue  that  may  have  otherwise 
drifted down into the ‘private’ political realm from whence it had emerged became ‘topical 
and controversial’ and was thrust onto the front pages.
29 The oil crisis had transformed 
energy into a hot political topic and the decision by the CEGB was its first unwilling 
target.  
 
  The Select Committee on Science and Technology (SCST), since its creation by the 
‘white heat’ Labour government in December 1966, had conducted several enquiries into 
the nuclear industry by 1973.
30 Having only just produced a lengthy report in June 1973 
titled Nuclear Power Policy it was now concerned by reports of the change of heart by the 
CEGB over the choice of reactor, and by December 1973 it had set up an official enquiry. 
When Arthur Hawkins appeared in front of the committee he added to their concerns by 
announcing that contrary to his earlier forecast of perhaps only one new nuclear plant 
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being required up to 1980, he now estimated that nine nuclear power plants would be 
required in the period 1974-79 and a further nine in the period 1980-83. He based this on a 
growth  in  electricity  demand  of  4¾  per  cent  per  annum  up  to  1980  and  5¼  per  cent 
thereafter; a drastic revision of his forecast in August 1972 of a 3½ per cent increase.
31  
Hawkins  insisted  that  this  was  not  a  knee-jerk  reaction  to  the  oil  crisis  and  instead 
explained that it was simply the right time to act in light of a projected deterioration in coal 
and oil supplies. Indeed he was adamant that the plans had been devised before the oil 
price rise as he claimed the subtle distinction that this was not a ‘panic’ measure, but a 
‘crash’ programme.
32  
 
The problems with the AGR reactor were well known by this time. Britain’s second 
nuclear  programme  was  launched  in  1964  (and  increased  in  1965  by  the  Wilson 
government) to build four new nuclear plants with a capacity of 8,000MW (see table 2.3). 
By 1966 building had started on the first reactor, yet at the end of 1973 none of these 
plants had been completed.
33 Indeed the first plant begun in 1966 at Hinkley Point would 
not be operational until 1976. Costs, already increasing due to construction difficulties, had 
been  further  exacerbated  by  high  inflation  in  the  1970s.  Therefore  the  decision  of  the 
CEGB to abandon the AGR was not wholly surprising. What was shocking to many was 
that it favoured the import of American technology as an alternative. The Economist saw a 
clear connection between the CEGB’s decision and the oil crisis and called the ‘crash’ 
programme ‘just plain silly’. They argued that there was no need for such a programme 
given the imminent flow of oil from the North Sea.
34  After lengthy enquiries into the 
choice of reactor and the extent of the new programme the government finally made an 
announcement in July 1974. Eric Varley stated that there was to be a programme of no 
more than 4,000MW of capacity over four years and the chosen reactor was to be the 
British SGHWR.  
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33 The Economist, ‘Why they forgot about nuclear power’ 12 January 1974, p.74 
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Table 2.3 
Nuclear Programmes: Britain 1953-78 
Programme  Year  Capacity (GW)  Proposed completion date 
I  1955  1.5 - 2  10 years 
Ia  1957  5-6  1965 
Ib  1957  5-6  1966 
Ic  1960  5  1968 
II  1964  5  1975 
IIa  1965  8  1975 
III  1974  4  1978 
IIIa  1978    1980s 
Iv  1979  15  1982-91 
 
Source: Williams, Decisions 
 
Coal  
The crises in oil and nuclear were set amidst continued turmoil in the coal industry in the 
period at the end of 1973. The numbers of miners employed by the National Coal Board 
(NCB) had fallen from around 700,000 in 1957 to about 300,000 in 1970 and through the 
1960s miners had looked on with bewilderment as their wages declined relative to other 
industrial workers.
35 This disquiet combined with rapid price inflation in the early 1970s 
resulted in a national strike in January 1972 that threatened to cripple supplies to Britain’s 
power stations. The Conservative government caved in after a very short time and awarded 
the miners record pay rises. However by late in 1973 rising inflation and insecurity were 
once again urging the miners towards industrial action. The oil crisis helped to exacerbate 
a further crisis as it created a strong bargaining position for mineworkers during the period. 
By early February 1974 the NUM had called a national strike and the government was 
forced to call a state of emergency and quickly introduced a three-day week. 
 
  In this period coal remained the major source of power for Britain’s electricity 
generation (see Chart 2.2) but came to be largely overlooked in the ensuing debate which 
focused  on  oil  and  nuclear.  From  1970  oil  had  begun  to  replace  coal  in  electricity 
generation,  whilst  nuclear  remained  largely  static  due  to  problems  in  getting  its  new 
reactors operational. Despite this fact the ensuing energy debate did not include a great 
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deal of discussion about coal as a viable fuel for the future. Long before fossil fuels were 
to become identified as the primary cause of global warming, the economic costs of coal 
burning were forcing it down the UK energy mix. 
 
Chart 2.2 
Fuel input for electricity generation, 1970-75 (Mtoe) 
 
Source: Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 
http://stats.berr.gov.uk/energystats/dukes5_1_1.xls  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54 
The ‘new environmentalism’  
A brief survey of the history of the development of renewable energy technology prior to 
1973, as recounted in Chapter 1, appears a rather inevitable tale of technological progress, 
such  as  Winner  described  as  being  ‘governed  by  a  powerful,  stultifying  orthodoxy’.
36 
Feenberg encapsulates the challenge for the historian in this in this comment,  
 
…once  the  black  box  is  closed,  its  social  origins  are  quickly  forgotten. 
Looking back from that later standpoint, the artefact appears purely technical, 
even inevitable.
37   
 
  It has now been well established that social processes are hugely important in the 
‘promotion, selection, and development’ of new technologies.
38 Many scholars, among 
them  Thomas  P.  Hughes,  Nathan  Rosenberg,  Langdon  Winner,  and  David  Nye,  have 
written extensively on the social aspects of technological development – and a number of 
these have also given specific consideration to the development of energy technologies. In 
Chapter 1, this social background to innovation and development in renewable technology 
was not explored. This failure is partly a result of the constraints of space and focus, and 
partly it is caused by the lack of an accurate record.  Ultimately we are forced to speculate 
as to the reason why the wealthy American electrical entrepreneur Charles F. Brush spent 
so much time and money developing a wind turbine for his backyard in Cleveland, Ohio, at 
a time when coal (and wood) was cheap and plentiful (see Appendix I). The inventions of 
Brush, and many others, appear to spring spontaneously from their drawing boards, live a 
brief life, and then fade into obscurity.  For the period beginning after the first oil price 
shock in 1973 we have the opportunity to present a very much more nuanced picture of 
technological development in renewable energy which in this research takes account of the 
social pressure exerted by the new environmentalism.  
 
  The  search  for  the  origins  of  environmental  thought  can  extend  far  back  into 
history.
39    The  environmentalists  of  the  1960s  and  70s  included  many  strands  that 
combined to present an often incongruous ‘front’ in what the more radical groups saw as 
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‘the  battle  for  the  planet’.  This  section  will  explore  the  direct  antecedents  of  the  new 
British environmentalism of the early 1970s.  
 
The Sixties – Planet Earth 
In the 1960s the environmental debate became global for the first time. Sheail presents the 
view that the twentieth century is conventionally divided up by its two world wars but also 
perhaps by,  
 
...a  third  staging  point  at  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  in  1989.  But  an 
environmental perspective, and a good deal of hindsight, might also bring to 
the fore the years leading up to 1970. As well as pictures of the oil-stricken 
Cornish  beaches  and  wildlife,  television  and  the  press  gave  particular 
prominence  to  the  thalidomide  scandal….It  was  a  time  of  marked 
disenchantment  with  science  and  technology,  as  developed  through  ‘big 
business’ and government. 
40 
 
  There was a range of factors that were all framed in, and accelerated by, the more 
radical mood of the decade. Criticism and rejection of the nuclear programme, which was 
begun in the 1950s both in Britain and the United States, became an important element of 
the growing ‘counter culture’.
41 And all over the world people were also struck by the first 
images of the earth beamed back from the Apollo missions, which made the planet seem 
small  and  somewhat  vulnerable.
42  In  the  US,  landmark  environmental  publications 
punctuated  social  events  like  the  Vietnam  protests  and  the  civil  rights  marches  and 
environmental catastrophes like the Torrey Canyon in 1967, lending a more radical tone to 
the American movement.
43 The appearance of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 is 
generally  accepted  as  a  key  moment  in  the  development  of  the  new  environmentalist 
movement that was to follow. 
44 ‘More than any other single document, it established the 
term and the idea “environment” in common usage’. 
45 
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pp. 23-25 
45 Lamb, Promising, p.23 56 
  One explanation for the enthusiastic reception that Silent Spring received may be 
found in a vague sense of unease that some environmental groups were beginning to voice 
over economic ‘progress’ – a feeling that also ran through the formation of the earliest 
preservation groups in the nineteenth century. In Silent Spring Carson’s concern was the 
use of pesticides and the potential harm that these caused to humans and animals. Carson 
was  herself  a  scientist  and  the  thrust  of  her  study  was  not  ‘anti-science’  but  rather  a 
critique of the uncontrolled use of new technology and the collusion of the state, in the 
form of public officials, in covering up the potential harms of that technology. It was this 
theme that arguably caught the imagination of the public rather than a specific concern 
over DDT.  In particular, this strong political theme contributed in igniting the radical 
imagination of young people in 1960s America and beyond and contributed to the growth 
of the new environmentalism.
46 
 
  The post-war cultural influence of the United States was cast widely and extended 
into a reshaping the thrust of British environmentalism after 1970. The strength of anti-
capitalistic  rhetoric  grew  and  became  a  feature  of  many  influential  environmental 
publications. As multinational business spread throughout the 1960s, particularly from the 
United  States,  and  concern  over  the  ‘Third  World’  developed,  there  appeared  to  be  a 
growing sense of discomfort with global inequality. More than twenty years after the end 
of the war the industrialised nations had recovered and made historic progress in raising 
the  living  standards  of  their  populations.  However,  similar  to  the  concerns  over  the 
‘population bomb’,
47 the rate of this unprecedented economic growth began to worry many 
and  Malthusian  concerns  were  raised  about  how  long  this  growth  could  be  sustained.  
Disquiet over economic growth combined with concern over the environment was found in 
the  work  of  several  influential  British  economists  writing  in  the  period.
48  One  of  the 
earliest was from Barbara Ward, a former Economist contributor, who wrote Spaceship 
Earth  in  1966.  The  book  set  out  a  very  early  version  of  the  case  for  sustainable 
development.
49  Significantly,  as  an  indication  of  the  general  mood  of  the  period,  the 
‘spaceship’ analogy came from a speech that Adlai Stevenson had given to the UN in 1965 
inspired by images of the earth as seen from space. 
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We  travel  together,  passengers  on  a  little  space-ship,  dependent  on  its 
vulnerable  supplies  of  air  and  soil;  all  committed  for  our  safety  on  its 
security and peace, preserved from annihilation only by the care, the work, 
and I say the love, we give our fragile craft.
50   
 
   Ward, who along with Rene Dubos was later to make a significant contribution to 
the landmark 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), was 
certainly  not  the  first  to  view  the  planet  as  an  interdependent  system,  but  within  the 
established British tradition of amenity and conservation, her prominence and influence 
allowed her to widen the traditional environmental debate in the UK to include wider, 
global  issues.
51  Her  analysis  also  formed  an  early  example  of  some  of  the  emerging 
differences  between  the  US  version  of  the  debate  and  the  British  version.  The  central 
argument of Spaceship Earth was presented in careful, non-sensational language, which 
was echoed in much of the later British contributions. Her view of whole-world systems 
(made more famous later by James Lovelock and his Gaia hypothesis) became widespread 
as support for environmental issues gathered pace through the late 1960s. 
 
The incongruence of industrial development and nature remained a central theme of 
environmentalism and created a clear, if indirect, link between the two. In the twentieth 
century,  as  the  spread  of  industrial  development  slowed,  the  most  tangible  effect  of 
industry  remained  in  its  polluting  impacts.  Air  and  water  pollution  began  to  concern 
environmental groups, and prompted the earliest environmental legislation. Arguably, this 
also  had  the  effect  of  establishing  a  strong  connection  between  energy  and  the 
environment, as the burning of fossils fuels, the production of town gas, and the expansion 
in transport grew into the issues of the later twentieth century. Concern about air and water 
pollution had been a feature of many urban philanthropic ventures since the nineteenth 
century but the direct relationship between energy and environmentalism was first seen in 
the 1950s when the National Smoke Abatement Society (NSAS) campaigned successfully 
for environmental legislation. The NSAS was formed in 1929 with aims made admirably 
clear  by  its  name  and  had  a  diverse  membership  which  included  individuals,  local 
authorities, and in an early example of energy tokenism, the National Coal Board (NCB).
52 
Following the ‘great London fog’ of 1952, said to have been responsible for 4,000 deaths, 
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the government set up an inquiry that resulted eventually in the Clean Air Act of 1956.
53 
Although the target of this legislation was not the coal industry per se, the legislation 
created ‘smokeless zones’ and created further problems for coal in its battle with ‘cleaner’ 
oil  as  both  domestic  and  industrial  consumers  were  forced  through  legislation  to  re-
evaluate their fuel choices.    
 
 The depletion of natural resources also developed into a central issue of 1960s 
environmentalism,  which  would  find  later  expression  in  the  landmark  environmental 
publications  of  the  early  1970s.
54  The  argument  was  closely  related  to  the  Malthusian 
perspective on population and food, and posited that a growing population, which in the 
developed West was also growing richer and consuming more, would eventually run out of 
the  earth’s  natural  resources.  Nobody  could  disagree  over  the  finite  nature  of  natural 
resources,  and  this  made  this  ‘common  sense’  element  of  the  environmental  position 
particularly compelling to the wider public. Concern over the depletion of fuel sources had 
a  long  history  in  Britain  dating  back  to  Jevons’,  The  Coal  Question,  in  1856,  which 
speculated over the ‘probable exhaustion of our coal-mines’.
55 One hundred years later the 
American  geologist,  M.  King  Hubbert,  would  posit  the  same  dilemma  for  oil.
56  The 
questions over the depletion of non-renewable resources were given greater prominence by 
the nuclear lobby that were keen to use the threat of a disappearing resource to ‘sell’ the 
benefits of new and bountiful energy supply. Supporters of nuclear power encouraged the 
growth in concern over the pollution emitted from oil and coal-fired power stations in a 
further  effort  to  highlight  the  ‘clean’  efficiency  of  the  ‘alternative  energy’  of  nuclear 
generation.
57  
 
  By  the  end  of  the  1960s  energy,  though  not  yet  a  central  theme  of 
environmentalism had risen in prominence within the debate. It had entered through a 
variety  of  channels  including  warnings  over  air  pollution,  resource  depletion,  nuclear 
power,  and  energy  security.  However,  environmentalists  had  little  to  offer  in  terms  of 
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alternatives at this time. The nuclear question, which by this time was nearly twenty years 
old, produced contradictory and largely unscientific responses from environmental groups. 
However, as 1970 introduced the new environmentalism to Britain the question of energy 
was to become more central to environmental identity. 
 
Into the Seventies – Limits to Growth? 
 
Table 2.4 
Membership of environmental groups  
 
UK Groups  1970  1971  1975  1980 
Greenpeace  -  -  -  10000 
Friends of the Earth  -  1000  5,000
a  12000 
World Wildlife Fund  -  12000  -  51000 
Ramblers Assoc.  -  22000  -  36000 
National Trust  226000  278000  500000  950000 
RSPB  38,000
b  98000    321000 
RSNC    64000    140000 
CPRE     21000    27000 
US Groups         
Sierra Club  113000  -  147000  182000 
Environmental Defense Fund  11000  -  37000  46000 
Environmental Action  3500  -  -  21000 
 
a-1976; b- 1967 CPRE – Campaign to Protect Rural England; RSNC – Royal Society for Nature 
Conservation: RSPB – Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
 
Sources: Bosso, C. J., ‘Rethinking the Concept of Membership in Nature Advocacy Organizations’, Policy 
Studies Journal, Vol. 31 (2003)  p.400, table 2; Connelly & Smith, Politics, p.69, table 3.1; Garner, 
Environmental, p.23, table 7.1; Robinson, Greening, p.45, table 1; Lowe & Goyder, Environmental Groups, 
p.133, table 7.2; McCormick, British Politics, p.33. 
 
 
 
The period 1970-1973 was a good time to be an environmentalist in Britain. Events 
on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  such  as  Earth  Day  1970  in  the  United  States
58  and  The 
Countryside  in  1970  series  (1963-70)  in  Britain  signified  the  increasing  interest  in 
environmental problems. Growing political recognition of environmental issues was also 
evident with the establishment in Britain of the Department of the Environment (DoE) in 
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1970, four years before the Department of Energy (DoEn) would be created.
59 This period 
also saw the formation of influential environmental campaigning groups such as Friends of 
the Earth in the UK (FoE UK) and a little later, Greenpeace.
60  According to a range of 
views the new environmental movement reached an initial peak in 1972,
61 culminating in 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), which took place in 
Stockholm  during  the  summer  of  1972.
62  Though  Table  2.4  shows  that  membership 
continued  to  grow  through  the  1970s.  The  Stockholm  Conference  gave  international 
recognition to environmental problems and lent further credibility to the views of the new 
environmental  movement.  Furthermore  it  allowed  the  many  grassroots  activists  who 
attended the conference, direct access to influential political figures.
63 
 
  Coinciding  with  the  Stockholm  Conference  was  the  appearance  of  the 
groundbreaking environmental text The Limits to Growth (LTG), which has been called 
‘the foundation-stone of Green political thinking’.
64  Sponsored by The Club of Rome and 
produced  by  a  team  of  scientists  at  MIT,  LTG  is  perhaps  the  most  famous  of  all 
environmental texts, despite competing with many other such publications in the period.
65 
It has attracted many critical responses since its publication in 1972 and its impact has 
been exhaustively charted.
66  Based on complex (for the time) computer models, its ‘eco-
doom’ conclusions called for immediate action and set the tone for Stockholm and after.  
 
                                            
59 The Conservative Government established the Department of the Environment in Britain in 1970. This was 
the first such department among any of the industrialised nations. 
60 Lamb, Promising ; Bohlen, J., Making Waves: The Origins and Future of Greenpeace (London: Black 
Rose Books, 2001); Wilson, D.,  (ed.) The Environmental Crisis: A Handbook for all Friends of the Earth 
(London: Heinemann, 1984); Weyler, R., Greenpeace: How A Group of Ecologists, Journalists and 
Visionaries Changed the World (London: Rodale Press, 2004)  
61 Sills, ‘Movement’; M. Allaby, interview with author, 24 July 2007; J. Elkington, interview with author, 3 
August 2007.  
62 Ward and Dubos, Only One Earth. This volume provides a report of the proceedings.  
63 Interview, M. Allaby, 24 July 2007 
64 Dobson, A.,  (ed.), The Green Reader (London: Andre Deutsch, 1991) p.13 
65 Sills, ‘Movement’, p.1. The author states that ‘some 300 books on the environment, on ecology, and on 
pollution were published in the United States in 1972 alone’. 
66 Meadows et al, Limits; D. Meadows et al, The Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update (London: Earthscan, 
2005). Some of the responses include, Beckerman, W., In Defence of Economic Growth (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1974); University of Sussex. Science Policy Research Unit, Thinking about the Future: A Critique of 
The Limits to Growth, H. S. D. Cole, et al (eds.), (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973); Sandbach, F., ‘The Rise 
and Fall of the Limits to Growth debate’ Social Studies of Science, Vol. 8, No. 4, (Nov., 1978) pp. 495-520; 
Galtung, J.,  ‘‘The Limits to Growth’ and Class Politics’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 10, No. 1/2.  
(1973) pp. 101-114; Kaysen, C.,  ‘The Computer that printed out W*O*L*F*’ Foreign Affairs, 50:4 (1972: 
July); Golub, R., and Townsend, J., ‘Malthus, Multinationals and the Club of Rome’, Social Studies of 
Science, Vol. 7, No. 2, Theme Issue: Citation Studies of Scientific Specialities. (May, 1977), pp. 201-222; 
Schoijet, M., ‘Limits to Growth and the rise of Catastrophism’, Environmental History, Vol.4, Part. 4 (1999) 
pp. 515-30 61 
  In  Britain,  the  new  environmental  movement  was  served  by  the  appearance  of 
several important magazines, as well as growing support from existing, well-respected 
publications such as New Scientist. The first of these, Resurgence, appeared in 1966 and 
was the creation of John Papworth who had been involved with CND and other pacifist 
groups since the 1950s.  It was (and remains) an eclectic mix of pacifism, anarchy, and 
poetry, which soon began to reflect the growth of new environmentalism in Britain.  By the 
late 1960s articles by influential figures such as Fritz Schumacher were appearing, as the 
magazine began to consider in more depth the issues around nuclear power. The growing 
awareness of environmental issues is reflected in the appearance by 1970 of two magazines 
explicitly devoted to environmental issues –Your Environment, which appeared first in 
December 1969, and The Ecologist in July 1970.  A small group that included the poet Ted 
Hughes started Your Environment. Although it was an exceedingly modest operation the 
magazine  included  contributions  from  key  figures  in  the  environmental  movement, 
including  the  nuclear  physicist  Walt  Patterson  (later  of  FoE  UK),  who  was  heavily 
involved with the magazine from 1970.
67 The Ecologist, although beaten to publication by 
Your Environment by a few months, arguably made a more telling and lasting contribution 
to new environmentalism in the Britain in the early part of the decade, shaping much of the 
ensuing debate.  
 
The Ecologist: ‘tub-thumping for the environment’ 
68 
The coverage that The Ecologist devoted to energy-related matters fell into three broad 
categories;  a)  nuclear  safety  and  waste,  b)  resource  depletion,  and  c)  alternative 
technology.  The  nuclear  safety  debate  had  widened  in  the  1960s,  influenced  by  the 
publication  of  a  range  of  titles  in  the  United  States,  which  reflected  the  growing 
polarisation of the debate.
69 The position of new environmentalism – and The Ecologist - 
was clear in its firm opposition to civil nuclear fission power on the familiar grounds of 
safety, but also increasingly on the issue of waste disposal also. Concern about these issues 
grew  and  the  announcements  such  as  the  plans  to  build  nuclear  power  stations  at 
Fessenheim in the Alsace region caused some reaction in Britain.
70 However, the number 
of articles declined as the arguments lined up against nuclear energy arguably became 
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repetitive and, perhaps, ineffective. Britain’s nuclear programme had stuttered to a halt due 
to  delays  in  completing  AGR  reactors  and  therefore  it  provided  little  ammunition  to 
environmentalists. The main difficulty for The Ecologist in its opposition to nuclear energy 
in the period was its simultaneous acceptance of the realistic potential of nuclear fusion.  
As  later  editorials  made  clear,  the  magazine  ‘concedes  the  possibility  of  unlimited 
energy’.
71 Indeed Peter Bunyard wrote,  
 
In theory there is unlimited energy in the world. All man has to do is to build 
breeder  reactors  and  to  achieve  thermo-nuclear  fusion  on  a  commercial 
scale.
72 
 
  This view created a clear dilemma for the magazine and may explain partly why it 
chose to largely avoid the topic of nuclear energy in its editorials. This concession also had 
an impact on the magazine’s coverage of depletion issues, particularly the specific concern 
about  the  depletion  of  fossil  fuels,  which  was  largely  absent  from  the  pages  of  the 
magazine in favour of a focus on the more general depletion of ‘natural resources’. The 
March 1972 editorial provides a clear example of this, in which Robert Allen defended 
BFS from the stern attack by John Maddox, editor of the respected journal Nature.
73 After 
challenging  Maddox’s  criticisms  of  the  BFS  view  on  population,  Allen  ponders  the 
question of whether there are ‘enough raw materials for 10 billion people, all consuming as 
much  as  we  do  today?’  He  immediately  clarifies  that  ‘he  is  not  thinking  of  energy 
resources’ before moving on to a discussion of metals.
74 
 
  However, by 1973 increasing mentions of energy appeared in the editorial content 
of The Ecologist. This can be explained to some extent by presentational changes in the 
magazine  as  the  single  author  editorial  was  (temporarily)  abandoned  and  the  wider 
interests of the editorial team were reflected more.
75 However, this increase in coverage is 
matched by a similar increase in the coverage of energy-related topics in the feature article 
section of the magazine. In this particular year, in the pre-oil crisis period, we see the 
magazine’s  first  editorial  devoted  entirely  to  energy  policy
76,  two  editorials  with  a 
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significant contribution on energy policy
77, and two further editorials that contain several 
references  to  energy.
78  Peter  Bunyard  was  the  main  contributor  of  this  energy-related 
editorial material, as he was with the feature articles on energy in the period, and it was his 
editorial contribution in the March 1973 issue that raised the issue of energy policy for the 
first time in the magazine.  
 
  The short piece, entitled ‘It’s never too late to be a coalman’, is a response to the 
government  announcement  of  additional  support  for  coal  mining  in  February  1973.
79 
Bunyard used the announcement to compare the merits of Britain’s traditional fuel source 
with  other  sources,  in  particular  oil  and  nuclear  power.  He  suggested,  perhaps  rather 
presciently, that coal ‘will be the only source of primary energy on which Britain will be 
able to rely with any degree of certainty by the turn of the century’.  Bunyard justified his 
argument by pointing to the ‘limited’ resources of oil and natural gas in the North Sea and 
by describing the nuclear industry ‘in chaos’. He went further in his criticism of British 
energy policy in the North Sea by suggesting that ‘total costs of exploration, production 
and  running  costs  over  the  next  10  years…are  likely  to  run  to  a  minimum  of  £2,500 
million.  The  25,000  new  jobs  anticipated  by  the  North  East  of  Scotland  Development 
Association will need an investment of £10,000 each.’
80  This is an interesting departure 
for The Ecologist on two fronts. Firstly, it was the first appearance of a debate about a 
specific energy-related government policy, and secondly it was beginning to discuss the 
economics of energy.   
 
  The first editorial devoted entirely to energy policy appeared in the May issue of 
1973 (3:5), written by Peter Bunyard titled ‘The Energy Crisis’. Set against a background 
of ‘crippling strikes taking place within a year of each other in the power stations, the 
coalmines and in the gas industry’, which, he argued, give some idea of the impact of 
energy shortages in ‘our industrial society’, he offers a critique of the absence of energy 
planning  in  Britain.  Although  once  again  conceding  the  ‘unlimited  energy’  available 
through  nuclear  power,  this  editorial  offered  a  much  more  specific  argument  directed 
against the safety issues of nuclear reactors - in particular the American LWR. Bunyard 
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was more positive about the safety of the ‘gas-cooled, graphite moderated reactors used in 
Britain’ but he emphasized the indecision of the British nuclear programme which he felt 
would fail to provide ‘a viable alternative’ in the face of rising prices among other fuels. In 
many ways this editorial predicted the conditions that prevailed following the oil crisis that 
was to arise five months later. It imagined a scenario of rising primary energy prices, and 
inadequate nuclear capacity set against the ever increasing demands of society and foresaw 
an  ‘economic  depression’.  Interestingly,  Bunyard  concluded  the  editorial  with  the 
suggestion that ‘now is the time to seek alternatives which lead to reductions in energy use 
and yet which will not necessarily lead to any diminution in the so-called standard of 
living’.   
 
  The  Ecologist  included  coverage  of  alternative  technology,  mainly  focused  on 
renewable energy technology, from its launch. In a series of regular columns under the 
titles ‘Ecotechnics’, ‘Down to Earth’, or ‘Demo-Technology’, articles would describe a 
range of initiatives in alternative technology. These ranged in content from the basic and 
practical to the highly technical and would often in accordance with the magazine’s aims 
include a polemical element. The columns dealt with a range of issues, but were strongly 
focussed on energy-related technology. They advocated the development of wind turbines, 
solar power, and energy efficiency through small-scale developments that aligned with the 
growing  Alternative  Technology  movement  in  Britain.
81  These  articles  serve  to 
demonstrate the lack of technical progress in renewable energy in the post-war era. The 
more technical articles in The Ecologist on the development of active solar technology do 
not show much change since Frank Schuman’s ambitious 1913 scheme in Egypt, and the 
features on wind turbines concentrate on the siting and installation of the existing decades-
old designs. However, these regular columns in the magazine do appear to have provided a 
valuable tool for the dissemination of the existing technical information in the early 1970s, 
and  encouraged  a  continued  interest  in  renewable  energy  among  the  environmental 
movement.  
 
In December 1973, the first issue of The Ecologist to appear after the oil crisis 
devoted its editorial to the situation under the heading ‘The energy steeplechase’. With an 
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accompanying cartoon by Richard Willson, Peter Bunyard set out the initial reaction of the 
magazine.
82 It focused on the issue of security of supply and rising demand, but curiously 
made no mention of the rise in oil prices that was a main feature of the crisis. As might be 
expected  the  magazine  saw  the  crisis  as  a  general  vindication  of  its  position  on  the 
industrialised nations’ reliance on oil, and the thrust of the editorial centred on supply 
issues. However, following on from the comments of Goldsmith in the August 1973 issue 
concerning security of supply, the article offered an essentially cultural explanation for the 
crisis.
83 Bunyard made repeated reference to the Middle East as ‘a part of the world which 
has never known peace since the dawn of civilisation’ and as ‘one of the world’s politically 
hottest and least stable spots’.  In the editorial he bemoaned the ‘sheer idiocy’ of basing the 
growth of industrialised economies on a resource that is found mainly in that part of the 
world. Bunyard also saw a clear link between the crisis and the nuclear programme and 
suggests that ‘technocrats are hoping that nuclear power will step smartly in’ to fill the 
energy gap. The short editorial concluded by suggesting ‘that there is only one answer and 
that is to embark immediately on policies to reduce demand for energy’ and closed with 
the warning that we are ‘enslaving ourselves’ to those that ‘control the energy circuits’. 
Once again The Ecologist returns to its advocacy of reducing the consumption of energy, 
the ‘virtues of restraint’
84, with no real suggestion of how that could be achieved.   
 
In  the  same  issue  (3:12)  Bunyard  contributed  a  lengthy  feature  article,  which 
appears to have been written prior to the oil crisis, titled ‘ENERGY- CRISIS or crunch?’ 
This article was a report on a jointly sponsored conference in London by the Financial 
Times  and  BOAC  on  ‘World  Energy  Supplies’.  The  article  explored  the  growing 
possibility of an energy crisis, facilitated both through the ‘unity’ among the oil producing 
countries and the increasing dependence on oil of ‘western economies’. This situation is 
contrasted with the earlier crises of Suez in 1956 and the embargo of 1967, which Bunyard 
suggested failed amid a ‘buyer’s market’ for oil. The article discussed the contributions of 
some  of  the  key  individuals  involved  in  energy  strategy  at  that  time,  including 
representatives from the U.S. Government, the banks, the oil companies, and OPEC. In 
particular the contribution of Dr Nadim Pachachi, a previous secretary general of OPEC 
was telling. Aside from a predictable call for the Arab producers to pursue ‘a co-ordinated, 
unified policy to freeze…crude oil production at present levels until such times as Israel 
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withdraws  fully  from  all  the  Arab  territories  occupied  during  the  1967  war’,  he  also 
criticised  the  West  for  its  unrealistic  ‘obsession  with  cheap  energy  prices’.  This,  he 
suggested, had forestalled the search for alternative energy sources, when ‘a price of seven 
to eight dollars per barrel’ would allow ‘non-conventional oil’ to compete successfully. 
Bunyard used the article to develop the magazine’s criticism of the lack of a clear energy 
strategy ‘…governments and the major energy industries have on the whole miscalculated 
the investment and resources they should have been putting into energy production over 
the past decade’.
85 
 
By January 1974 the magazine with more time to consider the implications of the 
oil crisis produced a lengthier and more considered editorial devoted entirely to energy. In 
addition  to  a  criticism  of  the  Government,  The  Ecologist  also  acknowledged  the 
significance  of  the  decision  by  CEGB  on  reactor  choice.  Written  by  Goldsmith  and 
Bunyard this editorial moved the oil crisis in to a context more familiar to readers of the 
magazine. Bunyard’s contribution, following on from his previous article, criticised the 
‘sorry  Government’  handling  of  the  economy  amid  soaring  prices  and  problems  with 
supply.
86  Bunyard pointed out that an oil crisis at some stage was widely predicted and yet 
the  government  ‘dithers  and  vacillates  when  confronted  with  reality’.  The  editorial 
suggested  that  this  weakness  from  the  government  creates  a  void  into  which  ‘private 
enterprise- however selfish and ruthless’ can step. The site of platform building for the 
North Sea oil industry ‘despite strong local opposition’ and the requests of the CEGB to 
use the American LWR were used by Bunyard as examples of the government being led by 
big business. Bunyard also criticised government-backed programmes such as Concorde 
and the Channel Tunnel as further examples of its ‘laughable’ and ‘mindless plans for 
growth’.  The  editorial  concluded  by  dismissing  the  ‘fiction’  that  thermonuclear  fusion 
could  ‘solve  man’s  energy  problems’.  This  is  a  complete  reversal  of  the  magazine’s 
repeated concession in earlier issues that ‘endless energy’ was possible and suggests that 
the magazine was beginning to shift from its previous position of a qualified acceptance of 
nuclear  power.
87  The  energy  debate  was  clearly  beginning  to  deepen  among 
environmentalists.  
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Accompanying the editorial of Bunyard is a short piece from Goldsmith on energy 
and GNP.
88 This piece is constructed around the research of Joel Darmstadter into the 
correlation between GNP and energy consumption, mentioned in chapter 1.
89 Darmstadter 
was interested in the changing relationship between GNP growth and the growth in energy 
consumption in the United States. This had shifted from a positive relationship where GNP 
growth outpaced the growth in energy consumption between 1920 and 1965 to a negative 
relationship  from  1965,  when  it  appeared  that  efficiency  savings,  mainly  in  electricity 
generation, had ceased. Darmstadter speculated that the shift in the relationship was also 
caused  by  the  high-energy  consumption  of  the  American  consumer.  Using  these 
conclusions,  Goldsmith  suggested  that  limited  conservation  of  energy  resources  would 
have a disastrous impact on society and the economy, by limiting the potential for GNP 
growth. He suggested that ‘the greatest priority today’ should be an attempt to maximise 
economic  growth  and  minimise  energy  consumption.  At  first  sight  this  seems  an 
anomalous conclusion for Goldsmith to reach given his repeated criticism of industrial 
society. However, it is clear that Goldsmith believed that energy use will increase and will 
bring about the collapse in industrial economies that he so craved. 
 
In 1974 there were only two further editorials that discussed energy to a significant 
extent. The first of these was in the March/April issue (4:3). ‘The Caviar Chimera’ was 
written by Goldsmith and covers the familiar ground of a general critique of industrial 
society with a few pot shots along the way at some of The Ecologist’s traditional enemies 
such as the scientist Barry Commoner and the Labour politician, Anthony Crosland. In this 
article  Goldsmith  discussed  the  way  in  which  the  oil  crisis  caused  a  backlash  against 
environmentalism  in  the  US  and  led  to  ‘a  veritable  avalanche  of  anti-environmental 
measures’.
90 After devoting two consecutive editorials almost exclusively to energy and 
the oil crisis The Ecologist largely abandoned the topic thereafter. The number of feature 
articles declined and lost the focus that had been gained during 1973.
91 The reason for this 
is unclear but it would be reasonable to speculate on two factors that may have caused the 
change.  Firstly,  there  was  the  recognition  that  energy  policy,  particularly  nuclear,  was 
mired in an esoteric technical debate that had little appeal to the readers of a popular 
magazine; the torch for this debate had clearly passed to FoE UK. Secondly, the political 
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turmoil of 1974 appeared too attractive a topic for the magazine, and political campaigning 
for the two General Elections in 1974 on behalf of the People’s Party seemed to dominate 
the direction of the magazine as its output reduced to ten issues a year. The peak of its 
influence in this early period that followed the publication of Blueprint For Survival in 
1972 appeared to have passed and the magazine appeared to struggle to discover a clear 
identity. The November 1974 issue (4:10) was a produced jointly with Resurgence and 
explored ‘new value systems’ based on ‘religions which have not become materialist’. 
Arguably, this might have seemed rather irrelevant to many of the traditional readers of the 
magazine,  the  majority  of  who  listed  New  Scientist  as  their  other  regular  magazine 
purchase.  
   
Technology: Soft, Appropriate, Intermediate, or Alternative? 
A key aspect of the social movements of the 1960s was their shared anti-industrialism, and 
growing distrust of government. This mood served to unite such disparate groups as the 
civil  rights  movement,  the  counter  culture,  the  anti-Vietnam  protesters,  CND,  and  the 
broader new wave of environmentalists. Among the specific targets of this critique were 
science and technology, seen as particularly potent symbols of authoritative control in the 
post-war period.
92  As previously mentioned, this is one explanation for the outstanding 
influence  of  Silent  Spring.    One  such  reaction  of  particular  interest  to  the  study  of 
renewable energy from the 1970s was the Alternative Technology (AT) movement.  Smith 
noted that the AT movement provides a rare example of a technologically focused social 
grouping, which was defined by pro-activity rather than pure critique (such as the anti-
nuclear  movement).
93    Many  of  the  factors  that  combined  to  produce  the  new 
environmental movement were also present in the AT movement, and the AT movement 
was  subsumed  under  the  environmentalist  banner.    Adrian  Smith  wrote  that,  ‘the  AT 
movement emerged on a wave of environmental concern over the impacts of industrial 
society,  and  a  radical,  counter-cultural  critique  of  its  technocratic  tendencies’.
94  AT 
advocates were motivated by this essential critique of capitalism, but in contrast to many of 
their fellow travellers on the counter culture trail, they offered alternatives, both product 
and lifestyle, as well as critique. 
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  The  AT  movement  had  emerged  in  the  1970s  as  a  specific  socio-technological 
response  to  the  widespread  anti-industrialism  that  had  begun  in  the  1960s.  Langdon 
Winner  saw  the  movement’s  rejection  of  technological  ‘progress’  as  just  the  latest 
manifestation of a periodical social phenomenon that in the past had produced a range of 
reactions  including  key  historical  figures  like  Robert  Owen,  Peter  Kropotkin,  William 
Morris, and Gandhi, and social movements like the co-operative movement.
95  This is a 
process  that  can  perhaps  also  be  discerned  in  the  formation  of  the  nineteenth  century 
amenity groups in Britain as described above. For Winner, the counter culture of the 1960s 
was  simply  the  latest  wave  of  social  disillusionment.    Emerging  from  these  swirling 
influences a new critique of technology emerged which followed a tradition established in 
the  1930s  by  Lewis  Mumford.
96  Both  Herbert  Marcuse’s  One-Dimensional  Man  and 
Jacques  Ellul’s  ‘outrageously  pessimistic’
97  The  Technological  Society  appeared  in  the 
mid-sixties, and both contained a bitter critique of the technocratic state.
98 In the same 
period Barry Commoner published Science and Survival, which focussed specifically on a 
critique  of  the  scientific  establishment.
99  Emerging  from  this  background,  the  AT 
movement embraced the belief that technology should be ‘liberated’ from the manipulation 
of  the  ‘technocracy’  and  handed  back  to  society.  Furthermore,  and  perhaps  more 
importantly it should be ‘non-violent towards people and natural resources’.
100 
 
  Perversely,  the  impetus  for  much  of  the  early  AT  movement  was  created  and 
developed through traditional commercial methods and channels. In 1968 Stewart Brand 
produced the first of many subsequent and highly successful editions of his Whole Earth 
Catalog, which presented readers with the opportunity to purchase from an array of small-
scale ‘back to nature’ technologies.
101 In many senses the Catalog offered a comfortable, 
consumerist vision of a different world, at a safe distance from the increasing violence of 
public demonstrations in the late 1960s.  According to Winner, amid the apparent political 
and  social  disintegration  of  the  globe  its  readers  could  imagine  themselves  as  ‘hippie 
environmentalist  spacemen  in  the  tradition  of  Buckminster  Fuller’.
102  The  Catalog 
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included articles about specific pieces of technology, accompanied by details of suppliers. 
The Ecologist also adopted this highly successful model in Britain early in the 1970s when 
it set up a company called Low Impact Technology Ltd.  It was run by Peter Bunyard and 
Andrew McKillop and sold a range of goods similar to the Whole Earth Catalog, such as 
‘Cinva Rams’ for making building blocks from compressed earth, solar panels, and 200w 
Winco  ‘Wind  Generators’.
103  The  magazine  used  its  regular  alternative  technology 
columns to develop the market for its products amongst its readership. The company also 
undertook some experimental work of its own, but it is uncertain whether this research 
ever produced any finished products, let alone any commercial success.
104 
 
 
Conclusions 
This  chapter  has  set  out  some  of  the  context  within  which  the  UK  renewable  energy 
programme was created during the early part of the 1970s. The survey of the role The 
Ecologist  magazine  and  the  emergence  of  the  AT  community  in  the  UK  shows  that 
awareness of energy issues and activity in renewable energy development was growing 
after 1970 and this change predates the oil crisis. Driven initially by fears of industrial 
pollution and then by concerns over the finite nature of fossil fuels, the new environmental 
movement  in  Britain  came  to  influence  the  public  debate  over  energy.  By  actively 
promoting and demonstrating the potential of renewable energy sources and ambitiously 
pointing to an alternative approach to the organisation of society the new environmental 
movement created a new section of public opinion that the Government addressed through 
its renewable energy programmes after 1974.  Although the example of other countries 
(most notably the United States) in establishing similar programmes was also an important 
motivation  here,  it  is  arguable  that  these  other  programmes  were  also  created  by  an 
awareness of growing support for the development of alternative energy sources as the 
work of Lee and Sine shows.
105  
 
  An important conclusion of this thesis is that this initiative was largely conceived 
as a token gesture, designed to demonstrate that the government was actively addressing 
the new post-oil crisis energy situation. I have suggested that the emergence of a new 
environmental movement in the UK from 1970 had an important impact in creating the 
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conditions  for  the  government’s  renewable  energy  programme,  and  in  explaining  the 
perceived  need  for  such  a  ‘token’.  The  growth  in  awareness  and  recognition  of 
environmental issues, demonstrated by the creation of the Department of Environment in 
1970  and  UK  government’s  active  participation  in  the  UNCHE  at  Stockholm  in  1972 
compelled the government to consider the ‘alternative’ forms of energy after 1974. This 
led directly to the creation of the Energy Technology Support Unit (ETSU) at Harwell 
early in 1974, and the launch of the UK renewable energy programme to which this thesis 
will now turn. 72 
Chapter 3 
‘Energy 1974, and after’
1 
 
This chapter will develop the theme of a post-war energy techno-institutional complex in 
the UK by focussing on the institutions involved in the UK renewables programme after 
1974. In the few months after the oil crisis the institutional structure of UK energy policy 
underwent  significant  changes.  Before  1974  the  formulation  of  energy  policy  was 
coordinated by the DTI. The Minister responsible for energy matters was aided by a Chief 
Scientist and an advisory body, ACORD (Advisory Council on Research and Development 
for Fuel and Power). In practice however, as has been argued, the nationalised energy 
industries  and  the  UKAEA  were  largely  left  to  formulate  their  own  individual  policy 
without reference to any centrally devised plan. In the post-war energy markets, where 
energy  prices  were  low  and  stocks  appeared  plentiful  this  was,  to  some  degree, 
understandable.  
 
  After October 1973 this complacency was shaken by the oil crisis which signalled 
an  urgent  need  to  formulate  a  coherent  energy  policy  for  the  UK.  In  addition  to  the 
challenges of the oil price shock, the continuing discoveries of North Sea oil and gas 
reserves in UK waters, the ongoing industrial relations problems in the coal industry, and 
the  perennial  debates  on  reactor  choice  focussed  unprecedented  political  attention  on 
energy policy from 1974. A new Department for Energy was established in January 1974 
by the beleaguered Heath Government as a knee-jerk reaction to the oil crisis, despite the 
strong  resistance  of  the  Secretary  of  State  at  the  DTI,  Peter  Walker.
2    Britain  had  a 
Ministry of Fuel and Power until the late 1960s when it was swallowed up briefly by the 
Ministry of Technology (Mintech), and then eventually by the new ‘super’ ministry, the 
Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  (DTI),  in  1970.  Now,  as  a  result  of  the  worldwide 
escalation in the price of oil, a dedicated Department of Energy had re-emerged; surgically 
removed from the DTI.
3 
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  The  chapter  will  chart  the  emergence  of  the  broader  renewable  energy  R&D 
programme after 1974 within this changed structure of UK energy policy-making, before 
moving on in subsequent chapters to consider the wave and wind energy programmes in 
more  detail.  In  particular  it  will  focus  on  three  of  the  key  institutions/organisations 
involved in creating and eventually sustaining that programme; these were the Central 
Policy Review Staff (CPRS), ACORD, and the Energy Technology Support Unit (ETSU). 
Both  the  CPRS  and  ACORD  predate  the  oil  crisis,  but  both  played  a  crucial  role  at 
different stages of the renewables programme. In contrast, the establishment of ETSU in 
April  1974  was  a  direct  result  of  the  energy  crisis  and  occupied  the  central  role  in 
managing the renewable energy programme throughout the period.  
 
  In addition, this chapter will also emphasise the importance of selected key actors 
within  UK  energy  policy  who  occupied  important  roles  within  the  above  named 
organisations.  Although  a  myriad  of  energy-related  committees  and  advisory  groups 
appeared after 1974 the central thrust of renewable energy policy was influenced, at least 
initially,  by  a  relatively  few  high-level  individuals.  This  chapter  will  emphasise  the 
influence of two powerful individuals who arguably held sway over UK energy policy in 
the mid-1970s; Lord Rothschild, head of the CPRS, and the Chief Scientist at the DoEn, 
Walter Marshall.  
 
Lord Rothschild’s Think Tank 
As part of the package of changes introduced by the incoming Heath Government in 1970 
in  the  White  Paper,  Reorganisation  of  Central  Government  (1970),  a  Central  Policy 
Review Staff (CPRS) - more widely known as the ‘Think Tank’ - had been established 
under Lord Victor Rothschild.
4 The CPRS was the first unit of its kind, based at the heart 
of Government, and set up to advise on a wide range of national policy issues. Heath saw it 
as an antidote to the often factional and uncoordinated thinking that existed at the heart of 
government, and enjoyed privileged (though occasionally problematic) access to the Prime 
Minister and the various Ministerial departments. Heath had used a similar advisory group 
whilst in opposition in the 1960s and was convinced of its value to government. 
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  Lord Rothschild was appointed to head the CPRS after retirement, aged 60, from 
his former post as Research Coordinator of the Royal Dutch Shell Group, where he gained 
a close familiarity with the energy business.
5 He also brought the force of his personality to 
the role. Rothschild, although undoubtedly a member of the elite classes, was in many 
ways an unconventional figure at the centre of government. He had no experience as a civil 
servant (although he had been Chairman of the Agricultural Research Council from 1948-
58) and was largely unused to the ways of Whitehall. Undeniably also his personal wealth 
‘removed him from the servitude of security in presenting his opinions’, and in its earliest 
incarnation the CPRS, and its views, were clearly seen as Rothschild ‘writ large’.
6   
 
    In early December Heath held an informal reception at No. 10 with the 
Cabinet and Rothschild to introduce Rothschild and the work of the CPRS; he explained to 
the assembled that its main function would be ‘to help Ministers to make better decisions 
about the allocation of resources.’
7  And by late February Rothschild had provided Heath 
with a ‘Proposed Work Programme’ for the CPRS.
8 He had spent two months visiting the 
various government departments and talking with the Secretaries of State and senior civil 
servants,  to  get  a  sense  of  what  they  regarded  as  their  most  important  and  immediate 
challenges.    His  enquiries  produced  a  list  that  was  broken  down  into  five  headings; 
‘General’,  ‘Long-term,  relating  to  social  and  economic  policy’,  ‘Research  and 
development - medium term’, ‘Specific studies’, and ‘CPRS - “watching briefs”’. The list 
included  fifteen  specific  items  ranging  on  a  spectrum  from  ‘Concorde’  to  ‘Some 
interdepartmental implications of social policy’ that reflected the free-ranging brief given 
to the CPRS. Until this point the establishment of the CPRS and its role in government was 
theoretical, and Ministers had in principle accepted the usefulness of such a body at the 
heart of government. They had perhaps even enjoyed the chance to discuss with Lord 
Rothschild the particular challenges that each of them felt that they faced.  However, this 
was the first opportunity for the Cabinet to see exactly what work the CPRS proposed to 
undertake. Sir Burke Trend commented to Heath that ‘this may be a rather painful process; 
and a few tears may be shed in the course of it’ as the government departments got used to 
having the CPRS so closely involved in policy-making.
9   
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7 TNA, PREM 15/406, Record of a Discussion, 2 December 1970 
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  In  the  report  Rothschild  described  ‘Watching  briefs’  as  those  ‘subjects  which, 
while continuing to be dealt with primarily by the Departments concerned, would engage 
the attention of the CPRS, who would hold a “watching brief” in relation to these activities 
and would take an active part in the interdepartmental discussion of them’.
10 Included in 
this list of five items was ‘United Kingdom Energy Policy’. The CPRS noted that the DTI 
was about to launch ‘a major review of energy policy’ and suggested that the CPRS would 
‘be in touch with this and will be discussing the scope of the study with the DTI’.
11 By 
September 1971, in a report on Government strategy, the CPRS was forming an initial 
view of UK energy policy. In a trenchant paragraph it observed, 
 
Energy policy. We have spread our bets too widely in the development of 
nuclear  energy  and  wasted  money.  Looking  ahead,  the  dominance  of  the 
Middle East in proven oil reserves looks capable of imposing a stranglehold 
over traditional sources of Western European energy supply. This may be 
eased for the United Kingdom by exploitation of the Continental Shelf in the 
short-term and in the longer term by nuclear energy. There are high stakes 
attaching  to  getting  our  national  energy  policy  right  in  this  changing 
position. 
12 
 
This short paragraph provides a useful and telling snapshot of UK energy policy at the 
outset of the 1970s. It also demonstrates that the CPRS had a remarkably good grasp of the 
state of UK energy issues at the time.  Two years prior to October 1973 the CPRS had in a 
sense predicted the oil crisis. It also made the observation that North Sea oil and gas would 
be a short-term solution that would only delay the requirement for a coordinated policy on 
energy. At this stage, though, and despite its problems, nuclear power was still seen as the 
only long-term solution.  
 
An Energy Policy for Britain 
In late May 1973 the first full-length CPRS report on energy policy, An Energy Policy for 
Britain,  bound  in  the  trademark  red  covers  of  the  CPRS,  was  presented  to  the 
Government.
13  The  report  had  been  prepared  with  the  help  of  the  economist  Michael 
Posner, who had worked at the Ministry of Power during the 1960s.
14  For the report the 
CPRS adapted a framework of ‘energy scenarios’ from work Rothschild had done at Shell, 
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which presented three possible futures based on oil prices projected to 1985.
15 The report 
then went on to construct a ‘Regret Matrix’, which advanced a range of current (1973) 
energy decisions that would be ‘least regretted’ in 1985. The main recommendations of the 
report centred on the improvement of the coal industry through ‘exploratory drilling’, a 
close  look  at  licensing  and  depletion  policy  in  the  North  Sea,  and  the  continued 
development of the nuclear power programme.
16    
 
  The DTI had produced its own energy report at around the same time which took a 
more traditional approach and contained some areas of difference. These tended to be 
focussed on statistical assumptions and projections though, and the DTI indicated that it 
was ‘in full accord’ with the CPRS ‘on a wide range of fundamental energy issues’.
17 
Despite this, the central contention of the CPRS report – that the price of imported oil 
would rise substantially over the following 10 years – was largely dismissed, and one DTI 
official found the CPRS case ‘unconvincing’.
18 Overall, the report was met with the most 
fatal  of  political  reactions  from  the  Government;  faint  scepticism  mixed  with  general 
disinterest. Ultimately however, the timing of the report, just months before the oil crisis, 
came eventually to increase the stature and credibility of Rothschild in energy matters. 
Although Rothschild’s team appeared remarkably prescient in predicting the oil crisis they 
had in fact only reflected other long-standing and well-publicised concerns over global oil 
supply, particularly in the United States, referred to in chapter 2.
19 Notwithstanding this, 
the report sealed the reputation of the Think Tank for expertise on energy policy in the UK, 
and  it  came  to  occupy  an  influential  position  on  energy  at  a  crucial  time.  Indeed, 
Blackstone  and  Plowden  argued  that  the  CPRS  came  to  fill  a  void  in  energy  policy 
expertise and as a consequence it ‘dominated’ the new DoEn at least until the appointment 
of Tony Benn as Secretary of State for Energy in 1976, who had less respect for such a unit 
(and for Rothschild personally).
20 
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  Therefore,  following  the  oil  crisis  the  Government  naturally  asked  Rothschild’s 
CPRS for what had become known as ‘a view’ on the new energy situation. In January 
1974 it produced a long report titled Energy Conservation quickly followed in March by 
another, Energy 1974, And After, both of which suggested that a combination of coal, 
conservation and nuclear energy (which became known as CoCoNuke) should form the 
core of any future UK energy policy.
21 The first report made recommendations in three 
areas; ‘Transport’, ‘Electricity Generation’, and ‘Energy in the Home and in Industry’. For 
transport the CPRS had six recommendations, and for the section on energy in the home 
and industry there were eight. The section on electricity generation contained a single, 
though bold, recommendation; ‘The first stage of a full technical and economic appraisal 
of harnessing wave power for electricity generation should be put in hand at once.’
22 This 
immediately led the new DoEN to commission such a report from the government’s own 
National Engineering Laboratory (NEL) at East Kilbride, and by February 1975 it had 
produced a positive report on the prospects for wave energy (see chapter 4).
23  
 
  Tired out by the strain of his role at the heart of British politics during a tumultuous 
1974, Lord Rothschild stepped down as head of the CPRS late that year, and was replaced 
by  Sir  Kenneth  Berrill.  During  his  four  years  at  the  helm  of  the  Think  Tank  he  had 
presented ‘views’ to the Cabinet on a wide range of key issues. Most of these were never 
published and remained as confidential advice to the Government. It is apparent though 
that his opinions on energy were influential in guiding the new Department of Energy in 
1974.  Equally  clear  was  his  role,  described  below,  in  setting  up  the  new  Energy 
Technology  Support  Unit  that  would  manage  the  Government’s  R&D  funding  in  the 
‘alternative sources of energy’.  Furthermore, his enthusiasm and powerful advocacy for 
wave  power  (inspired,  as  will  be  seen  below,  by  Gordon  Goodwin  at  the  DTI)  was 
instrumental  in  launching  the  wave  energy  programme  that  dominated  the  renewables 
programme  until  1982.  To  a  great  extent,  much  of  the  shape  and  direction  of  UK 
Government-funded  renewable  energy  R&D  programme  was  due  entirely  to  the  early 
intervention of Lord Rothschild.    
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The Advisory Council on Research and Development in Fuel and Power (ACORD)  
Prior to 1974 energy technology had been dealt with by the Energy Technology division 
(ENT)  at  the  DTI.  In  this  case  ‘energy  technology’  was  mainly  related  to  the  three 
nationalised energy industries - coal, gas, and electricity; nuclear power was outside the 
remit of the DTI, and therefore, the ENT division. It was a relatively small section within 
the DTI and particularly during the period of low oil prices during the 1960s its role was 
not central to wider government policy.
24 The ENT division operated in close association 
with ACORD, which had been established in 1960 as a successor to the Ministry of Fuel 
and Power Scientific Advisory Council.
25 Despite its creation ten years prior to the CPRS, 
arguably it was not until after the oil crisis that the Council began to enjoy some real 
influence on UK energy policy; particularly, as will be seen, in renewable energy.  
 
  ACORD’s first Chairman, following his retirement as Chairman of ICI, was Lord 
Fleck - succeeded in 1965 by the metallurgist, Sir Charles Sykes.
26 The members of the 
Council (who were unpaid) were appointed by the Secretary of State and were drawn from 
a range of energy-related fields. This would always include the three nationalised energy 
industries (coal, gas, and electricity) and the other major nationalised industries such as the 
British  Steel  Corporation  (BSC).  The  Council  also  had  representatives  from  national 
research bodies such as the Science Research Council (SRC) and the UK Atomic Energy 
Authority (UKAEA) and often a member to represent the universities. In addition, the 
Secretary of State could (and often did) appoint independent experts to the Council. The 
original terms of reference for ACORD, which followed closely those of its predecessor, 
were as follows, 
1. To  advise  the  Minister  of  Power  on  Research  and  Development  in 
relation to his statutory duty of securing the effective and co-ordinated 
development of coal, petroleum, and other sources of fuel and power 
in  Great  Britain,  and  of  promoting  economy  and  efficiency  in  the 
supply, distribution, use and consumption of fuel and power, whether 
produced in Great Britain or not: 
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2. To advise the Minister of new scientific and technical knowledge or 
applications of knowledge throughout the world, which in the opinion 
of the Council should be taken into account in the performance of his 
statutory duties: 
3. To keep the whole field of fuel and power under continuous review 
with  the  object  of  identifying  problems  needing  research  and 
development and advising the Minister of these problems with a view 
to discussion with the industries.
27  
 
 
  Despite this rather wide-ranging remit, until 1974 the primary function of ACORD 
had  been  to  scrutinise  the  annual  R&D  programmes  of  the  three  nationalised  energy 
industries and report formally on these to the Secretary of State. This role was carried out 
mainly through regular quarterly meetings and occasional site visits. ACORD was seen by 
some as a ‘paper tiger’ and for merely serving as a ‘rubber-stamp’ for the activities of the 
nationalised  industries,  and  the  industries  commented  that  their  proposed  R&D 
programmes  generally  passed  through  ACORD  with  ease.
28  Walter  Marshall  later 
considered this task ‘as an inescapable but tedious chore to be got out the way with the 
minimum time and effort.’
29 This criticism was not helped by the fact that far and away the 
largest R&D spending among the nationalised industries, by the UKAEA lay outside the 
remit of the Council. Sir Harry Melville
30, who succeeded Sir Charles Sykes as chairman 
of ACORD in October 1970, recognised and understood this criticism, and during his 
period as chairman he made a concerted effort to revise the organisation and remit of 
ACORD.
31  
 
  In 1973 Melville sent a short paper offering some suggestions for change to the 
Department, requesting a meeting with the Minister. In his proposals he expressed some 
frustration at the limits placed on ACORD. He stated that the core of ACORD’s duties, the 
‘detailed examination of the R&D programmes of the nationalised industries...is not really 
necessary’. Instead he suggested that ACORD should comment on the ‘strategy for R&D 
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to see whether it is well founded’. He commented rather acerbically that ACORD was ‘to 
some extent isolated from the discussions on energy problems that presumably occur in 
DTI’.
32 Although his request for a meeting with the Minister was successful, the outcome 
was that little or no change was implemented at ACORD.
33 Denness, an official at the 
DoEn who also acted as a member of the secretariat of ACORD, had commented that ‘it is 
probably  fair  to  say  that  we  are  not  entirely  happy  with  all  the  suggested  changes’.  
Discouragingly for Sir Harry, Denness went on to recommend that ‘the Minister merely 
notes what he has to say, leaving it open for officials to report to the Minister at a later 
stage if and when it is considered that there should be fundamental changes in ACORD’s 
modus operandi’.
34 The unmistakable impression given is that until the changes brought 
about in the organisation of UK energy policy after 1974, ACORD was clearly regarded by 
the ENT division as a very minor functionary in UK energy technology and as little more 
than a tool of the DTI. 
 
The Energy Technology Support Unit (ETSU) 
At  the  beginning  of  April  1974  the  Energy  Technology  Support  Unit  was  officially 
established by the new Labour Secretary of State at the DoEn, Eric Varley. ETSU formed 
the management hub of the UK renewable energy programme. It did not undertake any 
R&D  work  itself,  but  was  given  the  task  of  identifying  suitable  renewables  R&D, 
implementing and managing specific programmes, and advising the Secretary of State at 
the DoEn.
35  As the scale of the programme increased through the 1970s, ETSU created 
and  coordinated  several  ‘steering  committees’  that  were  concentrated  on  what  were 
regarded as the ‘most promising’ renewable technologies of the period. These included the 
Wave Energy Steering Committee (WESC) created by ACORD in June 1975, and the 
Wind  Energy  Steering  Committee  (WISC)  created  in  1978.
36  Although  central  to  the 
technical development of the programme it is debatable whether ETSU had any significant 
impact on policy. Certainly the reports it provided to the DoEn could affect the choice of 
technology, but these were routinely scrutinised by ACORD before reaching the Secretary 
of State and the Council was given the important task of ‘advising’ the department on 
renewable energy policy (see below). Despite this, the impact of ETSU must be carefully 
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considered  in  accounting  for  the  evolution  of  the  programme  within  the  government’s 
wider energy policy objectives.  
 
  ETSU was officially established in April 1974 at Harwell, which was home to the 
Atomic Energy Authority Research Establishment (AERE) and was one of the UK and 
Europe’s biggest centres of scientific research.
37 The Attlee Government had established 
Harwell in 1945 as a ‘research and experimental establishment covering all aspects of the 
use of atomic energy’.
38  However, for some years prior to 1974 it had been forced to 
diversify into what it termed ‘non-nuclear’ work in an attempt to secure its future amid the 
continuing uncertainties of the UK nuclear programme.
39 In what was a unique move for a 
government-funded research laboratory, Harwell began to seek out ‘industrial partners’ 
which  would  pay  for  specific  R&D  programmes.
40    Despite  strong  and  wide-ranging 
opposition to the scheme (some from within Harwell itself) under the influence of its new 
and ambitious young director, Walter Marshall, the plan appeared to work and a range of 
non-nuclear research programmes were set-up.
41 These included work in ceramics, non-
destructive  testing,  desalination,  and  carbon fibres.  By  1974,  Harwell’s  annual  income 
from outside of the Atomic Energy Vote amounted to £8m, which represented about 40 per 
cent of its budget.
42  
 
  In  May  1972,  Keith  Dawson,  who  was  to  become  the  first  Director  of  ETSU 
produced  an  internal  study  which  he  titled,  ‘Proposal  For  An  Advanced  Energy 
Technology Institute’.
43  Dawson was a senior scientist in the Applied Chemistry Division, 
and his proposal can be seen as a clear example of the diversification strategy to help 
safeguard  the  ‘future’  of  Harwell.
44    The  ‘needs’  which  his  proposal  was  based  upon 
provide a further indication that an awareness of the shortcomings in energy policy were 
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considered in detail in Chapter 5. 
42 Fishlock, ‘Marshall’, p.95 
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becoming  more  widespread  in  the  period.  Furthermore,  they  also  strongly  reflect  the 
growing influence of environmental issues at the time, mentioned in the previous chapter: 
 
(a) the need to formulate an overall U.K. energy policy which takes into 
account  all  the  economic,  sociological,  environmental  and  political 
factors (this requires the provision and evaluation of advice particularly 
on the new technology that will be needed), 
(b)  the  need  to  control  the  use  of  energy  sources  for  environmental 
reasons, 
(c)  the  need  to  conserve  existing  fuel  reserves  to  prevent  an  energy 
famine in the early part of the 21
st century, which is not further ahead 
than the time which has elapsed since the end of the Second World War, 
(d)  the need to diversify the U.K. energy sources for political reasons. 
 
  The  proposal,  which  anticipates  much  of  the  later  structure  of  ETSU, 
unsurprisingly saw Harwell as the only possible location for such a unit in the UK. ‘No 
other laboratory in the U.K. could take such a wide view of the situation, or bring such a 
powerful interdisciplinary approach to the range of problems involved.’
45 The work that 
Dawson considered that such an Institute should undertake betrayed an understandable 
personal  bias  towards  new  energy  technology  based  on  chemicals,  such  as  fuel  cells, 
advanced batteries, and synthetic fuels.  No specific mention is made at this early stage of 
the renewable energy technologies (in particular wave energy) that would later become the 
focus of much of ETSU’s early work. 
 
  A meeting was eventually held at Harwell in November 1972 to discuss Dawson’s 
proposal.
46 There had been some suggestion that the Institute could be launched as an 
Applied  Nuclear  Programme,  which  appeared  to  be  an  attempt  to  lend  the  unit  some 
credibility of continuity with Harwell’s main function.  However, at this meeting it was 
made clear that ‘the Directorate would not support the presentation of this proposal as an 
Applied Nuclear programme’.
47 The Harwell Directorate seemed anxious that any new 
venture should be distanced from the ‘weak commercial strategy’ of current research in the 
Applied Nuclear field.  It was agreed at this meeting that approaches should be made to 
DTI and Department of Environment (DoE) ‘contacts’ before any formal proposals were 
drawn up; however, the meeting was also reminded by Dr Dell of the pressing need for 
new programmes of work at Harwell. 
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  By early 1973, as the CPRS was preparing the launch of its first energy paper, the 
reach of Lord Rothschild on energy matters had extended to include Harwell. Rothschild 
made a direct approach to Walter Marshall ‘to consider what part Harwell as a laboratory 
might play in the formulation of alternative strategies for energy supplies’.
48 The request 
from such an influential figure at the heart of government appears to have encouraged 
Harwell and further studies of its potential role in energy technology were produced.
49  A 
new 8 page study by Dawson contained a recasting of the ‘needs’ which closely reflect the 
influence of Rothschild’s views on oil imports, 
 
There is a need to reverse the rise in dependence (currently 45% of total 
energy demand) of the U. K. on imported oil as an energy source for 
several reasons: 
(a) on a timescale of say 10 years, various factors will almost certainly 
lead to substantial increases in the price of oil, giving rise to adverse 
effects on the balance of payments and leading to a ‘dear energy’ regime 
which could affect many aspects of industry, 
(b) oil production will begin to decline within about 30 years and the gap 
between supply and demand will then increase rapidly, and 
(c) there are obvious political advantages to be gained by reducing the 
substantial dependence of the U.K. (and indeed Europe) on the Middle 
East as the primary source of oil. 
 
  This new set of ‘needs’ contrasts with the earlier version of May 1972 in several 
ways: first, it is clear that it was written in language that would have a more direct appeal 
to government, and in particular the DTI; second, although the ‘new environmentalism’ 
tone of the first version has been excised, in its place is a clear acceptance in (b) of the 
‘Limits to Growth’ thesis of rapidly depleting oil reserves. Clearly, Harwell’s ‘contacts’ 
within  the  DTI  had  had  an  influence  on  the  presentation  of  the  case  for  a  new  unit. 
However, much of the other content remained similar to that which Dawson had outlined 
in 1972.  The research focus remained firmly centred on the development of synthetic fuels 
and  advanced  batteries.  However,  the  report  did  include,  for  the  first  time,  a  brief 
discussion  of  ‘New  energy  sources’,  which  covered  solar,  wind,  and  tidal  schemes. 
Ironically,  these  ‘novel  approaches’  were  however  quickly  dismissed  by  Dawson  as 
‘impractical or uneconomic on close examination’.
50 
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  Marshall forwarded Dawson’s new paper to Rothschild in June 1973 and Dawson 
met with him shortly after the CPRS energy report had been produced. Rothschild’s view 
was  that  the  situation  was  probably  more  urgent  than  Dawson  had  suggested,  and  he 
thought that ‘oil production could decline in considerably less than the 30 years…quoted’.  
During the meeting Rothschild indicated that he supported the idea of ‘an assessment team 
on energy matters’ being based at Harwell. Indeed, he had evidently given the matter some 
thought as he proposed to Dawson that such a unit should comprise a budget of £250,000 
p.a. and a staff of 10.
51 Following on from the recommendations of the CPRS report, 
Rothschild believed that ‘electric road vehicles’ were a key element of any future energy 
R&D, and he emphasised this to Dawson.
52  
 
  Clearly, by mid-1973 the establishment of an energy technology unit at Harwell 
had  moved  a  significant  step  closer  to  reality,  particularly  with  the  recruitment  of 
Rothschild  to  the  Harwell  cause.    There  appeared  to  be  a  growing  realisation  of  the 
uncertainty in future energy supplies, and due mainly to the efforts of Rothschild, this 
recognition was beginning to spread to Government.  Some evidence of this recognition is 
to be found in the report produced at the DTI in August 1973 into ‘new energy forms and 
applications’.  The  report  was  produced  in  response  to  the  ‘possible  need  for  the 
Department  to  adopt  “a  more  positive  stance”  vis-à-vis  the  initiating  and  financing  of 
research into new energy forms and applications’.
53  There are clear links to the CPRS in 
the report as the author adopts the CPRS’s ‘SCARCE’ energy scenario as his framework.  
The 10 page report sets out to provide a brief summary of the state of R&D into ‘New 
Sources of Primary Energy’ both in the UK and worldwide, but remains largely fixated on 
coal and nuclear technologies. A short paragraph on solar, wind, and geothermal energy 
reaches similar conclusions to Dawson that these are ‘economically highly unattractive’.  
This is followed by another short paragraph on wave and tidal schemes which reaches 
similar  conclusions,  ‘Justification…would  fall  to  be  judged  from  the  standpoint  of  an 
insurance  option  against  the  possibility  of  a  nuclear  mishap  of  such  magnitude  as  to 
jeopardise acceptability of nuclear techniques for power generation’. The concept of an 
‘insurance  option’  would  reappear  repeatedly  throughout  the  UK  renewable  energy 
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programme  (see chapter 4).  The report concludes with the judgement that even ‘against a 
background of the CPRS “Scarce” scenario…the prospects are not such as to justify the 
mounting of new R&D activities’.
54  
 
   Leonard Williams was a Deputy Secretary at the DTI with a special interest in 
energy matters, and he transferred over to the new DoEn in January 1974.  Whilst at the 
DTI, Williams had arranged a meeting with Keith Dawson to discuss his proposal for an 
energy technology institute at Harwell. The claim by Rothschild to Marshall that he had 
‘suggested the matter be discussed in a high place’ seems to have borne fruit for Harwell.
55  
The meeting, on 6 December 1973, took place at the offices of the DTI in London. It was 
made clear at this meeting, by the official from the DTI, that Dawson’s proposals had 
‘fallen  on  fertile  ground’  and  the  establishment  of  an  ‘Advanced  Energy  Technology 
Centre’ was ‘introduced tentatively’.
56 Five days later, Leonard Williams, visited F. J. 
Doggett, the Deputy Chairman of the UKAEA, to report that the DTI wanted to make use 
of ‘a team at Harwell (building up to 20-30 strong)’ to establish an energy ‘think tank’.
57  
In a subsequent letter to Doggett from Williams there is some evidence that the impetus to 
establish the unit quickly stemmed from Government pressure to make positive statements 
on energy policy, as he suggests that it would ‘be of great advantage if we could make an 
early  announcement  of  these  new  arrangements’.
58  Walter  Marshall  wrote  to  Lord 
Rothschild to inform him of this approach and to thank him ‘for whatever part you have 
taken behind the scenes in bringing this about’, and rather fawningly assuring him that 
‘Harwell shall try and do a good job for you’.
59  
 
  At the beginning of January 1974 a series of meetings were held involving the DTI 
(after 12th January the DoEn) and selected figures from Harwell. Now that an energy 
technology unit at Harwell had been agreed in principle, it was left to sort out the structure, 
and budget of the new unit. Williams negotiated with the Treasury staffing levels of 12-20, 
and for a likely budget of £300,000, but added that the new unit would cost £15,000 in 
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1973/4  and  £200,000  in  1974/5. 
60  Perhaps  significantly,  this  was  not  far  away  from 
Rothschild’s  earlier  estimates.  However,  a  clear  public  statement  of  the  aims  and 
guidelines of the new unit would also be required. Despite some misgivings about the 
control that the DTI would exert over the work programme at Harwell,
61 Doggett wrote 
officially to Williams in early January welcoming the DTI proposals and agreeing that the 
unit should be established quickly.
62 Marshall attended an initial meeting at the DTI with 
Williams on 8th January before flying to India on business for a few weeks. After this it 
was left to Roberts, Marshall’s deputy, and Keith Dawson, to sort out the details of the 
new arrangement. Progress was made at meetings held throughout January, and possibly as 
a further sign of the government’s anxiety to show evidence of action on energy some 
hints about the creation of the new unit were leaked to the press.  A short article, ‘Harwell 
may do coal and gas research’ appeared in the Daily Telegraph on 10 January.
63  However, 
despite the wishes of the DTI to make a quick announcement, political events temporarily 
stalled the creation of ETSU. From mid-January rumours that Heath was going to call an 
early election abounded, and finally on 7 February the announcement was made that an 
election would be held on 28 February.
64 Dawson, and ETSU, would have to wait a little 
longer.  
 
  Soon  after  the  general  election,  as  the  new  Labour  government  under  Harold 
Wilson somewhat unexpectedly regained power, the creation of ETSU was back on the 
table at the DoEn.  The new Minister, Eric Varley (sponsored as an MP by the NUM) was 
at the helm.  The January meetings had hammered out most of the key issues surrounding 
the role of ETSU, and once the agreement of Varley had been obtained, the process of 
establishing the unit began.  In April the staffing levels and budget for ETSU were set, and 
the DoEn made the official announcement of the unit on 9 April.  For the remainder of 
1973/4  the  budget  was  fixed  at  £15,000,  and  for  1974/5  it  was  agreed  at  £200,000. 
Dawson, as head of the unit was given the authority to allocate only 10 per cent of the 
budget  without  first  consulting  the  Management  Committee,  which  was  chaired  by 
Leonard Williams.
65  It was also agreed that initially the unit should comprise around a 
dozen people, perhaps building in the future to twenty or so.  Naturally, Dawson was given 
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the job as head of ETSU, and he and L. E. J. Roberts (Deputy Director, AERE) were the 
Harwell representatives on the Management Committee.  
 
  The  role  that  Dawson  had  envisaged  for  an  ‘Advanced  Energy  Technology 
Institute’ in May 1972 had altered somewhat over the two years leading to the creation of 
ETSU.  His original focus on fuel cells, advanced batteries, and synthetic fuels, and his 
total  rejection  of  renewables  were  substituted  by  a  rather  different  set  of  initial  DoEn 
priorities for the unit. 
 
‘(a)  to  assess  and  report  on  the  applicability  of  wind  and  geothermal 
energy systems in the UK; 
(b) to assess and report on the methods of utilisation of solar energy as an 
energy source in the UK; 
(c)  to assess and report on the hydrogen economy and its competitive 
position with respect to SNG and methanol; 
(d) to maintain liaison with – and assess as required  - R & D work on 
waste heat and nuclear process heat applications; 
(e) to put in hand a study of energy utilisation in the industrial sector and 
advise on the investigational work and assessment work that would be 
required  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  realistic  appreciation  of  the  scope  for 
energy savings through changes in industrial practices; 
(f) to assist, at the request of the Department, in assessing proposals from 
outside sources for Government support of R & D projects.’
66 
 
  The first two items on the list, in particular, make clear the DoEn’s objectives for 
ETSU, as Dawson’s original research focus was largely swept aside. Investigations into the 
potential of wind, geothermal and solar energy sources were to form the initial work of the 
unit.  Much of this is explained by the sensitivity within the DoEn over the rivalry that 
existed  between  the  nationalised  energy  industries,  and  in  particular,  their  own  R&D 
programmes.  During the discussions which established ETSU consideration was given to 
the likely response of the coal, gas, and electricity industries to what might be seen as a 
duplication of existing research efforts: this would have an obvious potential impact on the 
R&D budgets of the nationalised energy industries. ‘The need for care’ was emphasised, 
so  that  the  work  of  the  unit  should  not  ‘cut  across  the  direct  responsibility  of  the 
nationalised industries to mount...R&D programmes’.
67 This anxiety gives some insight 
into the powerful position occupied by the nationalised energy industries. Moreover, the 
government was already spending vast amounts on energy-related R&D and the Treasury 
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was not keen on further spending within similar research fields (see Table 3.1).
68 This led 
the DoEn to emphasise the difference between the work of ETSU and that which was 
already underway – or that which could be considered to form part of an existing research 
programme.  In addition to this the budget agreed for ETSU was relatively small when 
compared to other energy R&D in the UK. Much less consideration was given to the likely 
reaction of ACORD, and this is discussed in detail below. Dawson had envisaged a unit 
that would eventually take on practical research programmes within the organisation, but it 
was clear that at the levels of funding and manpower agreed by DoEn, that ETSU would 
remain largely an advisory body for the new Department.  
 
Table 3.1 
Department of Energy (DoEn) Research Expenditure, (1972-73) 
Electricity Council (incl. CEGB)  £19,800,000 
UK Atomic Energy Authority  £64,000,000 
Gas Corporation  £8,964,000 
National Coal Board  £4,800,000 
British Nuclear Fuels (incl. centrifuge)  £4,000,000 
Safety in Mines Research Establishment  £1,301,000 
South of Scotland Electricity Board  £808,364 
North of Scotland Electricity Board  £119,449 
Total  £103,792,813 
 
Source: D. Fishlock, ‘Practical avenues for energy research’, Financial Times, 6 February 1974 
 
 
‘Harwell?’ 
69 
Despite the location of ETSU at the heart of the UKAEA’s research establishment the 
choice attracted little comment at the time, other than by some members of ACORD which 
will  be  discussed  below.
70  This  is  perhaps  partially  explained  by  low  expectations  for 
alternative  sources  of  energy  and  the  limited  interest  in  the  programme  at  the  time. 
However, as the programme began to falter in the early 1980s, particularly after the closure 
of the Wave Energy Programme, increasing speculation was directed at the independence 
of Harwell in controlling R&D into renewable energy (see chapter 4). The account above 
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of the establishment of ETSU shows that Harwell scientists always regarded it as the most 
suitable location for energy R&D and this was agreed at the time by New Scientist which 
pointed to the absence of any alternatives. It stated that the universities had ‘no obvious 
candidate’ to compete with Harwell, and moreover their ‘independence’ could also be 
brought into question.
71 It was only following the protests surrounding the controversial 
closure of the Wave Energy Programme in 1982 discussed at length in chapter 4, that the 
role of ETSU at Harwell became more of an issue. Speaking in a day-long House of 
Commons  debate  on  renewable  energy  in  1985,  Alex  Eadie,  who  had  been  Under-
Secretary of State at the DoEn during the 1970s said, 
 
The claim is that the wave energy activity at Harwell is independent. Perhaps 
the Minister will reply to that question. There is a feeling abroad that it is all 
wrong,  that  nuclear  and  wave  research  should  be  done  together  but  that 
objectivity is being blocked. That might be a gross slander but that feeling is 
abroad in the industry. 
72  
 
  This mood of suspicion was echoed in the same debate by Malcolm Bruce, who 
stated  more  directly  ‘the  suspicion  cannot  be  avoided  that  Harwell  has  an  interest 
ultimately in ensuring the continuation of nuclear-related research. It therefore does not 
appear to have the same commitment to securing the viability of alternatives’.
73 In addition 
to the critical questioning of the role of Harwell in parliament, the wave energy community 
was also sceptical. Wave pioneer, Stephen Salter, was understandably frustrated by the 
closure of the programme and in evidence to a House of Lords inquiry into alternative 
energy  in  1988  he  wrote  that  ETSU  had  ‘uncomfortably  close  links  with  nuclear 
technology’.
74 He was more outspoken that same year when he wrote in Environment Now 
that ‘The control of renewable energy must be taken away from the UKAEA. The UKAEA 
are not only ETSU’s landlord, but are also its paymaster’.
75 
 
  Although  the  focus  of  criticism  centred  on  Harwell  as  the  location  for  the 
management structure of the government’s renewables programme, it is clear that the real 
question (addressed by Salter) was about the potentially negative influence of the UKAEA 
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on the programme. However, defenders of ETSU and Harwell pointed to two mitigating 
factors. First, ETSU did not carry out any R&D at Harwell itself. The programme was 
coordinated and managed by Harwell staff, and even the sternest critics such as Salter 
conceded that ETSU staff generally acted in the best interests of the programme.
76 This 
was a view echoed later by Elliott in his extensive work on the UK renewable energy 
programme.
77 Second, as discussed in detail above, the AERE at Harwell had for some 
time  depended  on  non-nuclear  work  for  its  survival.  And  indeed  the  evidence  above 
suggests that it was probably the intervention of Lord Rothschild that ensured that the new 
unit  went  to  Harwell.  This  suggested  that  it  would  be  in  the  interests  of  Harwell  to 
maintain and increase the volume of work on renewable energy rather than see it ended. I 
would argue that the debate that emerged surrounding the choice of Harwell highlights the 
misunderstanding  that  arose  during  the  period  over  the  closure  of  the  wave  energy 
programme in particular. It suggests a UKAEA conspiracy to sink the wave programme 
just  as  it  was  showing  economic  and  technical  viability.  This  misses  the  point.  The 
UKAEA was only one part, though a powerful part, of the much wider techno-institutional 
complex which acted as a perpetual barrier to renewable energy. 
 
ACORD and ETSU 
During the negotiations between Harwell and the DTI to create ETSU, as noted above, 
some consideration was given to the nationalised industries, and their possible reaction to 
the implications of the creation of a new government energy R&D unit.
78 However, it 
appears that no such thought was given to the reaction of ACORD and the council learnt 
officially about the creation of ETSU from officials of the new DoEn at a council meeting 
on the 12 February 1974. E. C. Williams, who had been appointed Chief Scientist at the 
DoEn attended the meeting and was invited by Sir Harry Melville to outline the changes at 
the new Department of Energy. Williams explained that the new department was similar to 
the old Ministry of Power (familiar to many of the long-standing ACORD members) but 
with the important addition of responsibility for nuclear power. The Energy Technology 
division (ENT) would remain under the supervision of Len Leighton, who would in turn 
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report to Williams on ‘professional matters’ (Williams did not elaborate on what this might 
actually mean) and to another senior official, Peter Le Cheminant, on administration and 
energy policy. Despite the inclusion of nuclear energy within the ambit of the new DoEn, 
Williams explained carefully that he saw the ‘task of ENT division, in conjunction with the 
Council, as reviewing the whole energy technology field, excluding the UKAEA’s nuclear 
programme’. 
79 
 
  Williams,  joined  by  Leighton  who  was  also  in  attendance  at  the  meeting,  then 
immediately announced the creation of ETSU, which he presented as ‘a simple extension’ 
of the ENT division.
80  He explained that, 
 
...the  changed  situation  on  oil  price  and  availability  called  for  a  fresh 
assessment of technological options in the energy field to determine whether 
or not the Government should re-enter directly the R&D field from which it 
withdrew some ten years ago when supplies of conventional primary energy 
were in surplus at low prices. 
81 
 
Williams went on to say that the decision had been taken to ‘tap the capability at Harwell’ 
rather than extend the manpower of the ENT division to carry out this function on the basis 
of expediency; describing Harwell as ‘the UKAEA’s centre for non-nuclear R&D’.  Len 
Leighton backed Williams up by stressing the ‘need for such a unit’ and ‘the need to have 
more  people  looking  at  what  Government  should  be  doing  on  research  on  long-range 
problems’. He added, perhaps in an attempt to close off any final criticism, that Treasury 
approval had been received.
82 
 
  For ACORD the announcement was a stark reflection of the limited role that it 
represented in advising the Secretary of State on matters concerning energy R&D in the 
UK. Sir Harry Melville was ‘incensed’ by the announcement, and the representatives of the 
nationalised  industries  were  similarly  perturbed  by  the  news.  Clearly,  the  members  of 
ACORD saw this as a further weakening of their perceived position within energy policy 
in the UK. Grainger, the NCB representative, complained that the ‘comparatively narrow 
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experience of Harwell staff made them unsuitable for such wide-ranging assessments’.  He 
suggested instead that the ENT division should be expanded to fulfill this role. Professor 
Beer, an independent member of ACORD, accepted the creation of ETSU ‘on the grounds 
of expediency’, but he also alluded to Harwell’s role in suggesting that he would have 
preferred ‘a completely independent and objective body’ to be appointed. Indeed, the focus 
of criticism was not specifically about the creation of the unit per se, but on the choice of 
Harwell as its centre. Nicholson, who was attending the meeting on behalf of the UKAEA 
later summarised the objections, 
 
The Gas Council, Electricity Council, CEGB and the National Coal Board 
all had objections which fell into the following categories: - 
(a)  they are not being consulted; 
(b) AEA  people  at  Harwell  were  not  necessarily  competent  outside  the 
nuclear field; 
(c) they would be biased. 
83 
 
  In his notes of the meeting, Nicholson went on to write that he ‘challenged the 
members on their assumptions of ignorance and bias’ and pointed out that Harwell had 
undertaken R&D contract work for all of the nationalised energy industries in recent years.  
 
  In the correspondence surrounding the creation of ETSU there is no consideration 
of a role for ACORD in the alternative energy programme and the reaction of the council 
took Williams and Leighton completely by surprise. Leighton conceded to Nicholson after 
the meeting that the matter had ‘not been handled right both in terms of timing and the 
content  of  the  letter’  (which  had  been  sent  to  the  nationalised  industries  prior  to  the 
meeting).
84 Despite being forced to accept that there was little they could do to prevent the 
establishment of ETSU at Harwell, the members of ACORD did wring what would prove 
to be a crucial concession from Williams at the meeting. Nicholson recorded, 
 
The Department of Energy agreed to these strings, namely:- 
(1) that the Unit’s work would be reported to ACORD 
(2) that the Unit was a measure of expediency and that before it was used as 
a basis for building up a permanent energy policy unit, the whole matter 
would  be  further  discussed  at  ACORD,  among  other  places.  (Mr. 
Leighton has said that the contract was for one year). 
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  Although  the  second  point  was  largely  disingenuous  and  could  be  understood 
largely as an apology to ACORD, the first of these ad hoc ‘strings’ had the effect of 
maneuvering the Council into a powerful position between ETSU and the DoEn.  After not 
being mentioned at all in the initial establishment of ETSU, ACORD would become the 
body which assessed and co-ordinated the work of the Unit. Eventually this would lead 
ACORD to become central to the controversial decision to close down the Wave Energy 
Programme in 1982 (chapter 4).  Integral to the increased profile of ACORD after 1974 
was the role of Walter Marshall, the aforementioned director of Harwell, and his towering, 
though brief, impact on the formation of the UK renewable energy programme.  
 
‘Marshall the energy’
85 
Soon  after  the  creation  of  the  Department  of  Energy  in  1974  Sir  Harry  Melville  was 
replaced as chairman of ACORD by the rising star of the UK energy scene, Dr. Walter 
Marshall,
86  and  in  the  three  years  until  he  stood  down  as  Chief  Scientist  in  1977  he 
dominated the UK energy scene.
87  Marshall was respected both as a scientist and a science 
administrator. He was a brilliant physicist (elected to the Royal Society in his thirties) who 
began his career with the UKAEA at Harwell in 1954. There he rose very quickly through 
the management ranks becoming deputy director in 1966 and then, two years later (at the 
age of thirty-six), its Director. By the age of forty Marshall had been appointed to the 
board of the UKAEA.
88 During the summer of 1974 Marshall accepted the offer from the 
Secretary of State to take up the post of Chief Scientist at the new ‘science-starved’ DoEn, 
on the condition that he could retain his role as Director at Harwell.
89 Thus, one of the 
leading figures in the UK nuclear industry became the Government’s top scientific adviser 
(albeit on a part-time, unpaid basis) on energy policy.  In addition, Marshall insisted that as 
part of his new role at the DoEn he himself should assume the chairman’s role on both the 
new Offshore Energy Technology Board (OETB) and, as mentioned, ACORD.
90 As Chart 
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1  shows  this  placed  Marshall  in  a  uniquely  powerful  position  to  influence  the  future 
direction of UK energy policy.  
 
Chart 3.1      
Advisory structure 1974-77 - Department of Energy and Walter Marshall 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Although  Marshall  was  clearly  a  ‘nuclear  man’,  as  explained  above,  the 
consideration of the UKAEA’s R&D fell (and would continue to fall) outwith the remit of 
ACORD. The UKAEA formed the DoEn’s largest sector of energy R&D - in terms of 
scale and investment - and accordingly, Sir John Hill the Chairman of the UKAEA, also 
enjoyed  a  close  advisory  relationship  with  the  Secretary  of  State.  In  the  past  this  had 
served  to  weaken  ACORD’s  influence  on  wider  energy  policy,  but  clearly  Marshall 
occupied a unique position, not only as the DoEn’s Chief Scientist, but also as the UKAEA 
board member for research.  As such his influence briefly spread to every corner of UK 
energy policy. Writing in Nature in 1975, David Fishlock observed that Marshall and Sir 
John Hill had ‘...devised the kind of formula that can work only between two people in 95 
closest rapport, to avoid mutual interference within each other’s parish in advising the 
Secretary of State for Energy.’
91  This may indeed have been the case, but arguably the 
source of many of Hill’s views on nuclear R&D could be traced back the UKAEA’s board 
member for research.  
 
  The potential for conflict of interest was ultimately to cost Marshall his role as 
Chief  Scientist  in  June  1977  as  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Energy,  Tony  Benn,  grew 
increasingly  sceptical  about  nuclear  energy  and  particularly  the  role  of  the  UKAEA.
92 
Ironically, Benn had himself promoted Marshall to the post of Deputy Chairman of the 
UKAEA in 1975, despite Marshall’s own uncertainties of perceived conflict of interest, 
thus further increasing the nuclear profile of the DoEn’s Chief Scientist.
93 During 1974, 
when Marshall was first appointed, public interest in the nuclear power programme was 
just beginning to emerge when, as Williams described, the debate shifted from ‘private to 
public’.
94 Also in the same period, following the publication of the influential Flowers 
Report in 1976, many key individuals such as Lord Rothschild began to reconsider the 
wisdom of relying so overwhelmingly on nuclear energy for the future.
95  Clearly, by 1977 
with  the  Windscale  Inquiry  looming,  Marshall’s  position  was  becoming  increasingly 
untenable and he ‘stepped down’ from his role as Chief Scientist. Subsequently, he went 
on  to  become  Chairman  of  the  UKAEA  in  1981,  before  being  knighted  in  1982  and 
moving on to become the CEGB Chairman the same year. In a comment perhaps designed 
to highlight Marshall’s predilections, Benn praised his contribution and the ‘high regard in 
which I hold Dr. Walter Marshall’ before emphasising ‘the role which he can and must 
play in the decisions which must be reached in the nuclear industry within the AEA’.
96   
 
  The role of Walter Marshall in the formative years of the UK renewable energy 
programme serves as a useful example for the larger theme of this thesis: that of the UK 
energy TIC dominating and constraining renewable energy development. In 1977, after 
carefully pointing to Marshall’s pro-nuclear views, Benn went on to praise the work that he 
had done in advancing ‘the potential of alternative sources of energy’, and it is clear that 
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Marshall was crucial in pushing forward the early programme.
97 The archives show that 
Marshall’s views on the potential of renewable energy were no more pessimistic than any 
of those involved in policy making at the time. Indeed, he was responsible for launching 
the Wave Energy Programme in 1975 and through his dual roles he recommended several 
increases in renewables funding. There is certainly no evidence of Marshall conspiring to 
end the renewables R&D programme. There are two straightforward explanations for this, 
of  course.  First,  Marshall  was  director  of  Harwell  and  had  been  responsible  for  its 
‘survival’ diversification programme from the 1960s onwards. Not only did ETSU attract 
funding to Harwell, but it also served to raise the profile of the establishment as the UK’s 
centre for energy R&D. Second, Marshall was first and foremost a scientist, and he was 
interested in maintaining and promoting funding for scientific R&D in the UK. I would 
argue  though  that  overlaying  both  of  these  explanations,  there  is  a  strong  sense  for 
Marshall of the unassailable dominance of the existing structure of energy supply in the 
UK, and in particular the UKAEA.  
 
Conclusions 
This thesis sets out to develop an argument that Government-funded renewable energy 
development in the UK during the period 1974-88 was dominated and constrained by an 
energy  TIC.  This  chapter  has  shown  how  the  institutional  structure  of  the  renewables 
programme  was  established  within  the  TIC  and  controlled  by  interests  close  to  the 
traditional energy industries, particularly the UKAEA. Despite the attraction of the simpler 
explanations for such domination, such as the roles of Harwell and Walter Marshall in the 
period, it has attempted to address the question of influence based on the actual evidence 
that this thesis has examined. This shows quite clearly that, despite earlier pessimism about 
the prospects for renewable energy, ETSU acted to evaluate the R&D efforts of the various 
programmes in a largely fair and balanced manner. A complex network of independent 
consultants was contracted to provide ETSU with progress reports on all aspects of the 
work of the device teams. As stated above, even the most outspoken critics of the overall 
programme regarded ETSU as, at least, scientifically rigorous. This would suggest that any 
outstanding breakthroughs achieved in renewable energy development in the period would 
have been favourably supported at Harwell. It also shows, as argued above, that Walter 
Marshall supported the initiative to explore all new forms of energy and this included 
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renewable sources. Clearly, there was science-based support for renewable energy R&D in 
the UK.  
 
  The evidence therefore appears to challenge the view that renewable energy was 
explicitly sabotaged by the energy TIC at the level of the programme itself. What remains 
is a view which posits that other factors acted to constrain the successful development of 
renewable sources in the UK. At one level these are factors of scale and scope and would 
include the level of funding that was awarded and the targets that were set. The following 
chapter will demonstrate that there is strong evidence to support the argument that these 
factors were crucial in limiting the effectiveness of the programme. These elements of the 
programme were more closely influenced by ACORD, and by the attitude of the DoEn and 
the Government towards energy policy. This thesis argues that it was this wider, macro-
level influence on the renewables programme that limited its success. 98 
Chapter 4 
 The UK Wave Energy Programme, 1975-82 
 
‘The first stage of a full technical and economic appraisal of harnessing wave power for 
electricity generation should be put in hand at once’ 
1 
 
This  brief  recommendation  by  Lord  Rothschild’s  Central  Policy  Review  Staff 
(CPRS), and contained in its ‘Energy Conservation’ report to the government in the depths 
of the oil crisis in January 1974, set the pattern of renewable energy R&D in the UK until 
the early 1980s. The report set out to consider the possible solutions to Britain’s energy 
crisis, and as a part of that exercise, it had considered the contribution of ‘inexhaustible’ 
sources of energy, which included hydro-electric schemes, tidal power, wave power, solar 
energy,  and  nuclear  fusion.  Although  paying  some  attention  to  each  of  these  different 
energy  sources  in  the  appendix  section  of  the  75-page  report,  the  three  pages  that 
summarised the report’s recommendations contained only the brief statement above under 
the heading ‘Electricity Generation’. Reflecting the influence that the CPRS enjoyed in 
government  circles  (discussed  in  chapter  3),  particularly  during  the  early  1970s,  this 
statement  was  repeated  continually  over  the  next  few  years  as  the  justification  for 
unprecedented  levels  of  government  spending  on  R&D  on  renewable  energy,  and  in 
particular on wave power.  
 
  The UK renewable energy programme was focussed on wave energy throughout 
the 1970s.  Inspired by the early work of Gordon Goodwin at the Department of Industry 
(later of the DoEn) and the recommendation of Lord Rothschild's Think Tank, wave power 
was judged to offer the best prospects of all of the renewable sources of energy for the 
country.  Serendipity  played  its  part  too,  as  the  groundbreaking  discoveries  of  Stephen 
Salter coincided with the urgent new interest in alternative sources of power. Wave energy 
quickly gathered supporters, in ETSU, ACORD, and the DoEn, who proved to be powerful 
allies for its development. Two of the DoEn’s Chief Scientists, Walter Marshall and Sir 
Herman  Bondi,  did  much  to  advance  the  cause  of  wave  energy  and  their  influence 
extended to ACORD and the DoEn. Within the ENT division at the DoEn, Don Gore (the 
head  of  the  unit)  and  Gordon  Goodwin  worked  tirelessly  to  establish  a  wave  energy 
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programme and senior figures at Harwell such as Freddie Clarke and more notably, Clive 
Grove-Palmer, became firm advocates for wave power. It appeared that wave energy was 
unassailable - and this chapter will present strong evidence to show the damage that this 
view was to have on wave energy development in the UK.  
 
  The cracks began to appear at the Heathrow Wave Energy Conference in 1978. 
High relative costs and technical challenges - perfectly understandable for such a new 
technology - began to weaken official support for wave energy. ACORD began to look 
more closely at wave energy, and at alternative sources of renewable energy development, 
particularly  wind.  Wind  power  was  a  mature  technology  in  comparison  to  waves,  the 
technical challenges less daunting and therefore the costs easier to estimate. The years 
following Heathrow proved difficult for the Wave Energy Programme (WEP). Despite 
massive improvements in the technology and concomitant reductions in cost, the failure to 
settle on a single device proved fatal for wave energy. The new Government after 1979 
had little patience for a long-term publicly funded R&D programme such as wave power 
required. It demanded results, something concrete that could be plugged in to the National 
Grid and produce electricity at something close to the cost of the conventional sources. The 
decisions of the March 1982 meeting of ACORD to close the wave programme reflected 
this change. 
 
  The UK WEP illustrates some of the key aspects in the evolution of Government-
funded renewables R&D in the UK. Before the ascendancy of wind energy in the early 
1980s, wave power appeared to offer the best prospects as an ‘alternative source of energy’ 
and  quickly  became  what  a  later  Select  Committee  would  describe  as  the  DoEn’s 
‘favourite horse’ during the 1970s. The programme therefore attracted much of the funding 
for renewable energy R&D and nearly all of the political and media attention during the 
1970s.  It  began  amid  the  (almost)  heady  optimism  of  the  mid-1970s  programme  and 
effectively ended in the harsher fiscal spotlight of the Thatcher government. Along the 
way, the unfolding story of the WEP highlights many of the challenges that all renewable 
energy  technologies  faced  during  this  period.  I  will  show  that  these  challenges  were 
created  through  an  understanding  of  energy  that  was  dominated  by  the  traditional 
industries  and  seen  within  the  problem  frame  of  UK  energy  policy  at  that  time.  The 
principal theme of this view was the persistence of the traditional understanding of energy 
created by a belief in the history of great energy transitions: animal to coal, coal to oil, and 100 
oil to nuclear. This was despite the fact that closer examination of history would have 
revealed that from the time of the first Industrial Revolution Britain had been a mixed-fuel 
economy. Despite this, throughout the period and beyond, policymakers always considered 
renewable energy sources in terms of their potential to replace an existing fuel source, be it 
oil, coal or nuclear energy. Renewable energy (in this case wave power) was therefore 
routinely  understood  and  described  as  an  ‘insurance  technology’,  an  illuminating 
description which neatly summarises the overwhelming attitude to its anticipated potential. 
The widespread use of the term was clarified at length by ETSU in 1979 and is worth 
quoting in its entirety. 
 
The concept of insurance is important. Even if a country plans to achieve a 
particular pattern of energy supply and use, it might for a number of reasons 
find  itself  having  to  adopt  some  different  pattern.  Current  assessments  of 
future  likely  events  and  technical  progress  could  be  profoundly  mistaken. 
There  might  be  unexpectedly  high  world  energy  prices  or  restrictions  on 
trade, including sudden embargoes, or restrictions on the use of certain energy 
sources. For example, nuclear power might be limited for environmental or 
social reasons, or concern about the effects of increasing levels of carbon 
dioxide in the world’s atmosphere could lead to limits being set on fossil fuel 
combustion well within a 50 year time horizon.  
  Different technologies can provide a hedge against different risks. A robust 
RD&D strategy must ensure that technologies that might need to be used as 
an insurance are brought to an appropriate stage of development, so that if 
required they can play their insurance role. To be important as an insurance a 
technology does not have to be cost competitive with those which it might 
have to compete in normal circumstances. Wave energy, for example, may 
never be competitive against nuclear power; but if for any reason nuclear 
power  were  not  able  to  be  used,  wave  energy  could  be  an  important 
alternative.
2 
 
  As well as an interesting early reference to climate change and carbon limits, the 
quote above highlights the clear fact that nuclear power was the priority of UK energy 
policy throughout this period. This is well-established and unsurprising. Much less well 
understood, and more pertinent to my central thesis is the understanding of energy that 
underlies this policy priority: that energy policy could and should be based on a limited 
mix of fuels. Another key issue that the above statement highlights, and which was to 
become central to the debates over wave energy, was the concept of ‘an appropriate stage 
of development’.  After the initial enthusiasm for wave energy had subsided, particularly 
following  the  Heathrow  Conference  in  1978,  the  question  of  development  became  the 
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centre of debate in the WEP.  On one hand the wave energy device teams (and the WESC) 
were keen to develop the scale of the programme towards working wave energy devices by 
the mid-1980s, whereas the DoEn and ACORD were daunted by the inevitably huge costs 
of such an undertaking. As we shall see, by 1982 the government judged controversially 
that wave energy had reached a stage in its development that was ‘appropriate’ within the 
UK’s wider energy policy.  
 
  This was the background against which renewable energy was developed during the 
1970s. The WEP began as a serious attempt to examine the long-term potential of wave 
energy  in  the  UK,  but  I  will  show  that  it  was  undermined  by  constantly  shifting 
expectations which only accelerated after the election of the Conservative Government in 
1979. Rather than fully endorsing the view that the WEP was the victim of a nuclear-
inspired conspiracy in the early 1980s, I will argue for a more subtle explanation. My 
research  shows  that  the  wave  energy  community  misunderstood  the  weight  and 
pervasiveness  of  the  government’s  energy  problem  frame  during  the  1970s.  The 
widespread publicity that the programme attracted, and the enthusiastic endorsement of 
many key figures within the energy policy community, led the supporters of wave energy 
to believe that it occupied a key position in the UK’s energy future. This was mistaken. 
Rather, all of the evidence points to the fact that wave energy was never seen as anything 
more than ‘insurance’ by the government. The early programme set out ‘to examine the 
potential of wave energy devices’ and by the early 1980s, in the view of the government, 
the WEP had largely fulfilled these initial goals. By general agreement the next stage of 
the WEP, demonstration in the open seas, required much more significant sums, and this 
was an investment that the Conservative government was simply not prepared to make for 
a rather uncertain insurance policy.  
 
The wave resource 
The UK - mainly in Scotland - has the best wave energy resources in Europe, and among 
the best in the world. However, the actual figures attributed to the potential of the resource 
varied during the course of the WEP, primarily to suit the argument - for or against wave 
energy - being advanced at the time.  However, by the mid-1980s it was assumed that 
offshore wave energy could provide in the order of 50 - 66 TWh per year of electricity, or 102 
approximately 20 Mtce.
3 At the time this represented roughly twenty-five percent of total 
electricity consumption in the UK, which in 1980 stood at 241 TWh.
4  In contrast, the 
suggested total potential for wind energy in the UK increased greatly through the period, 
beginning early in 1973 with estimates in the region of 4 TWh, when wave was initially 
estimated at a staggering 900 TWh.
5 By the mid-1980s developments in wind energy had 
raised these estimates to a figure much closer to that estimated for wave energy and wind 
was seen as having an onshore potential of around 45 TWh.
6  The huge early figure for 
wave energy was produced in March 1973 by the Energy Technology Unit (ENT) at the 
DTI and was based on existing wave data.
7 It extrapolated these figures from the entire 
1700 miles of UK coastline which resulted in such impressive looking numbers. This basic 
approach was also adopted by the more rigorous NEL report on wave energy that appeared 
in 1975 although in this case the total potential was estimated at 500 TWh.
8 Clearly, these 
early estimates varied greatly from the eventual agreed potential for wave of around 50 
TWh.  How is this explained?  
 
  The  very  first  estimates  for  renewable  energy  in  the  UK  concentrated  on  the 
physical  scale  of  the  resource.  The  subsequent  reductions  in  the  figures  for  wave  are 
explained  by  the  investigation  that  took  place  during  the  first  phase  of  the  WEP  to 
determine  the  technically  feasible  scale  of  the  resource.  Clearly,  the  working  NEL 
assumption of an unbroken line of wave energy devices ringing Britain, ten miles out to 
sea, was not practicable. Moreover, neither was the implicit assumption that all of the 
energy  contained  in  the  waves  could  be  captured  and  sent  to  shore  without  any 
transmission losses. Therefore, the first job of the new WEP was to determine this new 
figure and this is where we shall move to considering the first phase of the programme.  
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The Wave Energy Programme 
Although  most  accounts,  including  this  one,  identify  Rothschild's  CPRS  report  as  the 
starting point of the UK’s wave energy R&D programme, there was already some impetus 
within the government to explore the potential of wave power. The DTI report referred to 
above was produced in March 1973 and provided some of the inspiration to the later CPRS 
study. Indeed, Rothschild consulted the author of the earlier report, Gordon Goodwin of 
the Energy Technology division (ENT) at the DTI, and used his investigations into wave 
energy extensively.
9 Goodwin was a scientist by training, and became fascinated by the 
potential of wave energy in 1973. He played a key ‘behind the scenes’ role in developing 
wave  energy  in  the  UK  (described  in  more  detail  in  chapter  5).  Prior  to  the  official 
appearance of the CPRS report (although obviously aware of its content) the DTI had 
already  commissioned  the  National  Engineering  Laboratory  (NEL)  at  East  Kilbride  to 
produce  a  detailed  techno-economic  appraisal  of  the  state  of  global  wave  power 
technology.
10 The high public profile of Rothschild’s Think Tank attracted publicity to 
wave energy and provided the initial boost that it required, but it was the recommendations 
of the NEL report that provided the evidence required for the establishment of the wave 
energy programme after 1975.
11  
 
The NEL report: ‘preliminary assessment’ 
The stated objective of the NEL report was to ‘assess the economic and technical viability 
of wave power generation in the UK’, but its focus was overwhelmingly on the technical 
challenges  of  wave  energy.
12  Although  the  report  did  suggest  that  electricity  could  be 
produced from wave energy ‘at about 1p/kWh’ within the summary of its findings the 
report conceded that it was unable to fully assess the economic potential of wave energy 
owing to the uncertain technical development of wave energy devices.  
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No  undue  emphasis  should  be  placed  on  these  cost  estimates  as  the 
assessment  did  not  and  could  not  determine  the  costs  of  structures  and 
components whose detailed design requires extensive investigation. 
13 
 
Despite  this,  the  recommendation  of  the  report  was  that  ‘The  UK  should  maintain  an 
interest in the development of power generation from sea-wave energy’. Notwithstanding 
its shortcomings, Ross, perhaps the strongest and most widely published critic of the UK 
WEP, described the NEL report as the ‘standard work’ on wave energy and it formed the 
basis  for  the  Wave  Energy  Programme  (WEP).  Gordon  Goodwin  was  less  impressed 
however. Ross quotes an interview with Goodwin in the early 1980s where he describes 
the report in much more negative terms.  
 
We granted them £13000 to produce this and they had access to Salter’s 
work. It is horrible. It is rubbish. It is paper ideas. I had argued that water 
would not do what you expected. I thought we should get our feet wet. I was 
over-ruled and work went on at the NEL.
14 
 
  Goodwin  was  enthusiastic  about  the  potential  for  wave  energy  and  had  been 
instrumental in putting it on the agenda of the DTI, and subsequently the CPRS, through 
1973.  He  had  written  the  March  1973  DTI  study  and  had  contributed  to  Rothschild’s 
report. However, his comments were made as the WEP was facing closure in the early 
1980s. Ross concluded that his harsh comments arose because NEL shifted through time 
from  supporting  the  work  of  Salter  at  Edinburgh  University  towards  a  different  wave 
device - the oscillating water column - based on a design originated by Masuda in Japan. 
Goodwin had been closely associated with the Salter team from late 1973 (see chapter 5). 
This then may partly explain his damning assessment of the NEL report. However, I would 
add the view that he was frustrated at that lack of progress in wave energy and placed some 
of the blame for this on the initial eighteen-month delay caused by the wait for the NEL 
report.  The  report  undoubtedly  set  the  tone  for  the  WEP  and  following  its 
recommendations in its first phase this focussed on ‘study’: device development in the labs 
and test tanks of the device teams - with no ‘wet feet’.  This first phase will be explored 
next.  
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‘Phase one: Study’  
In 1985, with the convenience of hindsight, a government report mapped out the evolution 
of the development of the WEP.
15 This official version presented the NEL Report as the 
‘Preliminary Assessment’ stage lasting until early 1976 which then introduced a two-year 
‘Study’ phase of the programme. In late 1978 this was followed by ‘Reference Designs’; 
this part of the WEP, when device teams worked towards the design of a 2GW generating 
station, which, as it turned out would last until the programme was drastically reduced and 
effectively shut-down in March 1982. The government report termed the phase after 1982 
as  the  ‘Reduced  Ongoing  Programme’.  At  the  time  this  was  written  in  1985,  the 
government  was  still  coming  under  criticism  for  what  some  saw  as  the  premature 
abandonment of wave energy R&D, and the above can be seen on one level as a clear 
attempt to emphasise the structural logic of the WEP and to emphasise the government’s 
assessment that the programme had reached ‘an appropriate stage of development’. The 
clear gap in the otherwise detailed NEL study was in the cost of generating electricity from 
the sea waves, and this therefore had to be a priority for the programme. This section will 
focus on the ‘Study’ phase of the programme which began formally in April 1976 and 
lasted until the Heathrow Wave Energy Conference in November 1978. 
 
  Following  the  favourable  conclusions  of  the  NEL  report  in  1975  the  formal 
decision was taken by ACORD in June of that year to establish a Wave Energy Steering 
Committee (WESC).
16 The initial task of this committee was; 
 
• to draw up and agree a national programme of work for the study of wave 
energy 
• to advise on the implementation and management of that programme 
• to advise on the technical briefing of UK delegates to international meetings 
on wave energy 
• to report to the Chief Scientist, Department of Energy on matters relating to 
wave energy.
17  
 
  WESC began to meet formally from August 1975. Despite the claim that ‘members 
of the WESC were drawn from industry, academic institutions, consultants, officials, and 
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ETSU’
18, in fact, as table 1 shows, the initial membership was dominated by the last two of 
these groups,  ETSU and the DoEn. The pace of initial developments was quickened by the 
DoEn’s  Chief  Scientist,  Walter  Marshall,  who  was  very  anxious  to  work  ‘urgently  on 
progressing  Wave  Power  R  and  D’.
19  This  was  partly  explained  by  his  recent 
uncomfortable appearance in front of the Select Committee for Science and Technology 
(SCST) which, in common with many other aspects of energy policy, was sharply critical 
of the lack of progress in renewable energy technology.
20 The initial challenge lay mainly 
in funding the programme, as the relatively new and small DoEn was slow in establishing 
its R&D budgets.
21 Late in 1974 this had already led to the Salter wave energy device 
secure its initial funding from the rival DTI through the recently established Mechanical 
Engineering  and  Machine  Tools  Requirements  Board  (MEMTRB)  (see  chapter  5). 
Shortage of DoEn funds meant that the same body also initially funded the WESC.  
 
Table 4.1 
Wave Energy Steering Committee Membership, 1975-76 
22 
L. E J. Roberts (Chairman)  ETSU (Harwell)  
F. J. P. Clarke (Chairman - from July 1976)  ETSU (Harwell)  
J. K. Dawson  ETSU (Harwell)  
G. Goodwin  DoEn 
D. Gore  DoEn 
R. Hancock   NEL 
G. Potter  Science Research Council (SRC) 
J. K. Wright  CEGB 
C. Grove-Palmer (Secretary)  ETSU (Harwell)  
 
 
  The ENT division at the DoEn had prepared a paper for the ACORD meeting in 
June 1975 which suggested funding for a  wave programme ‘should be about £400,000 per 
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annum at present, rising to perhaps £2 million in three or four years time’.
23 The first 
option was to consider diverting some of the existing ETSU budget, however for 1975/6 
this had been agreed at a total of £300,000 - with perhaps only around £100,000 being 
available  for  the  wave  energy  programme.
24  At  the  early  meetings  of  WESC  it  soon 
became apparent that a figure much closer to the ENT recommendation would be required 
for a two-year programme. Wave energy was continuing to attract publicity and this added 
to the pressure that Walter Marshall felt to demonstrate serious intent in energy R&D. By 
April 1976, when the official wave energy programme was launched £1m was the amount 
allocated by the DoEn for the two-year study. 
 
  By January 1976 the WESC had formulated a plan for the first stage of the formal 
Wave Energy Programme. This set out a two-year programme lasting until the end of 
1978, which was to include ‘nine major areas of work.’
25 This included four ‘Specific 
Wave Energy Convertor Projects’ and five identified areas of ‘Generic work’. The original 
four wave energy devices included were: 
 
✦  Salter’s Duck (University of Edinburgh) 
✦  Cockerell’s Raft (Wavepower Ltd.) 
✦  Masuda’s buoy - the Oscillating Water Column (NEL) 
✦  Russell’s Rectifier (Hydraulics Research Station)  
 
  Each  of  these  devices  featured  prominently  in  the  NEL  report,  and  as  already 
mentioned  in  the  case  of  ‘Salter’s  ducks’  government  R&D  funding  of  £65,000  was 
already  in  place  through  the  DTI  (see  chapter  5).  The  publicity  that  surrounded  wave 
energy  during  1974,  and  resulted  in  the  funding  for  Salter,  was  also  assisted  by  the 
prominence given to Sir Christopher Cockerell’s work on wave energy. Cockerell, through 
his work on developing the Hovercraft, was one of the best-known and respected British 
scientist/inventors and his presence undoubtedly attracted further attention to wave energy. 
Cockerell was optimistic about wave energy, and as early as October 1974 he had been 
interviewed by the BBC on its prospects. In the interview he suggested that the wave 
energy ‘which at the moment just bashes the shore and goes to waste’ could meet all of our 
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electricity consumption needs. 
26 Along with Salter, Cockerell and his raft device had been 
under development since late in 1973. Cockerell had formed a new company, Wavepower 
Limited, with some funding from British Hovercraft Ltd. to develop the device, and the 
DoEn had indicated early in 1974 that government R&D funding would be allocated to his 
new device.
27  
 
  The other two wave energy devices that feature in the initial programme were also 
given their prominence in the WESC recommendations by the NEL report. The Masuda 
buoy was the most well established of all the devices proposed for the programme and the 
NEL  report  identified  it  as  ‘the  most  promising  scheme’.
28  Yoshio  Masuda  had  been 
developing his floating buoy wave energy device since the Second World War and it was 
therefore the only device to have achieved any commercial development. The remaining, 
and  least  well-developed  device,  known  as  the  Russell  rectifier,  was  based  at  the 
Government’s own Hydraulics Research Station (HRS) at Wallingford. Like the Masuda 
device the fundamental idea had been developed prior to the 1970s, owing its development 
to  earlier  work  during  the  1950s  on  wave  energy  by  Walton  Bott.  Bott  gained  his 
experience in energy working on hydroelectric schemes in Scotland before relocating to 
Mauritius in 1953 to set up an electricity board.  Bott developed a shoreline wave energy 
device which was later taken up by Robert Russell, a scientist based at Wallingford. These 
devices,  along  with  the  Raft  and  the  Duck,  then  appeared  to  WESC  to  be  the  most 
promising of the early wave energy devices.  
 
  The other element of the initial wave energy programme proposed by WESC was 
five areas of ‘Generic Work’ (see below). This would eventually result in the creation of 
the  Technical  Advisory  Groups  (TAGs)  that  were  directly  responsible  for  assessing 
different elements of the programme. This area of the programme was to prove crucial in 
developing and assessing the work of the device teams, though some, including Salter, felt 
that they sometimes slowed progress with unnecessary extra work (see chapter 5 for more 
discussion on this point).  
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✦ Wave data 
✦ Wave loading and the behaviour of Structures 
✦ Anchoring and Mooring 
✦ Energy conversion and Transmission 
✦ Environmental studies and external relations.
29 
 
  The summary paper proposed the initial programme as a ‘feasibility study’ and 
went on to say clearly that ‘If, when the feasibility study has been completed, the idea of 
wave energy continues to look attractive, it will be necessary to build larger scale models 
for more extensive tank trials’ (my italics). WESC planned to ‘take at least two devices’ to 
this next stage, and have ‘at least one 1 MW prototype operating at sea within the next ten 
years’.  Significantly  for  the  future  programme  the  WESC  went  on  to  suggest  that  the 
anticipated cost of such an ongoing programme ‘is unlikely to be less than £25m’.  This 
shows quite clearly that from the outset of the renewable energy programme considerable 
funding was anticipated in order that devices could be developed fully. As has been shown, 
wave  energy  was  seen  as  the  major  contender  in  this  period.  This  arose  from  the 
assessment of its potential contribution as a major energy source. In contrast to the small 
contribution  traditionally  expected  from  renewable  energy,  wave  energy  showed  early 
promise as a potentially significant contributor to UK electricity consumption. Even bodies 
thought of as hostile to renewable energy sources such as the CEGB suggested that it could 
provide ‘nearly five times the average demand on the CEGB’.
30 This helps to explain much 
of the early enthusiasm for wave power. 
 
  On April 29 1976 Alex Eadie, the Under-Secretary of State for Energy, responding 
to a written question announced the launch of the Government’s ‘national research and 
development  programme  into  wave  energy’.  The  WESC  recommendations  had  been 
adopted without any alteration and a two-year £1m programme to establish the ‘feasibility 
of  large-scale  extraction  of  power  from  the  sea-waves’  was  formally  created.
31  In 
preparation for the announcement Eadie had made a public visit to see Salter’s work at 
Edinburgh during March that year and was personally impressed by the potential of the 
resource.
32  Although  WESC  was  careful  not  to  indicate  any  favourites  among  the 
competing  wave  energy  devices,  the  Salter  team  was  allocated  the  largest  slice  of  the 
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proposed  budget.
33  This  was  partly  due  to  the  advanced  development  of  the  duck  in 
comparison with the other devices, but also reflected the high public profile of Salter as a 
wave energy pioneer.  
 
  The ‘study’ phase of the programme went very much according to the proposed 
WESC plan.  The National Engineering Laboratory at East Kilbride were given the task of 
developing the Masuda device, which after a brief spell as the ‘Pelican’ became more 
widely known as the oscillating water column (OWC) and each of the device teams set 
about the initial development task of producing designs for a 1MW generating station. 
Very early in the programme (in fact, prior to the official programme) the Salter team at 
Edinburgh  formed  a  partnership  with  Lanchester  Polytechnic  and  industrial  partners, 
Ready Mixed Concrete (UK) Ltd. and Insituform (Pipes and Structures).
34 They formed a 
limited company called Sea Energy Associates (SEA) to help develop the Duck concept 
which received separate funding from the WEP. This was an interesting example of an 
early  university/industry/government  initiative  which  is  dealt  with  in  greater  depth  in 
chapter 5.    
 
  By April 1977, only a year after the launch of the official programme, the DoEn 
announced an increase in funding to £2.5m. 
35 Although this was partly due to the dramatic 
impact of inflation at the time (averaging around 16% in the period) it was also a reflection 
of the rapid development and testing of the wave devices.
36 The earlier funding received by 
the Salter team meant that the WEP did not begin from a standing start, as the Edinburgh 
lab had already assembled a suitable testing tank for the four first generation devices. With 
the first 1:100 scale tests completed, the DoEn and some of the teams were keen to scale 
up their devices and get them into the open-water. Very quickly this was to lead to conflict 
between Salter and the Lanchester team, specifically over open water trials of Salter’s 
Duck in Loch Ness during 1977.
37 Salter favoured more tank testing, but the Lanchester 
team led by Norman Bellamy (and encouraged by the WESC) was keen to test a 1:10th 
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scale model in open-water. This gave rise to some bitter exchanges, covered in more detail 
in chapter 5, which give some early indication of concern over the direction of the WEP. 
 
  By the end of the two-year study phase of the programme, and despite Salter’s 
strong objections, open water trials had taken place in Loch Ness of the Salter device and 
the Cockerell Raft in the Solent. Allowances had been made within the WEP budget for 
additional devices to be included, and by the end of the two-year programme more devices 
were beginning to receive DoEn R&D funding.  
 
Heathrow 1978 
A first Wave Energy Conference at Heathrow marked the end of the two-year study phase 
of the programme in November 1978  and attracted over 300 delegates, including many 
from  overseas  keen  to  hear  about  the  initial  successes  of  the  UK  wave  energy 
programme.
38 The conference brought together all of the wave device teams, the Technical 
Advisory Groups (TAGs), government, and the press to review the results of the feasibility 
study. Despite the commitment of the DoEn earlier in 1978 to fund the programme for a 
further two years, most commentators identify the Heathrow Conference as the crucial 
turning point away from wave energy in the UK.
39 Unfortunately little archive material 
exists  on  what  this  thesis  regards  as  the  pivotal  moment  in  the  period.  This  account 
therefore will rely on the conference programme and the personal recollection of some of 
its participants.  
 
  Although the conference produced clear evidence of tremendous technical advances 
in wave energy data and devices, the estimated costs of generating electricity that were 
unveiled  at  Heathrow  deflated  early  enthusiasm.  The  crest  that  the  wave  energy 
community had been riding right up until the conference dipped into a trough from which 
it could not recover. One purpose of the feasibility study had been to identify the most 
promising wave energy devices for further funding and development, and the device teams 
all had plenty of technical progress to report on at the conference. However, the study 
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phase of the programme was also given the task of estimating the likely cost of wave 
power - something that the NEL report had been unable to do. It was these results - the 
economics of wave power - that caused significant and lasting damage to the reputation of 
wave energy.  
 
  The omens were bad for wave energy when Freddie Clarke, chairman of the WESC 
and research director at Harwell, opened the conference on the 22 November in somewhat 
gloomy terms, ‘...there is usually a stage in the research and development of technology at 
which the problems loom larger than the solutions and things appear to change from month 
to month and possibly from week to week. Wave energy is currently at this stage.’  He 
gave a very brief review of the first two years of the programme, in which he highlighted 
what he regarded as its three main achievements. The first of these was the ‘team of some 
150  people  all  over  the  country...who  are  gaining  a  grip  on  this  new  and  difficult 
technology  of  wave  power.’    The  second  was  the  shift  from  ‘elementary  testing  in 
laboratory to very sophisticated testing that simulates in miniature real sea conditions’ 
adding that the ‘films of these are very striking indeed.’ This technological development 
was ‘a substantial step forward in our knowledge’ but in introducing his third point he 
judged that it was ‘still not great enough’. The last ‘achievement’ was what Clarke termed 
‘a proper engineering evaluation of concepts’. This final point referred to the role that 
Rendell, Palmer and Tritton (RPT), a key consultant to the WEP, played in assessing and 
evaluating the devices in the programme. He explained that RPT, working closely with the 
teams, had produced ‘so-called reference designs, and have costed them. So it is that we 
are today able to give some costings for the first generation of wave energy machines.’ 
40 
He then concluded his opening remarks under the heading ‘The high costs of the early 
designs’. Whilst conceding that some ‘important designs and concepts’ were hoping for a 
figure of 10p per kWh, he estimated average generation costs in a ‘very high’ range of 20-
50p per kWh, compared to the average electricity generation cost at that time of 2p per 
kWh. This was a million miles from the 1p per kWh that the NEL report had tentatively 
suggested in its report.  
 
  Speaking later in the conference, Clive Grove-Palmer the WEP manager was more 
upbeat about the prospects for wave energy. Both revealing the hubris of the wave energy 
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community and anticipating the unfavourable reaction to the Heathrow figures, he rather 
naively suggested that although the ‘cost analysis’ could be seen as ‘a hatchet job’ he 
thought that ‘...there is nothing quite like the thought of an execution to concentrate the 
mind.’  Ross later wrote that most of the journalists and foreign buyers had left the meeting 
after the first day when the technical challenges and high predicted costs for wave energy 
were unveiled and emphasised.
41 Certainly in the media there was evidence of a notable 
shift  away  from  the  largely  positive  views  on  wave  energy  immediately  following 
Heathrow.  Writing in the Observer Jeremy Bugler, referring to the RPT report suggested 
that  ‘A  3-volume  gale  hits  the  wave  energy  men’.
42  In  The  Scotsman,  Frank  Frazer 
focussed on the ‘environmental and social aspects of wavepower’ with the ‘routing [sic] of 
pylons across the Isle of Skye’.
43 In a letter to Salter on the publication of the Heathrow 
proceedings,  Grove-Palmer  observed  that  it  ‘...presents  a  rather  gloomy  picture  of  the 
prospects for wave energy and that fact has not escaped the press.’
44 
 
  It appeared from Grove-Palmer’s remarks at Heathrow that the goodwill of the 
Government  and  public  support  for  alternative  energy  had  been  taken  too  easily  for 
granted. Four years of R&D on wave energy, including the previous two years of official 
backing had lent the programme a feeling of invincibility. Much of this was perfectly 
understandable, of course. In the early part of 1978, following the success of the early 
programme and before the two years of the ‘study phase’ were completed, the Government 
had agreed funding for a further two years of wave energy R&D; at an increased rate. And 
Glyn England, chairman of the CEGB which was often seen as a strong advocate for the 
expansion of nuclear power, speaking at Fawley power station in July that same year said,  
 
As we see it at present wave power is the most promising of the renewable 
energy  sources...Averaged  over  the  year  there  is  about  80  kilowatts  of 
power in each metre of wave front approaching Britain from the North 
Atlantic.  This  implies  a  total  annual  availability  of  120,000  megawatts 
(120 gigawatts) of power along Britain’s Atlantic Coast. However, not all 
the  power  could  be  harnessed.  There  would  inevitably  be  substantial 
power losses in conversion, and transmission losses, too, so that probably 
only  about  one  third  could  actually  be  got  to  the  electricity  consumer. 
Nevertheless this is still a substantial amount of power - enough, in fact, to 
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supply  the  whole  of  Britain  with  electricity  at  the  present  rate  of 
consumption. 
45  
 
  Added to the official endorsements of wave power was the positive, widespread 
and ongoing media coverage that wave energy received prior to the Heathrow Conference.  
The launch of the WEP was covered extensively in the UK and abroad.
46 This coverage 
reflected the official enthusiasm for wave energy and continued throughout the ‘study’ 
phase  of  the  programme,  as  progress  was  covered  positively  by  the  press  and  trade 
journals. This included gushing reports of the opening of a new £100,000 wave energy 
tank at the University of Edinburgh,
47 and the first open-water trials of the Duck at Loch 
Ness in 1977.
48  
 
Phase two: ‘Reference Designs’ 
In the first phase of the programme the WESC operated within a set of loosely defined 
long-term  targets  for  the  wave  energy  device  teams.  Their  initial  report  to  the  Chief 
Scientist  in  1976  had  suggested  that  the  teams  should  work  towards  having  a  1MW 
prototype ‘operating at sea’ by the mid-1980s.
49  More clearly defined were the short-term 
two-year  technical  targets  of  the  programme,  and  ironically,  the  Heathrow  Conference 
provided evidence that these had been achieved successfully. This element of success led 
to a reconsideration of the scale of the target that the teams were set, and when the funding 
was increased early in 1977 the ‘reference design’ that the teams were working towards 
was  also  increased  dramatically  to  2GW  (2000  MW)  power  station.
50  In  addition  to 
reflecting the success of the device teams, this new target says something about the attitude 
of the DoEn towards new energy sources. Echoing the comments by the CEGB on the 
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scale of the resource it illustrates the government’s pressing need for alternative energy 
sources to demonstrate their potential as major fuel providers according to the dominant 
energy paradigm. Although accepted with little comment at the time (again, perhaps a 
reflection of the hubris of the wave energy community) the change in the scale of the 
reference designs created problems for the device teams from the Heathrow Conference 
onwards. During this new phase of the programme the consultants RPT were set the task 
by the WESC of estimating the cost per kWh of the much larger station. Later, Salter 
would repeatedly complain that this was like trying to estimate the cost of air travel in the 
1980s based on data available in 1910.
51  
 
  By the end of 1978, at the start of the next phase of the wave energy programme, 
the range of devices receiving DoEn funding had increased significantly. Joining what 
became known as the four ‘first generation’ devices, were a number of new devices listed 
below.  
✦ the Flexible Bag (University of Lancaster) 
✦ the Clam (Lanchester Polytechnic and Sea Energy Associates) 
✦ the Triplate (Royal Military College of Science) 
✦ the Cylinder (University of Bristol) 
 
  The greatly increased number of devices indicated a number of things. First, from a 
technological point of view it was an illustration of the rapid spread and transfer of new 
technology within UK research establishments. This was aided and encouraged by the 
wide  press  coverage  but  must  also  have  indicated  the  existence  of  some  form  of 
technology R&D network within the UK. Certainly also the number of devices increased 
in proportion to the funding available for wave energy within the DoEn. Interestingly the 
device teams rarely, if ever, complained about the extent of funding available. On the 
contrary,  after  the  official  programme  was  established  Salter  wrote  regularly  that  his 
research  was  ‘well  provided  for’.  Rather,  bitter  complaints  were  reserved  for  the 
administrative process that accompanied the funds discussed in detail below.  
 
  A second important issue that arises from the increase in devices is the uncertainty 
that this indicates from WESC, particularly about the potential of first generation devices. 
Chapter 1 discussed the long history of wave energy converters, in particular the large 
number of wave device patents - a point emphasised in the NEL report. In that history of 
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devices a wide variety of approaches had been taken to extracting energy from the sea 
waves. Famously, Salter had invented his basic but highly efficient Duck device within a 
few  short  months  by  going  ‘...round  to  Woolworth’s...[and  buying]...sixpen’orth  of 
Balsa...’
52 adding another method to the already long list of wave energy devices. In short 
it appeared that there were a number of methods for extracting power from the waves, and 
in each case the fundamental principle and design of the devices was arguably the least of 
the technological challenges facing the teams.
53  
 
  It was the ease with which new wave energy conversion devices could be devised 
that made the initial study phase of the programme a success, as each concept was tested in 
the controlled environment of the laboratory tank. The Heathrow Conference had gone 
beyond the test-tank to imagine each device operating in the open sea - and this is where 
the real challenges lay. Donald Swift-Hook, a senior CEGB scientist who worked on wave 
energy in the 1970s, later argued that the actual device selected was almost irrelevant: each 
device converted wave energy at high efficiencies. The key lay in collecting the energy and 
transmitting it to the National Grid.
54 Although perhaps understandably disagreeing with 
his point over the irrelevance of converters, Salter was aware of this general issue and this 
helps to explain his resistance to what he viewed as premature testing in open water at 
Loch Ness in 1977.
55 However, the WESC decision to include yet more wave energy 
devices shows some misunderstanding of the importance of this point. Unfortunately, the 
decision to include additional devices also resulted in some nervousness and criticism from 
ACORD over the scope of the programme, and this led directly to a series of retreats from 
the WEP that ultimately resulted in the closure of the programme by 1982.  
 
  The  first  official  signal  of  a  retreat  from  the  WEP  resulted  from  the  ACORD 
meeting in March 1980. At this point it may be worthwhile to describe the way in which 
the overall DoEn management of the programme was structured, which Salter referred to 
as a ‘tortuous chain of command’.
56  As outlined in chapter 3, ACORD had the task of 
advising  the  DoEn  on  its  energy  R&D  programmes.  Although,  controversially  nuclear 
energy lay outside the remit of ACORD, after 1974 the renewable energy programme was 
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added to its advisory responsibilities. ETSU provided the next link in the management and 
advisory  chain  and  it  reported  on  the  range  of  individual  renewables  programmes  to 
ACORD on an annual basis. WESC reported progress on the WEP to both ETSU and 
ACORD. Ultimately, it was ACORD who would make recommendations to the Secretary 
of State, and they had a strong influence on outcomes as was discussed in chapter 3. The 
difficulties arose in the timing of progress reports and advice. Salter described it thus: 
 
The  cycle  of  events  began  with  the  Treasury  Financial  Year  in  April. 
There had to be time for the Department of Energy officials to consider the 
ACORD advice and for ACORD to approve its own minutes. This meant 
that the advice must be given at an ACORD meeting in February. The 
proposals put forward to ACORD had to be discussed by one meeting of 
WESC and modified for approval by a second. This meant that WESC 
must  have  all  the  information  it  needed  in  early  December.  The  most 
important piece of information required was the report by the Consultants. 
If they worked flat out they could finalise reports on a number of devices 
in about a month, but this meant that they must bring down the chopper on 
the work of the device teams by the beginning of November. Everything 
they saw was a flash photograph of the position in October. There is no 
chance of a device team saying “There. It is finished. Nothing can improve 
it. We have spoken.” The drawings and graphs carried long streaks as the 
paper was wrenched from beneath their pencils at 23.59 on October 31st. 
 
  After  April  the  Department  of  Energy  would  tell  the  Programme 
Manager how much he would have to spend. This would be unlikely to be 
the same as the amount he wanted and so he would have to talk with 
device teams, Project Officers, Consultants and TAGS and arrive at a new 
revised  programme.  If  he  worked  with  the  tireless  devotion  for  which 
programme managers are selected he might have this done by the end of 
May, ready for discussions by WESC in June and for modifications and re-
approval in July. The sums of money involved exceeded the amount which 
could be authorised without signature by officials of the Department of 
Energy, who are of course on holiday in August. But when they returned 
in  September  it  took  no  time  at  all  to  authorise  and  issue  the  formal 
contracts from the Harwell contracts branch. It was just possible to get one 
out by mid-October, leaving two weeks for the ordering of equipment and 
the  recruitment  if  not  the  training  of  staff  before  the  consultants’  axe 
descended.  A single hiccup in any part of the procedure could make the 
official  working  time  go  negative  and  often  did.  When  the  contracts 
arrived they could be amazingly complicated.  In one the work programme 
was  split  into  four  time  periods  and  four  different  work  topics  giving 
sixteen different pots of money and no certainty that it could be transferred 
between them. 
57 
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  Even allowing for the frustration that Salter felt as part of the device teams at the 
sharp end of this process, it clearly placed severe constraints on the work of the WEP. 
Bellamy, of the SEA/Lanchester Polytechnic team shared Salter’s concerns. In April 1978 
he wrote to Clarke,  
 
What is not acceptable is the inflexibility of the yearly go/no-go decisions 
on  device  team  existence  which  particularly  applies  to  educational 
institutions. Even with the intention of continuity from year to year, the time 
scales  of  reports  leading  to  proposals  leading  to  contracts  cannot  be 
achieved  without  disruption.  Something  should  be  done  to  put  future 
programmes on a businesslike basis. 
 
  Despite the complaints of the device teams and the efforts of WESC and the Chief 
Scientist, Sir Herman Bondi, the Treasury were firm that the basis of government funded 
R&D should remain on yearly contracts. They pointed out that ‘This policy is adopted for 
all  Government  R&D  work  of  this  nature,  including  entire  weapons  systems  costing 
several hundred millions of pounds to develop.’  Although confessing not to ‘be fully 
aware of all the details’ of the WEP, the Treasury went on to explain that yearly contracts 
‘allow the Government to limit their involvement in the event of (i) public expenditure cuts 
or  (ii)  a  desire  to  terminate  the  work  either  because  the  technological  feasibility  of 
completing the work becomes doubtful or because the market prospects change adversely 
to such an extent that continued funding cannot be justified.’
58 This was to prove to be an 
uncanny prediction of the fate of the WEP.  
 
  After what can now be seen as the high point of the WEP between 1976 and 1978, 
the  disappointing  economic  assessments  of  wave  energy  presented  at  the  Heathrow 
Conference  and  the  proliferation  of  devices  eventually  caused  ACORD  to  look  more 
closely at the programme. Increased funding for 1978/79 of £2.9m had been agreed by 
ACORD  early  in  1978  (before  Heathrow)  but  clearly  the  enthusiasm  for  waves  was 
beginning to wane.
59 The case for wave energy was not helped by the publication later in 
1979  of  the  Heathrow  Conference  Proceedings,  the  appearance  of  the  DoEn’s  Energy 
Paper 42 on the wave energy programme, and the election of a new government committed 
to  cuts  in  public  expenditure.  Unfortunately  for  the  device  teams,  despite  significant 
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improvements in cost per kWh since Heathrow, Energy Paper 42 reproduced the earlier 
higher figures from Heathrow. However, by the time these publications appeared, and prior 
to  the  election  of  the  Thatcher  government  in  May  1979,  the  March  1979  meeting  of 
ACORD had approved an increased budget of £4.9m for wave energy in 1979/80.
60  
 
ACORD March 1980 
Wind energy, which had been largely dismissed up until this point, began to look more 
favourable to the DoEn and by the March 1980 meeting of ACORD official impatience 
with wave energy was increasing. From June 1978, under invitation from Sir Herman 
Bondi,  a  Wind  Energy  Steering  Group  (WISC)  had  begun  to  meet  (also  under  the 
chairmanship of WESC chairman, Freddie Clarke) to develop a wind energy programme 
(see chapter 6).
61 Despite this, in January 1980 ETSU produced its fifth annual report for 
ACORD which was full of praise for the ‘considerable progress’ made by the WEP during 
1979. Referring to the ‘very high’ costs estimated at Heathrow (and repeated in Energy 
Paper 42) it noted that ‘all these factors have been improved significantly during 1979’. 
Instead of the wide 20-50 p/kWh range, costs on a range of devices had been reduced to 5-
15 p/kWh, with the promise of further reductions.
62 These figures were repeated in the 
WESC report for ACORD, and both reports painted a very promising picture for wave 
energy.  
 
  Alluding to another primary criticism of the WEP by ACORD, the WESC report 
also stated that ‘...a diversity of devices is still seen as an important feature of the ongoing 
programme…’.
63 However, by 1980 ACORD judged that the programme had become too 
diverse and Grove-Palmer was asked to return to ACORD in June 1980 with a radically 
revised wave programme featuring only two devices. At the time, Sir Hermann Bondi 
observed that there existed a fundamental difference between WESC and ACORD on the 
approach to wave energy. ACORD saw the programme in terms of wave devices, whereas 
WESC  saw  it  as  a  set  of  broader  technical  and  economic  challenges  that  were  being 
addressed through the work of all of the device teams.
64 The structure of the WEP reflected 
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the  WESC  objectives,  as  the  consultants  and  TAGs  surveyed  all  of  the  device 
development. Arguably, misunderstanding over this point also caused the WEP to begin to 
unravel.  
 
  Nevertheless, Grove-Palmer returned to ACORD with a new proposal featuring just 
two devices, the Flexible Bag and the Oscillating Cylinder. After some discussion ACORD 
added a third device, the Oscillating Water Column, which was being developed by NEL. 
Accordingly, from 1980 funding for three devices, the Rectifier, the Triplate, and the Raft 
was stopped completely, while the remaining teams, the Duck and the Clam, continued on 
(with  greatly  reduced  funding)  as  contributing  elements  of  the  wider  wave  energy 
programme. The ongoing WEP was therefore eventually agreed by ACORD as a two-year 
programme concentrating on three devices. In September 1980, John Moore, the Under-
Secretary  of  State  for  Energy  opened  the  WEP’s  new  test  tank  facility  at  Cockerell’s 
Wavepower  in  Southampton.  Despite  the  decision  a  few  months  earlier  to  drop 
Wavepower’s Raft from the list of devices under development (the tank would continue to 
be used by the programme) Moore reassured his audience that ‘I am confident that if 
solutions  are  possible  our  wave  energy  researchers  will  find  them.  Whatever  other 
problems they may face, lack of Government support will not be among them.’ 
65 
 
ACORD March 1981 
Despite John Moore’s words, by the time of the next ACORD meeting on wave energy in 
March 1981 the WEP appeared doomed. Rumours, strenuously denied, appeared in the 
press  that  the  decision  had  already  been  taken  to  close  the  programme.
66  Added  to 
diminishing  official  faith  in  wave  energy  as  a  method  of  providing  for  future  energy 
demand, the advocates for waves had suffered a blow in 1980 when the Chief Scientist, Sir 
Herman  Bondi,  was  replaced  as  Chief  Scientist  (and  therefore  also  as  Chairman  of 
ACORD). Sir Herman was known to keenly support the development of renewable energy 
sources, and was convinced about the potential of wave energy. He was replaced with Dr 
Anthony Challis from ICI. Although a chemist by training Challis was brought into the 
DoEn for his commercial experience. As well as Bondi’s enforced departure from the 
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scene, Freddie Clarke also left WESC during 1980.
67 Thus, by the time of the March 1981 
meeting wave energy had lost two of its most influential supporters.  
   
  By  this  stage  the  earlier  confidence  of  WESC  in  the  long-term  future  of  the 
programme had been shaken by the 1980 ACORD reaction. In the short time between 
reaching agreement on a new two-year programme (in June 1980) and the March 1981 
meeting  of  ACORD  there  had  been  little  opportunity  to  demonstrate  any  significant 
progress  in  wave  energy  that  might  reassure  the  committee.  Despite  the  two-year 
programme (lasting until 1982) Grove-Palmer was now aware that ACORD was rapidly 
losing patience with wave energy, and he recorded after the 1981 meeting that ‘there was a 
substantial  body  of  opinion  which  was  in  favour  of  stopping  the  programme  now.’
68 
Despite the majority view on ACORD favouring immediate closure, approval was given to 
complete the two-year programme eventually agreed in 1980. Grove-Palmer immediately 
held a meeting with the device teams which laid out clearly the challenges ahead.  March 
1982  was  looming  as  a  crucial  date  for  the  WEP  as  ACORD  had  insisted  that  a 
‘recommended way forward’ for the programme be presented by then. After consultation 
with WESC, Grove-Palmer saw that the programme now had only three options. 
 
(1)  Building a demonstration module at near full size of a system which 
could produce power of value to the UK National Grid, or 
(2)  Build  a  demonstration  module  at  near  full  size  of  a  system  which 
could provide interest to smaller power consumers, or 
(3)  Stop work on wave energy.
69 
 
  His discussion paper for the meeting emphasised that by March 1982 ‘there would 
be no request for a further extension to try and get more answers before making a decision 
about the future’ and he warned the device teams that ‘the decision date is not the subject 
of discussion it has been fixed.’ Coming less than three years after Heathrow a new cost 
target of below 5p kWh was set for March 1982 and WESC and the device teams worked 
on achieving this. Clearly, Grove-Palmer now felt that the best prospects for maintaining 
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the WEP lay in seeking funding that focussed on a single device, and he implored the 
device teams to work together on selecting what he termed ‘the chosen one.’ 
70 
 
  WESC  were  understandably  concerned  over  the  short  time  available  before  the 
1982 meeting to put a convincing case for wave energy before ACORD. Therefore, in 
December 1981 Grove-Palmer arranged for all of the device teams to give a presentation to 
the  new  Chief  Scientist,  Dr  Challis.
71  Clearly  the  intention  was  to  win  over  Bondi’s 
replacement (as Chief Scientist and chairman of ACORD) and demonstrate the progress 
and potential for the wave energy programme prior to the March meeting. Grove-Palmer 
stressed to the teams that they must emphasise reductions in cost achieved since 1979 (5 -
15p kWh) and ‘explain why you believe that your device has the potential to become 
economically viable’. He also asked that the teams ‘discuss why you believe that your 
device should be the one first selected to be used as the basis for a sea-trial of a megawatt 
sized module’.   
 
ACORD March 1982: ‘Reduced Ongoing Programme’  
The Wave Energy Programme was officially closed down at the ACORD meeting on 19 
March 1982, although as discussed the signs had not been good for the WEP for some 
time. The meeting itself took place in the wider context of a greatly reduced DoEn budget 
for renewables, of which the programme managers were made aware. Funding of over 
£17m in 1981-82 was to be restricted to around £11m in 1982-83: cuts would have to be 
made.  As  was  the  custom  for  ACORD  meetings,  each  of  the  individual  programmes 
submitted reports to the council through ETSU which outlined the progress made in the 
previous year and a suggested programme (and accompanying budget) for the next year. 
As a result of the ending of the two-year programme, and the recently difficult passage of 
its proposals through ACORD, wave energy was given particularly close attention. It had, 
after all, been the DoEn’s favoured renewable technology for the previous seven years. 
The minutes of the ACORD meeting show that the council considered three approaches in 
reaching its decisions.
72 The first was to ask that the budget be increased to allow the 
present  programmes  to  continue,  the  second  to  make  ‘pro  rata  cuts  across  each 
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programme’,  and  the  third  to  select  ‘a  number  of  more-promising  renewable  energy 
technologies’. Recognising the ‘constraints to which all parts of the public sector were 
being subjected’ and with the prompting of the chairman, Dr Challis, the council agreed 
that the third option ‘offered the best opportunity to formulate sound recommendations on 
the future of the development of renewable energy sources and technologies for the UK.’  
 
  With its task established the council then went on to consider a daunting list of 
twelve  programmes  in  turn;  Passive  Solar  Design,  Solar  Water  Heating,  Active  Solar 
Space Heating, Geothermal Aquifers, Geothermal Hot Dry Rocks, Biofuels: Combustion, 
Biofuels:  Anaerobic  Digestion  for  Animal  Waste,  Biofuels:  Anaerobic  Digesters  for 
Vegetable Materials, Biofuels: Thermal Processing, Onshore Windpower, Offshore Wind, 
before concluding with its discussion of Wave Power.
73 For proposal after proposal of the 
smaller budget programmes, and perhaps anticipating the savings to be made by closing 
the wave programme, ACORD recommended that ‘work should continue broadly along 
the lines planned at or about the proposed level of expenditure.’ It was only when the 
council reached the final three programmes on its agenda that the recommendations started 
to vary.  
 
  The wind energy programme had been gathering pace for some time, and in the 
months leading up to the ACORD meeting agreement had been reached with the DoEn to 
fund a very large 3MW demonstration turbine on Orkney (see chapter 6). The council 
noted  that  ‘onshore  windpower  seemed  currently  to  offer  the  best  prospects  for  bulk 
electricity  generation  of  any  of  the  renewable  energy  sources  being  studied  by  the 
Department.’ However, they were much less sure about offshore wind, judging it to be 
‘technically and economically more risky’ than onshore wind.  The onshore windpower 
programme  was  therefore  approved,  and  given  priority  over  the  offshore  programme, 
which should only then be developed ‘budget permitting’.  
 
  Finally, the council turned to the wave power programme, though by this time, an 
observer would have noted two things. First, wind power had been recognised by ACORD 
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as the ‘most promising’ of the renewable technologies, and second, by the time the council 
came to consider Wave Power the DoEn renewables budget had, theoretically at least, been 
allocated.  The  numbers  for  wave  energy  disappointed  ACORD.  Despite  much  larger 
earlier (and later) estimates, the size of the resource was now put at ‘about 20 TWh’. Much 
less than Glyn England of the CEGB had spoken of in 1978. Frustratingly for the device 
teams, the council was also unimpressed by the latest cost estimates for wave energy, 
which now fell in the range of 4 - 12p kWh. The teams had been given a ‘target’ of 5p 
kWh for 1982. But despite this representing a huge improvement over the three and a half 
years since the Heathrow Conference, the council was unmoved. Obviously referring to 
wind energy, the council judged that it ‘did not accept that wave power could become 
economically competitive against other electricity generating technologies expected to be 
available  over  the  strategic  review  period  (1981-2025)’.  Clearly,  wave  energy  was 
doomed. 
 
  The final, and arguably most significant, criticism of the WEP focussed on the 
wave energy devices. As shown above, Grove-Palmer and WESC had been aware that the 
ACORD review would require evidence that a single device had been identified that could 
be taken forward to sea-trials.  Unfortunately, the ENT report on the WEP supplied to 
ACORD was equivocal on devices.
74 It identified two devices - the ‘Edinburgh Duck and 
the  Lanchester  Clam’  -  as  having  ‘a  clear  lead’  but  was  quick  to  point  out  the 
‘development problems’ of each. 
 
The  Edinburgh  Duck  depends  on  the  proving  of  the  reliability  of  the 
sophisticated, but complete, power take-off system, while the Lanchester 
Clam has less, but not insignificant, need for component development but 
offers rather more expensive power. 
75 
 
  It was therefore not surprising that the council would decide that ‘no single device 
had emerged as having all the required technical features’. However, subsequent comments 
cast doubt on whether a clearly identified single wave energy device would have made any 
difference to the ACORD decision.  
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  Members  also  considered,  as  part  of  the  wave  power  review  the 
implications for the other parts of the renewable energy R & D programme 
if it were decided to go ahead to the full-scale demonstration of a wave 
power device in the open sea, estimated to cost £10 million. The Council 
agreed  that  in  order  to  make  way  for  further  wave  power  work, 
Departmental  support  for  other  more  promising  renewable  energy 
technologies would have to be abandoned. This would result in a change of 
balance in the Department’s efforts which the Council considered would 
have unacceptable consequences for the development of renewable energy 
sources for the UK. 
76  
 
 
  Clearly,  wind  power  had  now  galloped  onto  centre  stage  as  the  ‘Department’s 
favourite horse’. In the end it provided what wave energy had failed to; a single, clear, and 
large-scale  example  of  the  technology  in  action,  producing  electricity.  ACORD 
recommended starkly, ‘that no new development work on wave power should be supported 
from the Department’s R&D budget’.  Although they were keen that the results of the 
seven-year  WEP  should  be  ‘prepared  for  publication...in  a  tidy  form  so  that  the  work 
supported to date would be available to Government and the private sector should it be 
decided to re-consider the role of wave power in the UK energy economy’.  Some funding 
trickled on for the WEP (around £300k) to allow for the ‘tidying up’ of the programme, but 
after a difficult few years Government-funded wave energy R&D was finally ended in 
March 1982.  
 
 
Conclusions 
ACORD  were  aware  that  there  would  be  much  ‘public  interest’  over  their 
recommendations. This proved to be the case and their decision created controversy; and 
has continued to do so. Criticisms focussed on the ‘facts’ of wave energy as presented to 
ACORD and the exclusion from the meeting (for the first time) of the WEP programme 
manager,  Grove-Palmer.  Allegations  of  secrecy  and  ‘stitch-ups’  abounded.  The  device 
teams were incensed that the reports supplied to ACORD had been withheld from them, 
and  it  was  only  several  months  after  the  decision  had  been  taken  that  they  became 
available. They argued that crucial figures had been deliberately miscalculated and in the 
case of the Duck a key consultants’ report had allegedly been changed after it was written. 
In Parliament during the 1980s wave energy was discussed in two heated debates and 
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criticism of the Government’s decision to end the programme was strong, as MPs asked, 
when the WEP had achieved the cost targets set why did ACORD pull the plug? Looking 
closely  at  the  evidence  surrounding  the  ACORD  decision  it  is  clear  that  many  of  the 
criticisms of the process are valid. Based on a year to year assessment of wave energy, the 
programme should have been continued. Significant technical progress had been made and 
cost targets achieved.  
 
  This then leads to a wider explanation for the closure of the programme that has 
been advanced: the nuclear conspiracy theory. Some commentators have suggested that the 
WEP was ‘scuppered’ by the powerful nuclear industry, fearful of the increasing viability 
of wave energy. The evidence for this is largely circumstantial and contextual. ETSU, and 
therefore WESC, was situated at Harwell, as discussed in chapter 3. The Chief Scientist, 
Walter Marshall, was clearly a ‘nuclear man’. Nuclear energy R&D funding dominated the 
DoEn’s  R&D  budget  throughout  the  period.  Nuclear  debates  had,  as  Williams  wrote, 
moved from the private sphere to the public arena during the 1970s and public awareness 
and criticism of nuclear power was growing.
77 There is no doubt that the nuclear industry 
was increasingly sensitive to criticism from the 1970s onwards. Again, although direct 
evidence is harder to locate there is some validity in this argument.  
 
  However, despite the validity of the more conventional explanations for the closure 
of the WEP I would suggest that this chapter presents clear evidence for two alternative 
interpretations: one at the meso-level, one at the macro-level. First, at the meso-level, from 
the outset the device teams were clear that a long process of R&D would be an essential 
element of the programme. Despite the proliferation of wave energy device patents from 
the past, developing a viable large-scale wave energy device would require a substantial 
programme of theoretical work and tank-testing before any device would make it to the 
open sea.  However, rapid early progress resulted in open-water trials in Loch Ness and the 
Solent during 1977 and the disastrous Heathrow Conference followed this. I believe that 
this shifted the expectations of ACORD and the DoEn. Despite earlier acceptance of the 
caution advocated by the device teams, the government now had examples of wave energy 
in the water and evidence (at Heathrow) for the high estimated costs. From this point the 
attitude  of  ACORD  and  the  DoEn  towards  wave  energy  changed.  It  was  no  longer  a 
promise of ‘what is to come’, but rather a demonstration of the technical and economic 
                                            
77 Williams, Decisions 127 
limitations of wave power as a viable future energy source for the UK. Patience with R&D 
evaporated  and  ACORD  sought  results  -  a  clear  ‘winner’  among  the  devices  and  an 
economically  viable  wave  machine  in  the  open  sea.  The  WEP  could  not  provide  this, 
however, wind energy could. 
 
  The second, macro-level, resides in placing the events of the WEP within a broader 
understanding of the dominant energy paradigm of the period. Despite the gradual shift to 
oil in overall postwar UK energy demand, electricity generation was still dominated by 
coal  burning,  as  it  had  been  for  nearly  a  century.  Thus  the  pattern  of  production  in 
electricity was firmly based on one big fuel source. From the 1950s nuclear energy held 
out some promise as a complement, and ultimately replacement, for coal. The CEGB, who 
made the decisions about which type of power stations to build, needed to have long-term 
confidence in the available fuels. Their initial hesitancy over oil-fired and nuclear power 
stations through the 1950s and early 1960s illustrates this point. Thus, UK energy policy 
became dominated by the view that fuel supply must be secure, dependable, and most 
importantly large scale. This framed the development of renewable energy, in this case 
wave power, within an energy policy that demanded proven reliability and scale. By March 
1982 the DoEn lost confidence in wave power to meet this demand. 128 
Chapter 5 
Case Study: Salter’s Duck and Sea Energy Associates  
  
The discussion of the creation and organisation of the UK renewable energy programme in 
Chapter 3 was followed in Chapter 4 with a close analysis of the evolution and eventual 
demise  of  the  UK  Wave  Energy  Programme  (WEP).  This  chapter  will  explore  some 
further elements of the programme by considering the individual case of the wave energy 
pioneer at Edinburgh University, Stephen Salter. This will focus on the involvement of 
private  industry  in  the  WEP  by  considering  the  creation  and  evolution  of  Sea  Energy 
Associates Limited (SEA); a company formed with the financial backing of Ready Mixed 
Concrete  Limited  (RMC)  to  exploit  the  commercial  potential  of  wave  energy.  Salter’s 
involvement and interest in wave energy spanned the entire WEP coinciding with the very 
earliest formation of the UK renewable energy programme in 1974. Indeed, in many senses 
it was his initial research, culminating in the publication of an influential 1974 article in 
Nature that helped to kick-start the WEP.
1 His invention, the Duck, was featured among 
the four ‘first generation’ wave energy devices in the programme and he remained a key, 
and persistently vocal, part of the WEP through the 1970s and 1980s.
2  
 
The Salter Duck 
When Stephen Salter, an academic at Edinburgh University, wrote to Peter Walker, the 
Secretary of State at the DTI, in December 1973 about his developments in wave power 
technology he could not have anticipated the content of the yet to be published CPRS 
report,  Energy  Conservation,  which  would  give  the  potential  of  wave  energy  such  a 
prominent endorsement.
3 In his letter he modestly offered some idea of the ‘promising’ 
nature  of  his  research,  before  solemnly  wishing  Walker  best  wishes  ‘in  your  present 
difficulties’.
4 In an oft-repeated anecdote, Salter would explain that just a few months 
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earlier, with a heavy cold and amid the gloom of the oil crisis he had been inspired by his 
wife ‘to solve the energy crisis’.
5  
 
What she wanted was something which would provide the vast amounts 
needed,  which  would  be  clean  and  safe,  would  work  in  the  winter  in 
Scotland and would last forever. It is a good thing for an engineer to have 
the design objective clearly specified.
6  
 
  He  quickly  set  to  work  on  his  domestically  inspired  design  challenge.  Gordon 
Goodwin later commented on Salter’s ‘extraordinary position of an established lecturer 
with no lecturing responsibilities’ and this allowed him the freedom to pursue his ideas 
with vigour (and the resources of the University of Edinburgh).
7 He already had a ‘lavishly 
equipped  toolroom  and  electronics  laboratory’  and  his  work  within  the  University’s 
research departments also allowed him access to a small test tank with a basic wave-
maker.
8  After  some  preliminary  research  on  the  characteristics  of  waves  and  some 
calculations on the likely scale of the resource, he began to experiment with devices to 
extract energy from the sea waves (see fig.5.1). Beginning with a simple ball-cock float 
device (fig.5.1, 2.1A), he estimated that he was able to extract around 15 per cent of the 
available energy. Later, by hinging the mechanism below the surface of the water (fig.1, 
2.1B) he was able to improve this figure to nearer 60 per cent.  As he wrote later ‘It looked 
as if the to and fro movement was better than the more obvious up and down’. After some 
experimentation with flaps in the water, Salter had a couple of initial designs which he 
called the Kite (fig.5.1, 2.1D) and the Tadpole (fig.5.1, 2.1E) after each of their shapes. At 
this point Salter realised that he needed to know much more about waves. Britain’s sea-
faring traditions mean that it was well served with wave data, and Salter met with Laurie 
Draper, from the British Oceanographic Data Service, who was by coincidence visiting 
Edinburgh around the time. Earlier in that same year, Draper had also advised Goodwin on 
the potential of wave energy. Greatly encouraged by his discussions with Draper, it was at 
this point that Salter wrote to the DTI. 
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Figure 5.1 
The evolution of Salter’s wave power device designs  
 
 
 
Source: Salter, S., ‘Looking Back’, in Cruz, J (ed.), Ocean Wave Energy: Current Status and Future 
Prospects (Springer: Heidelberg, 2008) Fig. 2.1, p.9 
 
  Salter’s letter to Peter Walker included a brief four-page summary of his work so 
far on wave power. At that time Salter was working in the Bionics Research Laboratory at 
Edinburgh’s  School  of  Artificial  Intelligence,  and  he  later  speculated  about  the  likely 
bewildering effect that this might have on the reception that his letter received.
9 Before 
Christmas 1973 Salter received a prompt and courteous reply from the DTI thanking him 
for his letter, and noting that ‘the points which you make, and the figures quoted in the 
accompanying paper, are both interesting and striking’.
10 Happily for Salter, his letter and 
report were then passed to Gordon Goodwin, who also had responsibility within the DTI 
for dealing with what he called the ‘oddball enquiries’.
11 Despite being put off by what he 
dismissed as some ‘distracting facetiousness’ within Salter’s report, Goodwin recognised 
                                            
9 Ross, Power, p.43. In an interview with Ross, Gordon Goodwin confirmed that he treated Salter’s letter 
with skepticism at first, owing to its unusual sounding origins. He went so far as to telephone the Edinburgh 
University switchboard to check that Salter existed and ensure that he was not the victim of an elaborate 
departmental hoax. 
10 TNA, EG 16/13, DTI to Salter, 17 December 1973 
11 Ross, Power, p.43 131 
the ‘sound and original thinking’ that it contained: particularly, as Salter’s initial claims for 
the potential of wave energy appeared to confirm his own earlier estimates.
12  
 
  ‘As a matter of urgency’ Goodwin visited Salter at Edinburgh in late January 1974 
to see for himself the developments that had been made.
13 He was greatly impressed by 
Salter’s work and reassured (and it appears, relieved) that many of his own calculations of 
device efficiency produced for the CPRS report were confirmed by Salter during this visit. 
During the period between writing his initial letter and Goodwin’s visit, Salter had been 
working  steadily  on  improving  his  designs.  With  the  help  of  colleagues,  such  as  the 
mathematician Denis Mollinson at Heriot-Watt University, he had been working towards 
an ‘optimal shape’ for his device. Quite quickly he arrived at a basic varnished balsa wood 
model  that  he  initially  called  the  ‘pregnant  Duck’  (fig.5.1,  2.1F).  To  his  delight  and 
amazement  he  found  that  this  shape  could  achieve  a  staggering  energy  conversion 
efficiency of around 90 per cent.
14  
 
  Goodwin’s account of his visit betrays both a scientist’s enthusiasm (Goodwin was 
trained  as  a  biologist)  for  the  potential  of  wave  power  technology,  and  some  mixed 
personal views about Salter’s own understanding of that potential. He describes Salter as ‘a 
man of impressive ability’ and ‘outstanding talent’. Noting that ‘some of the pieces of his 
work I saw were of astonishing quality, both in conception and finish.’  However, he then 
goes on to write ‘At this point the adulation has to stop, as Mr Salter’s imagination appears 
to stop, at the boundaries of his device.’  Introducing what was to become a recurrent 
theme in the development of renewables in the UK, Goodwin explains that Salter,   
 
…tends  towards  the  grandiose  and  panacea  like  in  his  thinking  and  has 
difficulties in appreciating that any major undertaking has to fit in with 
existing  economic  structure,  must  be  costed  on  a  totally  comprehensive 
basis, and has to compete with other dominant calls upon National [sic] 
resources. 
15 
 
  Notwithstanding this critical view of some aspects of Salter’s thinking Goodwin 
judged that Salter ‘had a great deal to offer’ and recommended to the Department that 
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Salter be given support to carry out his research ‘either directly or through NEL’.
16 During 
his visit he made Salter aware that a report on wave energy had been commissioned from 
NEL and encouraged Salter to consult with them. Following the visit, responding to a 
specific request from Salter, Goodwin set out in a  subsequent letter the ‘official’ position 
of the new DoEn on his work; ‘we are impressed by your work and hope that you will be 
kind enough to keep us informed of the progress you make’. Salter had also asked for 
confirmation that the DoEn ‘would be happy’ to let the DoEn’s position on his work ‘be 
known publicly’, and Goodwin was able to confirm this.  
 
  With a delay in any possible funding from the DoEn, Salter was keen to be allowed 
the freedom to pursue alternative sources of funding. This is an example of Salter’s keen 
awareness of the value of publicity for his work, which was to recur throughout the WEP. 
Another recurring, and arguably more crucial theme, in Goodwin’s letter was the focus on 
the  economics  of  wave  power.  He  took  the  opportunity  to  remind  Salter  of  the  ‘next 
essential step in the furtherance of your ideas...a comprehensively based costing of the 
power that could be produced by such a scheme’.
17 For the moment however, it was clear 
that the commissioning of the NEL wave power study placed constraints on the DoEn 
when  it  came  to  the  funding  of  wave  R&D  projects  until  the  study  had  produced  its 
recommendations.    
 
‘Distracting facetiousness’? 
Goodwin  clearly  found  some  of  the  content  in  Salter’s  four-page  outline  of  his  initial 
findings irritating. This probably refers to the brief introduction and the closing sentence of 
what otherwise was an overwhelmingly impenetrable (for the non-science trained reader) 
document. The final sentence in the report could perhaps be charitably forgiven as a weak 
attempt at humour. Here, among the acknowledgements, Salter thanked ‘Sheikh Ahmed 
Zaki  Yemeni  and  OPEC  for  their  continuing  support’.  Evidently  Salter  had  more 
confidence in this particular joke as it was later repeated in the conclusions of his highly 
regarded Nature paper.
18 Probably more annoying to Goodwin was Salter’s - again, widely 
repeated  -  reference  in  the  introduction  to  the  environmental  arguments  for  renewable 
energy. Salter had written, ‘There are people, until recently regarded as eccentric, who 
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question our practice of treating as income those resources which our descendants will 
regard as capital.’
19  
 
  As discussed in chapter 2, a key strand of the new environmental movement of the 
early 1970s was the famous ‘limits to growth’ thesis advanced by the Meadows team at 
MIT, and in the UK by The Ecologist magazine’s, Blueprint for Survival.
20 Each of these 
publications  strongly  rejected  the  ‘solution’  to  energy  resource  depletion  offered  by 
nuclear  power  on  the  grounds  of  safety  and  waste  disposal,  and  the  fledgling 
environmental  groups,  such  as  Friends  of  the  Earth  UK  (FoEUK)  campaigned  against 
nuclear energy.  Therefore in the early part of the 1970s (and until very recently) to adopt 
an environmental stance was equated with being ‘anti-nuclear’, and arguably this is the 
message that Goodwin would have taken from Salter’s opening statement.  
 
  Despite  this,  what  would  become  notable  throughout  the  government’s  early 
renewable  energy  programme  was  the  absence  of  explicit  references  to  environmental 
arguments.  Arguably  less  surprising  is  the  total  lack  of  criticism  of  nuclear  energy, 
although during the 1970s and 1980s the two issues - renewable energy and nuclear energy 
- seemed inextricably linked through constant economic comparison. Earlier comments 
(see chapter 3) made it clear that the renewables programme was an ‘insurance’ against 
failure in nuclear development. Therefore, this lack of criticism is explained on one hand 
by  the  pervasive  involvement  of  the  UK  nuclear  community  in  the  renewable  energy 
programme,  both  by  location  (Harwell)  and  influence  (ETSU  and  Walter  Marshall). 
However, it is also explained by the continuing official faith in nuclear energy as the 
energy of the future, despite a problematic history of development.
21 Therefore, before the 
widespread awareness and acceptance of climate change emerged in the 1990s the official 
drivers for renewable energy resided mainly in their potential to meet UK energy needs in 
a cost-effective way and (as explained in chapter 3) more specifically as an ‘insurance 
option’ against failure in the nuclear programme. 
 
                                            
19 TNA, EG 16/13, ‘Wave Power: by Stephen Salter, School of Artificial Intelligence, University of 
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  During November 1973, as he was forming his ideas on wave energy, Salter had 
attended  a  conference  at  the  Royal  Society  in  London  on  ‘Energy  in  the  Eighties’ 
addressed by among others, Peter Walker (perhaps planting the idea for his subsequent 
letter). At the conference Salter came across a copy of a pamphlet, World Energy - Facts, 
Issues  and  Opinions,  written  by  Amory  Lovins  of  the  recently  formed  UK  branch  of 
Friends of the Earth (FoEUK) that had been actively promoted by the new environmental 
group during the conference.
22 He sought out Lovins at the conference and discussed his 
ideas for wave energy.
23 Salter wrote later that the pamphlet ‘influenced me profoundly’. It 
clearly satisfied his academic and scientific sensibilities with its ‘meticulous detail’ and 
‘hundreds of references’ and set out ’how long [energy] might last, and what might be the 
side effects’. It was a pivotal moment for Salter. He wrote that after reading the pamphlet 
‘energy research was no longer a bit of a joke for me to fill in between projects. It was 
time,  if  the  light  water  pressure-vessel  designers  will  forgive  the  expression,  to  get 
cracking’.
24   
 
  Salter’s  private  correspondence  particularly  through  the  1970s  is  peppered  with 
references to his strong anti-nuclear beliefs.
25 In one letter he stated plainly that ‘...my 
motivation for carrying out this research project is based on my fear of nuclear power’
26 
and in another that this was ‘...a strong motivation to the whole of our team…’
27 His 
resistance  to  a  nuclear  future  was  repeatedly  made  plain,  built  on  a  growing  public 
awareness of the problems of nuclear energy, focussing on safety, decommissioning, and 
waste  disposal.  But  he  was  persistently  meticulous  in  his  care  to  avoid  any  public 
statements or connections with anti-nuclear groups or sentiments.
28 He received repeated 
invitations  to  address  environmental  groups,  but  declined  all  of  these  politely,  always 
stressing the sensitive nature of his position within the UK energy establishment; ‘to attract 
the attention of the very powerful nuclear establishment in this country would be unwise at 
this stage and so I am not able to say everything that I feel about the nuclear industry.’
29 
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Despite this care, from the moment of his first contact, it was perhaps clear to some within 
the DoEn that Salter was motivated by somewhat differing aims than those of the wider 
programme. Equally clear was Salter’s eloquence and skill in dealing with the media. This 
would  help  to  explain  Goodwin’s  repeated  insistence  on  ‘cost-effectiveness’  and  his 
discomfort with Salter’s quasi-environmental statements.  
 
Initial funding 
By March 1974 Salter, realising that no research funding was likely to come directly from 
the  DoEn  in  the  meantime,  submitted  proposals  for  funding  to  the  Science  Research 
Council (SRC) and to the Wolfson Foundation.
30 The SRC proposal sought funding of 
£66k over three years, whilst an almost identical proposal to the Wolfson was for £74k 
over the same period.  Salter sent copies of the proposals to Goodwin and provided him 
with regular updates on his work. He mentioned some of the individuals that he had been 
consulting with, such as Michael Longuet-Higgins (‘the top wave man’), as useful names 
to mention if Goodwin felt ‘able to influence SRC’.
31 By early July, after seeking the 
advice of the DoEn, the SRC responded to Salter’s proposal with an offer of just £6,900 
over 2 years, which Salter declined.
32 The SRC were frightened off by the large capital 
investment that Salter’s proposals involved (£30k) and suggested that he should undertake 
a ‘more thorough examination of the theoretical aspects and engineering feasibility’ before 
launching  the  larger-scale  experiments  that  his  proposal  suggested.  This  was  a 
disappointment for Salter and Goodwin, who both felt that the NEL report would provide 
much of what the SRC recommended and that what was needed from Salter was a more 
experimental  approach.
33  Disappointingly  for  Salter  and  Goodwin,  the  Wolfson 
Foundation reached similar conclusions.  
 
  Whilst awaiting the outcome of his grant proposals Salter had continued his wave 
power  research  at  Edinburgh.  The  establishment  of  ETSU  had  heightened  interest  in 
renewable energy during the mid-part of the year, and Salter had published what proved to 
be a much-cited article on wave power in the respected journal Nature in June 1974.
34  
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This was picked up by some of the popular media newly obsessed by energy, and articles 
began to appear on the government’s investigations at NEL into wave power potential.
35 
Attracted by the publicity, and by the recommendations of the CPRS report, the CEGB 
also began to consider the possibilities of wave power around the same time. Don Gore, 
Deputy Chief Scientific Officer at the DoEn (and Goodwin’s immediate superior), wrote to 
Salter in June 1974 to advise him that Donald Swift-Hook from the CEGB’s Marchwood 
Laboratory in Southampton was heading a programme of research into the potential of 
wave power.
36 He suggested to Salter that this could result in some CEGB funding for his 
research. 
 
  When the news of Salter’s largely unsuccessful applications to the SRC and the 
Wolfson Foundation emerged in July, the DoEn acted swiftly to locate other sources of 
funding for his research. Undoubtedly the main motivation for this was the belief – mainly 
from Goodwin and now Gore – that wave power research had some value, but political 
considerations  were  also  important.    With  the  recent  launch  of  ETSU  and  the  media 
interest in wave power inspired by the publication of the CPRS report (also in June 1974), 
it  was  important  that  the  DoEn  was  seen  to  be  moving  forward  in  its  efforts  to  seek 
solutions to the energy crisis: and it was to ETSU that Gore turned first. In a revealing 
letter he referred to the ‘sordid’ difficulties that surrounded the funding of the NEL report 
(due to the reorganisation of the DTI at that time) and the continuing problems in finding 
funds for the ‘kind of work’ that Salter was doing.  He indicated that Salter had claimed 
that he would have to halt his research on wave power and that the respected New Scientist 
wanted to publish a ‘sob article, no doubt inspired by Salter, on the lack of Government 
support’. Gore asked Dawson for ‘a few thousand pounds (Salter suggested £8,000)’ from 
the  ‘ETSU  or  Harwell  budget’,  and  revealed  that  he  has  already  had  the  approval,  in 
principle,  of  Walter  Marshall.
37  A  few  weeks  later  Dawson  replied,  highlighting  the 
limitations of the ETSU budget, but with an offer of £4,000 and the chance of further 
funding when subsequent ETSU budgets were set.
38  
 
  Realising  that  only  limited  funding  could  be  extracted  from  the  limited  ETSU 
budget, the ENT division of the DoEn decided on an alternative approach. Len Leighton 
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wrote  to  Maddock,  the  Chief  Scientist  at  the  DoI,  in  July  to  make  him  aware  of  the 
situation with Salter’s SRC application, and to advise that NEL had agreed to work with 
Salter  on  any  future  wave  power  R&D  that  he  might  undertake.
39  NEL  was  a  highly 
regarded section of the DoI at this time. Salter himself had already written to Maddock in 
February  as  part  of  his  personal  campaign  to  raise  awareness  of  wave  energy.
40  After 
advising that they themselves had no funds for this type of project, Leighton suggested to 
Maddock  that  the  natural  result  of  any  developments  would  result  in  ‘hardware 
development in the engineering field’ and would therefore be ‘right in your court’.
41 The 
DoEn had earlier expressed some anxiety over retaining control over wave power R&D 
amid the gathering publicity that Salter’s work was receiving, and this approach to a ‘rival’ 
department illustrates the risks that Gore, Goodwin, and others were prepared to take in 
order that the research be continued.
42  
 
  In the event, the positive response of NEL to Salter’s work proved to be decisive.
43 
In August 1974 a series of meetings were held at NEL in East Kilbride and at Salter’s lab 
at Edinburgh University, attended by representatives from the DoEn and the DoI at which 
Salter gave ‘a particularly impressive demonstration of his experimental approach and of 
his  self  made  equipment.
44  Another  creation  of  the  Heath  government,  along  with  the 
CPRS (see chapter 3), had been the Requirements Boards. These were set up within key 
government  departments  to  control  the  funding  of  new  projects.  For  wave  power  the 
Mechanical  Engineering  and  Machine  Tools  Requirements  Board  (MEMTRB)  was 
regarded as the most relevant body, and accordingly they were invited along to these initial 
meetings. Verbal assurances of support from DoI were given to Salter at the meeting itself, 
and by October 1974 the official announcement was made that he was to receive support of 
£66k over three years (the amount he had originally sought from the SRC) through the 
MEMTRB. This represented the start of government-funded wave power R&D in the UK, 
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achieved  in  large  part  by  a  partnership  of  Salter’s  impressive  technical  ability  and 
ingenuity and Goodwin’s indefatigable search for funding.  
 
Leading from the rear:
45 Gordon Goodwin 
Gordon Goodwin was a key figure in the development of wave power in the UK, and his 
role raises the question of ‘influence’ and ‘influential figures’ in the renewable energy 
programme. In previous chapters I have emphasised the roles that high-status figures such 
as Lord Rothschild and Walter Marshall played in the development of wave power. Both 
of these individuals, by nature of their contrasting positions, were able to bring about the 
creation of the WEP, and as such they could both be judged as influential. In the case of 
Marshall, much of this influence was due to his wide-ranging responsibilities as Chief 
Scientist,  chair  of  ACORD,  and  director  of  Harwell.  In  this  sense  he  acted  both  as  a 
symbolic and physical link between groups and was able to bring pressure to bear on a 
number of diverse groups. I would suggest that Goodwin played a similar, and arguably 
more important, role in this regard. Although in comparison to Marshall, he occupied a 
junior position within the DoEn, Goodwin’s long civil service experience provided him 
with  a  network  through  which  he  was  able  to  steer  and  establish  the  early  wave 
programme. 
 
  In contrast with Salter, who actively sought publicity for the benefit of his work on 
wave power (and for a brief period in the 1970s became a familiar face in the media) 
Gordon Goodwin remained a behind-the-scenes figure throughout the WEP. Ross provides 
an interesting portrait of Goodwin ‘a man withdrawn and taciturn’ in his book, Power from 
the  Waves,  where  he  describes  him  as  ‘the  best  ally  of  wave  energy  inside  the  Civil 
Service.
46 Certainly from the evidence it appears that within government Goodwin had 
waged a subtle one-man campaign for wave energy since he compiled his first report for 
the DTI early in 1973. As noted previously he was largely responsible for the inclusion, if 
not the prominence, of the recommendation for wave power R&D included in the CPRS 
report.  All  of  the  existing  correspondence  in  the  archives  on  wave  energy  from  the 
commissioning of the NEL report to the closure of the programme features significant 
input from Goodwin. Despite misgivings over aspects of Salter’s personality, he worked 
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tirelessly through 1974 to secure funding for his wave energy research, and it is largely 
through his creative approach, and the enlistment of more senior support within the DoEn, 
that funding was eventually secured. Following the establishment of the WEP this effort 
was no longer required, but Goodwin remained a key figure at the heart of wave energy 
throughout, via his insider position as a member of WESC and his role as secretary of 
ACORD.  
 
‘We are on our way’
47 
The announcement of funding for Salter attracted a good deal of attention. Both he and Sir 
Christopher Cockerell were interviewed on BBC Radio 4 news programmes, and various 
stories appeared in the press.
48 Salter already knew Cockerell reasonably well having spent 
some time as an apprentice engineer at British Hovercraft.
49 On the 7 October 1974 The 
Times  reported  the  news  of  Salter’s  funding  on  the  front  page  of  the  newspaper.
50 
Cockerell had also been working on devices to harness wave power for around the same 
time as Salter, although he later commented rather sourly that Salter had the advantage of a 
university laboratory to advance his work, whereas he had been left to fund any initial 
research privately. During 1974 Cockerell had been in touch with the DoEn, providing 
them with updates on the progress of his design for a floating raft device. As early as 
February 1974 the DoEn had noted that he would soon be in touch looking for funding, 
and indicated that this would likely be forthcoming.
51   
 
  In this period prior to the founding of the WEP, other wave power projects had also 
joined the research effort, drawing on a range of funds. In a memo dated 16 August 1974 
Goodwin outlined the institutions that were either ‘actively working in this field or have 
test facilities and an expressed interest in making a contribution’.
52 They included; 
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o  NEL - East Kilbride 
o  CEGB Marchwood Laboratories – team led by Dr D Swift-Hook 
o  S. H. Salter - University of Edinburgh 
o  Gifford & Partners – test tank work in collaboration with British Hovercraft 
Corporation (Sir Christopher Cockerell)  
o  NPL Ships Division - Feltham 
o  Hydraulics Research Station - Wallingford  
o  British Hydrodynamics Research Association – Cranfield  
o  Admiralty Research Laboratories - Teddington 
53 
 
  The  extent  of  interest  gives  some  indication  of  what  Gore  described  as  the 
‘infectious nature of wave energy R&D’.
54 Ironically, given the difficulty in securing funds 
for  Salter,  most  of  these  projects  would  have  been  funded  indirectly  by  the  Treasury, 
through each institution’s annual budget. The most notable example being the CEGB team 
under Swift-Hook which by this time had allocated £50,000 for a ‘practical programme’ on 
wave  energy  that  sought  to  ‘supplement  rather  than  duplicate’  the  work  of  Salter  and 
NEL.
55  Therefore,  even  before  the  official  launch  of  a  wave  power  programme  the 
government funded R&D effort in wave energy had expanded. In this way the WEP can be 
understood as an obvious next step in co-ordination.  
 
  With government funding in place Salter was able to continue development of what 
had now become known, more simply, as the Duck (fig.5.1, 2.1F).
56 Having arrived with 
speed at an optimal shape for his wave energy device, the Edinburgh team now turned its 
attention to fine-tuning the other aspects of the device. Their three-year plan was focussed 
mainly on perfecting and extending the single Duck to a ‘multi-vane’ model arranged 
along a single spine or ‘backbone’. Typical of the month-by-month plan was the entry for 
May-July 1976 ‘Analysis, Writing, Thinking, trying anti-bending moment tricks’. Also 
included was the plan to build a dedicated wave maker, which would be housed in a new 
building at Edinburgh University.
57 Arising from its pole position in wave energy R&D, 
Edinburgh was to have enviable test-tank facilities throughout the WEP - often much to 
Salter’s annoyance, as this inevitably created a stream of requests to use the facilities or to 
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simply look.
58 Salter wrote that, ‘There seem to be more than 365 people in the world who 
feel entitled to a day’s outing to look at wave models.’
59 The constant parade of observers 
was eventually to include television crews, Government ministers, Select Committees, and 
even royalty (the Duke of Edinburgh).  
 
  In his first-year report dated September 1975 the Edinburgh team showed good 
progress on the agreed plan, despite the illness (causing temporary paralysis below the 
waist) of David Jeffrey, Salter’s trusted assistant. Salter reported that much of the work on 
apparatus scheduled for early 1976 had been completed, and that the ‘second-phase’ of the 
work on the wave maker building (scheduled initially for January 1977) could be brought 
forward. High inflation was having an impact on the programme, and he noted that he had 
been forced to ‘defer orders since June to avoid overspending’. Included in his report was a 
section on ‘new cost planning’. With perhaps a nod to Goodwin, Salter ended his report 
with a low-key reference to economics, couched in recognisably civil service terms, ‘On 
the basis of one year’s work I can say that the possibility of economic power from sea 
waves has not been excluded.’ 
60 
 
Commercial partners: Sea Energy Associates 
At the end of the 1980s, as the Government was clearly backing away from further public 
expenditure on renewable energy, much was made of the need for ‘industry’ to become 
‘increasingly involved in research, development and demonstration activities, eventually 
taking  these  functions  over  from  Government.’ 
61This  was  somewhat  misleading  as 
commercial  involvement  had  been  a  notable  aspect  of  the  UK  renewable  energy 
programme from the 1970s, particularly, as will be seen in chapter 6, for wind energy.  
Wave energy was also developed from the outset with the aid of a range of partners from 
‘industry’. Previous chapters have referred to a ‘government’ programme, and indeed the 
WEP  was  managed  and  derived  the  majority  of  its  funding  from  the  DoEn  budget. 
However,  throughout  the  programme  commercial  capital  and  expertise  featured 
prominently  -  particularly  within  the  two  leading  wave  device  teams  of  Salter  and 
Cockerell.  
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  Sir  Christopher  Cockerell  had  formed  one  of  the  earliest  wave  energy  firms, 
Wavepower Limited, by February 1974; made up of a consortium of McAlpines, Gifford 
and Partners, British Hovercraft, and Cockerell himself.
62 When the WEP was launched in 
1976, Wavepower Ltd formed a public/private partnership with the DoEn, which along 
with SEA Ltd routinely attracted the largest portion of the programme’s budget. Salter also 
recognised the advantages that could be gained, both financially and technically, through 
the inclusion of industrial partners and from early on he sought out suitable candidates. 
 
  Salter complained (to an industrialist) in 1972 that his ‘big problem’ was ‘finding 
intelligent  sympathetic  industrialists’.
63  From  late  1973  he  had  been  in  touch  with  a 
number  of  commercial  firms,  seeking  funding  and  support  for  his  wave  work.
64  This 
included a disastrous exchange with Shell which resulted in Salter travelling to the Shell 
research  facility  in  Rijswijk  in  the  Netherlands  only  to  be  mistaken,  to  his  great 
displeasure, for a job applicant.
65 However, by mid-1975, after ‘some rather disappointing 
discussions with Lithgows, Langs [sic] (and […] Taylor Woodrow)’ 
66, he had managed to 
secure interest in supporting his work from Ready Mixed Concrete (UK) Ltd (RMC). As 
Salter proposed that the full-scale Ducks should be constructed from concrete this was 
perhaps  a  logical  tie-in  for  all  concerned.  The  contact  arose  through  an  ‘inventive’ 
engineer  at  the  civil  engineering  firm,  Edmund  Nuttall  Ltd.,  called  Eric  Wood.
67 
Stimulated  by  the  publicity  for  wave  power  during  1974  Wood  was  inspired  to  make 
contact  with  Salter  and  explore  the  possibilities  of  collaboration  and  commercial 
exploitation. He was responsible for developing the contact with RMC, and for bringing 
Norman  Bellamy  (his  cousin)  based  at  Lanchester  Polytechnic,  into  wave  energy.
68  
However, the latter step would prove to be the source of bitter disagreements with Salter 
that would eventually end the SEA partnership.  
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  Prior to the announcement of the DoEn’s £1m wave energy programme, Wood and 
Bellamy had themselves submitted a joint proposal for funding to MEMTRB. This had 
also been the source of Salter’s earlier funding, and the initial deliberations of the Wave 
Energy Steering Committee (WESC) clearly identified this as the primary funding source 
for UK wave power development. However, the minutes of the meeting which considered 
the Wood/Bellamy proposal record that it received a fairly hostile reception. Goodwin 
noted,  
 
In  seeking  their  presentation  the  WESC  representatives  had  the  evident 
goodwill of both the board secretariat and the chairman. Despite this the 
board came close at times to a unanimous rejection of the proposals and 
quite an amount of this goodwill was used up. 
69  
 
 
  Eventually MEMTRB approved funding by ‘reluctant consensus, but by no means 
unanimous, agreement’. In the end, this uncomfortable meeting was perhaps unnecessary 
as  the  DoEn  soon  after  took  over  wave  power  funding.  However,  it  established  the 
credibility of Wood and Bellamy and resulted in the formation of Sea Energy Associates 
Limited. 
 
  During  the  Wood/Bellamy  presentation  to  MEMTRB  the  issue  of  commercial 
interest in wave energy was raised, as the Chairman read a letter from RMC ‘declaring 
their  interest  in  contributing  a  50%  stake’.  The  reaction  of  the  meeting  illustrates  a 
developing awareness of the advantages of early industrial partnerships in government-
sponsored R&D and an example of the declinist thinking that pervaded Britain during the 
1970s. 
 
The Chairman suggested that industrial participation might be premature. 
There  was  a  chorus  of  disagreement  with  this  sentiment  as  being  quite 
opposed to the objectives and function of the board. It was strongly asserted 
that industrial failure to exploit innovatory ideas was a marked feature of 
poor UK economic performance.
70 
 
The  possibility  of  commercial  involvement  immediately  raised  the  question  of  patent 
ownership. During his earlier visit to London when he experienced his renewable energy 
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epiphany Salter had filed a provisional patent for his wave device, which he subsequently 
assigned to Edinburgh University in May 1974.
71 Edinburgh University wrote to Peter 
Young, Director of RMC, in October 1975 to assure him that ‘the University certainly 
considers  that  it  is  the  legal  owner  of  the  original  Salter  patent’  and  although  they 
confirmed  that  they  had  applied  for  Government  funding  none  ‘was  forthcoming’  to 
support his original work.
72 RMC were obviously reassured and by December 1975 the 
registered company, Sea Energy Associates Limited (SEA), had been formed. Although 
initially wholly owned by RMC, agreement had been reached that 49 per cent of the shares 
would be transferred to another company ‘probably to be called Marenco’ which would be 
jointly  owned  by  another  commercial  partner,  Insituform  Ltd.  (a  division  of  Edmund 
Nuttall Ltd.), as well as Salter, and Norman Bellamy.
73  Young confirmed that,  
 
RMC  have  agreed  to  support  (subject  to  certain  safeguards)  research 
expenditure totalling £230,000 over the first two years, and are, in principle, 
prepared to support much higher expenditure to finance the construction of a 
quarter scale model commencing in the third year and, of course, assuming 
satisfactory technical progress to that stage. Expenditure from year three 
onwards will run into many hundreds of thousands of pounds. It is hoped 
that  the  Government  will  contribute  50%  of  the  expenditure  referred  to 
above during the first two years’ development programme.
74 
 
  Despite the seeming good fortune in attracting commercial interest and significant 
capital at such an early stage in wave energy development, Salter had a prickly relationship 
with industry. He explained in a letter ‘...as an engineer I enjoy a love-hate relationship 
with technology. It only goes sour when the commercial people become too powerful. We 
must find ways of saving the good bits.’
75 Therefore it was perhaps not surprising that his 
involvement with SEA was quickly to prove troubled and acrimonious. Crucial to Salter, 
as  the  comment  above  suggests,  was  retaining  control  of  the  R&D,  and  this  quickly 
emerged  as  the  source  of  his  disagreements  within  SEA.  Perhaps  only  his  distrust  of 
Government  involvement  outweighed  his  distaste  for  ‘commercial  people.’  During 
negotiations with RMC he wrote to a friend ‘Wave Power is racing ahead and if we can get 
some private finance the Government will contribute an equal amount and allow us to keep 
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control.  Otherwise  they  will  finance  the  whole  of  it  and  take  over  themselves.’
76  The 
involvement of RMC appeared at the time to have achieved this goal for Salter.   
 
  By late 1975 the Government’s involvement in wave energy had accelerated with 
the establishment of WESC, followed soon after by Alex Eadie’s announcement of a £1m 
wave energy programme (as discussed in chapter 4). Research funding for wave energy 
shifted from the convoluted and difficult process that was necessary to fund Salter initially, 
to  an  explicit  Government  programme  for  wave  power.  Salter’s  earlier  fears  over 
Government involvement seemed to have been realised and he wrote ‘The vested interests 
of the establishment have jumped onto the bandwagon fairly hard and things seem to be 
getting out of control. I am reminded of the poem about somebody riding a tiger.’ He went 
on to state that with the involvement of RMC ‘we could go independent if necessary’.
77 
However,  it  was  unthinkable  at  the  time  that  the  high-profile  Salter  device  would  not 
feature prominently in any new Government wave energy programme. Despite continued 
development by Cockerell’s team and new work by NEL on the Masuda device, Salter 
remained at the leading edge of UK wave power R&D. Accordingly, early in March 1976, 
and prior to the official launch of the wave power programme, an innovative private/public 
contract was eventually drawn up between SEA and the DoEn.
78  
 
  It  was  clear  that  the  inclusion  of  a  commercial  partner  was  something  of  a 
departure  for  the  DoEn,  ‘The  existence  of  [SEA]  made  it  necessary  to  negotiate 
commercial terms quite different from those which would be normal for a University type 
contract.’
79 After a ‘protracted series of negotiations’
80 a jointly funded programme was 
agreed with each party contributing £202,000 (later increased to £230,000 due to inflation) 
over  two  years  for  the  ‘development  and  exploitation  of  wave  power  devices  based 
substantially  on  the  Salter  and  SEA  patents’.
81  The  DoEn  pressed  for  control  of  the 
intellectual  property  rights,  but  ‘conceded’  these  to  SEA  on  the  basis  that  ‘it  was  an 
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unimportant matter so long as HMG had free use for their own purposes and adequate 
control over the rights to grant licences.’
82 A WESC report stated, 
 
It would be difficult to summarise the whole agreement in a few words but 
it is sufficient to say that: (a) HMG now has secured a position in which 
there will be a fair return on the National investment if it should prove 
possible to make any profit out of the SEA/Salter system; (b) HMG has the 
right to veto overseas licensing if they consider it unnecessary; (c) ETSU 
will have Project management control to ensure that the objectives of the 
feasibility study are achieved. 
83 
 
A meeting of SEA Ltd. took place in June 1976 as the initial WEP was being put 
together  and  reveals  some  sensitivity  about  the  role  that  SEA  would  play  in  the  new 
programme. The minutes stated that, 
 
...difficulty  with  dealing  with  various  other  investigating  bodies  and 
advisory groups acting on behalf of the Wave Power Steering Committee 
was discussed. It was agreed that these parties had no contractual standing 
with  SEA  and  that  in  future  these  bodies  should  not  be  given  any 
commercially useful information. It was stressed that many of the parties 
investigating had their own commercial interests and that several of these 
parties were certainly being more commercial than SEA in keeping their 
secrets close to their chests. 
84 
   
  A key issue arose at this meeting that would ultimately prove to be the cause of 
Salter’s relationship with SEA, and more specifically with Bellamy’s Lanchester team, 
descending into acrimony. Bellamy tabled a paper at the meeting entitled ‘Revised Wave 
Power Development Programme’.
85 Bellamy was keen to construct ‘a model of working 
ducks’ immediately, rather than first concentrating efforts (as Salter preferred) on further 
development work on some aspects of the ‘backbone’ of the device within the testing 
tanks.  For  Bellamy  ‘engineering  experimentation’  was  important  at  this  stage  of  the 
programme. Salter was also keen to test the device in open water and favoured ‘a one 
metre  diameter  model  sited  near  Inch  Keith  on  the  Firth  of  Forth’  but  Bellamy  was 
insistent  that  a  larger-scale  model  in  ‘a  more  protected  inland  water  where  current 
problems would not be met and where the working environment would be safer’ was the 
best way forward. He had already begun conducting tests on 1:60 scale 6-metre string of 
                                            
82 TNA, EG 16/50,ET 51/013, Note of a Meeting on 4 march 1976 at Harwell on Salter’s Ducks 
83 TNA, EG 16/100, WESC(76)P59, Contracts for Wave Power 
84 SA, Minutes of Technical Meeting of Sea Energy Associates Ltd. held at Lanchester Polytechnic at 11.00 
am, 23rd June 1976.  
85 SA, Revised Wave Power Programme, 2nd draft, July 1976 147 
Ducks at Draycot reservoir, but he was keen to extend this to a 1:15 scale model 50-metre 
string.
86  He  mentioned  Loch  Ness  as  a  possible  site,  though  he  acknowledged  the 
unwelcome slant that the choice of this site may give to the publicity.
87 The minutes record 
that ‘the matter was not completely resolved’.  
 
  In the months following the meeting Salter and Bellamy made some attempt to 
resolve their differences. For his part, Salter stated that he was ‘wholeheartedly in accord’ 
with Bellamy on several points. The main one being that ‘our ultimate aim is to produce 
cheap electricity’. However, in what was to become a familiar Salter argument over wave 
R&D, he went on to point out that he made a ‘crucial distinction’ between ‘the ultimate 
aim, and the objectives in the earlier stage of development’.
88 Salter’s stated strategy from 
the outset had been to ‘maximise credibility in the shortest time’.
89 His comments also 
reveal that Goodwin’s insistence on the crucial role of sound economics in wave power 
had taken hold.  
 
What we must aim for now is to maximise information. And we must do 
this precisely in order that, later on, we can be efficient in the sense that we 
can  do  the  job  as  cheaply  as  possible.  So  we  must  distinguish  between 
sophistication  in  the  early  stages  in  order  to  gain  information  and 
sophistication in the final design. If we are sophisticated now we shall know 
how to be cheap later. I consider this principle is the key to the success of 
the project. Do you accept it? 
90  
 
Evidently, as events would prove, Bellamy evidently did not accept this principle. Much 
later,  in  1979,  after  the  SEA  partnership  had  disintegrated,  Salter  reminded  the 
Maidenhead Wave Energy Conference of the deceptive attraction of ‘simplicity’ in new 
technology.
91 Referring to Bellamy’s contention (with whom, by this time, relations were 
very poor) that ‘simplicity should be the over-riding design principle’, Salter responded in 
typical  fashion.  After  a  lengthy  quote  from  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary  defining 
‘simplicity’, he wrote,  
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It seems to me that ‘simple’ is not a simple word. While I do not argue that 
simplicity is for simpletons, I believe that it is an irrelevant factor, I want to 
get things right whether rightness comes from simplicity or complexity. The 
history of technology has many examples of designs which were ‘right’. 
Very often, these ‘right’ designs are elegant.
92 
 
  By the time that Salter had written to Bellamy in December 1976 the decision over 
Loch Ness had already been taken by SEA. During a visit to Lanchester Polytechnic earlier 
that month, Alex Eadie, no doubt keen to demonstrate visible early progress on wave 
energy, had announced that trials of the Duck would take place in Loch Ness during the 
summer of 1977.
93 Salter thought that this was a grave error and he was placed in a very 
uncomfortable position by the announcement. He wrote, ‘I am sorry about the Loch Ness 
announcements which resulted from a visit by Eadie to the Lanchester people. It is much 
better to say what you have done rather than what you hope to do but it may get all of the 
monster  headlines  out  of  the  way  early  on.’
94  The  SEA  partnership  had  been  formed 
around Salter’s device and the Loch Ness trials would be of his Duck design, yet in the end  
- and through his own choice - he had little involvement with it. He continued work at 
Edinburgh on improvements to the backbone of the Duck and the construction of a new 
wide tank, whilst, as predicted, the press and television were drawn to Loch Ness to see 
‘Salter’s Ducks’.  
 
  After the establishment of the WEP and two years of funding from the DoI, the 
control of Salter’s team passed from NEL (Jim Leishman at NEL had been managing 
Salter’s team) to WESC and Clive Grove-Palmer. Salter’s second-year report for the DoI 
had shown evidence of continued progress and he had been able to report once more ‘we 
can  say  that  the  possibility  of  economic  power  from  the  sea  waves  has  still  not  been 
excluded.’
95 He wrote in January 1977 that ‘the duck is still the favourite device’ and 
reported that ‘we have a budget of £180,000 for the next two years with a contribution 
from an industrial group which brings the total up to nearly £500,000.’ 
96 Clearly, despite 
his difficulties with Lanchester and the Loch Ness trial, his confidence in the future of 
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government backing for wave energy research remained high and he wrote ‘There are quite 
strong political pressures to give us a higher budget and immense amounts of goodwill.’
97  
Through 1977 Salter focused on the construction of a new wide testing tank at Edinburgh 
which he saw as the next logical step in the development of a robust and economic wave 
energy device.  
 
  Grove-Palmer had officially agreed his proposals for the wide tank in March 1977 
and construction began late in 1977. Up until this point the Edinburgh team had been 
testing designs in a borrowed narrow wave tank that resembled an elongated fish tank. This 
had allowed 1:100 scale testing of a single device, but clearly could not accommodate the 
testing of a string of devices that would be required. Salter had designed the Duck as a 
modular device, which could then be incorporated into long strings, forming wave power 
stations of varying size. This would allow strings of Ducks to be added or removed from 
future installations. Many of the early wave devices (such as the Raft) shared this modular 
design, and it was regarded as a positive feature of wave energy. From the beginning Salter 
had  been  pushing  to  build  a  wide  testing  tank  at  Edinburgh.  He  regarded  this  as  an 
essential step in perfecting the design of wave power devices, contrary to the views of 
Bellamy at Lanchester who, as stated above, pressed for the development of scaled-up 
devices in the water. It was clear to Salter that of equal, if not greater, importance than the 
wave device design itself was the design of the mechanism that would couple the devices 
together. In the case of the Duck this was the spine or backbone. The wide tank would 
allow Salter to develop a reliable backbone at 1:150 scale, which he regarded as an optimal 
testing scale. Salter had earlier hired a 1:10 scale tank for a week to test his Duck design 
but concluded that ‘Everything was far slower and more expensive but, for shapes like 
those of most wave devices, no more accurate [than the 1:100 tests]’.
98 
 
  Funding for the wide tank was capped at £100,000 as this was the amount that 
Grove-Palmer,  as  WESC  programme  manager,  could  approve  without  seeking  further 
approval from ACORD and the DoEn; not to mention the inevitable delays that the pursuit 
of greater funding would create. The Salter team had therefore to ‘design backwards from 
£100,000’.
99 A new building had to be constructed at Edinburgh University to house the 
wide tank, but with the purchase of scrap parts and a great deal of ingenuity the team was 
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able to stay within the tight budget. The tank was eventually filled with 350 tons of water 
in January 1978 and was ‘officially’ opened in July 1978 by Alex Eadie, just prior to the 
Heathrow Conference.
100 It comprised of 89 wavemakers and could reproduce (at 1:150 
scale) an area of sea 3 km wide and 1 km long (see fig. 5.2). In the wide tank, using around 
90 1:150 scale Ducks, the Salter team would be able to reproduce a scale model of the 
2GW wave power station that the WEP had set as its ‘reference design’ (see chapter 4). In 
the event it was a rival team that first used the tank from February 1978.  
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Figure 5.2:  
The Edinburgh wide tank  
 
Source: Salter, S., ‘Looking Back’, in Cruz, J (ed.), Ocean Wave Energy: Current Status and Future 
Prospects (Springer: Heidelberg, 2008) Fig. 211., p.27  
 
   
 152 
Salter was distracted from his focus on device development during the construction 
and equipping of the wide tank. In addition, his attention was repeatedly drawn to the 
problems  of  SEA,  Lanchester,  and  the  Loch  Ness  Trials.  Recognising  the  difficulties, 
Grove-Palmer wrote to SEA in March 1978 that ‘The Ducks project is in danger of going 
off the rails and something must be done quickly to put it back on course’. He noted that 
there was ‘an almost total lack of communication between SEA and Salter.’ 
101 Despite the 
attempts to resolve their differences it was clear that Salter and Bellamy had fundamentally 
irreconcilable  views  on  the  direction  of  wave  energy  development.  After  the 
announcement of the Loch Ness trials, soon after the formation of SEA, Salter took little 
part in the SEA/DoEn project. The Edinburgh team continued to receive separate DoEn 
funding (£35,000 per annum) for its tank work, and Salter devoted himself to this aspect of 
the work. As early as June 1977 Salter was writing about a ‘crisis in the organisation and 
planning of the [SEA] project’.
102 Soon after he began to openly question the ‘competence’ 
of the Lanchester team and warned Peter Young, the RMC director of SEA, that ‘we are 
headed for an expensive disaster’. He elaborated, 
 
I  am  sure  that  you  must  be  aware  that  on  several  occasions  we  have 
questioned  the  competence  with  which  the  various  Lanchester  activities 
have  been  conducted.  Each  of  the  steps  from  computer  simulation  to 
Draycote to Loch Ness have followed an identical pattern. They find that a 
problem  is  harder  than  they  supposed  and,  instead  of  solving  it,  they 
abandon it and move on to a yet more ambitious goal. The present Loch 
Ness model has the wrong shape of duck with the wrong moment of inertia 
and centre of gravity, a spine which is too stiff, inadequate control of spine 
alignment and power take-off and unreliable information on the directional 
characteristics of the waves. 
103 
 
  By December 1977 the ‘crisis’ had evolved into a ‘rift’
104, and finally become a 
‘split’.
105  By May 1978 Salter stated plainly that ‘I have no faith in the competence of the 
Lanchester  team  and  cannot  be  involved  in  any  of  their  future  work.’
106  For  him  the 
ultimate folly of the Loch Ness trial lay in the harm that it could do to the image of wave 
power. The RMC people involved in SEA agreed with Salter that the Bellamy trials at 
Loch  Ness  were  over-ambitious,  but  regarded  this  as  a  mistake  in  the  time-scales 
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envisaged for the work; ‘...we have been trying to go too fast’.
107  Certainly the Loch Ness 
trials  were  dogged  with  difficulties  and  delays.  Problems  between  NEL,  who  were 
collaborating on aspects of the project, and Lanchester, meant that vital parts for the trial 
were severely delayed.  When these parts did arrive, winter conditions had also arrived on 
Loch Ness, and the bad weather (which included parts of the loch freezing over) hampered 
the SEA team further. This pushed the work - to have been completed in the summer of 
1977 - into the next year, and by May 1978 an extension to the SEA/DoEn project was 
agreed  by  WESC.  An  additional  £330k  was  allocated  to  the  trials  and  the  proposed 
completion date was extended until 31 October 1978. Significantly, WESC required that 
SEA make certain alterations to the model - the centre of gravity and moment of inertia - 
which echoed some of Salter’s earlier criticisms.
108   
 
  Through  the  summer  of  1978  WESC  made  repeated  attempts  to  heal  the  rift 
between Edinburgh and Lanchester, noting that ‘Salter and Bellamy have not been working 
fully in harness’. They urged that the Loch Ness trials should go ‘hand in hand’ with the 
wide tank work at Edinburgh.
109  However, it was clear that Salter would not be persuaded. 
During 1978 the SEA/Lanchester trials continued at Loch Ness and the interim results of 
the tests were reported at the Heathrow Conference in November that year (see chapter 4). 
The technical challenges that had been thrown up by the trials formed a major part of the 
rather  gloomy  prospects  for  wave  energy  which  were  presented  at  the  conference.  In 
particular, the SEA team had encountered real challenges with the bending ‘spine’ of the 
device,  and  in  the  power  ‘take-off’  mechanism.  These  were  problems  that  Salter  had 
recognised, and judged would be best tackled at 1:150 scale in the new wide tank.  
 
  Following the Heathrow Wave Energy Conference official enthusiasm for wave 
energy dipped. The technical challenges and associated costs revealed at the conference 
served to dent the initial surge of optimism shown by government and, consequently, by 
private industry. The ‘immense amounts of goodwill’ that Salter had referred to, only one 
year earlier, vanished quickly. Shortly after Heathrow, after the first two years of the SEA 
project, RMC reviewed their involvement in wave energy. They were clearly concerned by 
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the technical challenges revealed by the Loch Ness trials, and probably disappointed and 
disconcerted by the lack of commitment that Salter had shown the project.  
 
  A meeting of SEA was arranged for January 1979 to discuss a way forward for the 
project, and a paper circulated by Peter Young of SEA/RMC prior to the meeting made the 
position abundantly clear.    
 
This paper has been written in an attempt to assess the commercial future of 
wave  power  and  SEA  Ltd’s  chances  of  benefiting  from  it.  RPT’s 
[consultant] latest cost estimates are analysed and it is concluded that wave 
power is unlikely to be competitive as a source of electrical power for the 
grid within a commercially viable time scale. An alternative route - energy 
farming - is discussed, but with wind and tidal energy likely to be more 
competitive in this scenario it seems again that time is not on our side. The 
conclusion is that we should not invest further funds in wave power and that 
any future commitment should be on a fully funded basis, hopefully with a 
management fee to provide a worthwhile profit. 
110  
 
SEA were concerned about the emerging understanding of the development time-scales for 
wave energy, and how this would affect their investment. Young elaborated,  
 
Patents last for 15 years. Some of ours are already one or two years old. We 
should therefore be in a position to cash in within 8 years at most if we are 
to see much return. With the sort of problems now being thrown up, and the 
speed  at  which  ETSU  functions,  it  appears  unlikely  that  a  full-scale 
prototype of any device will be built within 8 years, let alone one on which 
we have patent rights.   
 
The meeting signalled the end of RMC’s involvement in wave energy, and the winding 
down of SEA Ltd. The arrangement had lasted for nearly three years and had focussed on 
trials of the Duck at 1:10 scale in Loch Ness. The DoEn and RMC had invested heavily in 
the project and the results had been largely discouraging. Bellamy reported at the January 
meeting that ‘The work had demonstrated beyond doubt that a duck string could absorb 
substantial amounts of power’, but the cost predictions and reliability figures loomed large. 
Also, by this stage Bellamy was losing interest in Duck development and had submitted 
separate funding applications to WESC for his new ‘Clam’ wave device. So, from early 
1979  the  Duck  would  return  to  the  test  tank  of  Stephen  Salter  and  his  team  at  the 
University of Edinburgh.  
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Conclusions 
This  chapter  has  examined  an  early  attempt  at  the  commercial  development  of  wave 
energy. It has shown how this began in 1975 with Stephen Salter’s search for industrial 
partners to aid in the development process, and resulted in the formation of Sea Energy 
Associates  Ltd  in  1976.  Despite  regular  complaints  over  the  administration  of  DoEn 
funding, Salter remained generally satisfied (throughout the early WEP) that the levels of 
that funding were adequate, and even generous, for his R&D work on the Duck. Therefore 
his motivation for including commercial partners can be seen to have been derived mainly 
from awareness that large-scale engineering expertise would ultimately be required for the 
successful  development  of  wave  energy  in  the  UK.  At  full-scale  the  Ducks  would  be 
constructed of concrete and each Duck would be in the order of 3 metres across. Ready 
Mixed  Concrete  Ltd.  appeared  to  be  an  ideal  partner;  not  only  for  their  expertise  in 
concrete but also their willingness to invest significant amounts of time and capital in the 
project.  
 
  Very quickly it emerged that Salter and SEA had fundamentally different ideas 
about  the  way  in  which  the  Duck  should  be  developed.  Although  Salter  focused  his 
disagreements over the direction of the project on the Bellamy team’s ‘competence’ - it 
was  clear  that  RMC,  anxious  over  patent  exploitation,  were  also  keen  to  hasten  the 
development process. As has been seen, Salter maintained that the future viability of the 
Duck would be best served by thorough laboratory testing prior to up-scaling and testing in 
the open water. This fundamental disagreement sealed the fate of the SEA partnership 
almost from the outset. 
 
  Another  key  theme  that  emerges  in  this  chapter  was  the  influence  of  new 
environmentalism, in particular ant-nuclearism that lay at the heart of Salter’s motivation 
to develop a renewable energy source. Though clearly stimulated by the oil crisis (and Mrs 
Salter) to consider renewable energy sources, it is plain that Salter was greatly influenced 
by his early encounter with Amory Lovins and the new UK branch of Friends of the Earth. 
The challenge for Salter was to create a renewable energy device that would serve as a 
genuine alternative to the continued expansion of nuclear power in the UK.  This long-term 
hope, that Goodwin had termed ‘grandiose and panacea like thinking’ for the potential of 
renewable energy arguably caused Salter to approach the development of wave energy in a 
careful and considered way, which was at odds with the frantic pace encouraged by short-156 
lived enthusiasm of the DoEn; and the clash with Bellamy over the Duck trials at Loch 
Ness  illustrates  this  well.  This  chapter  emphasises  that  Salter  remained  committed 
throughout the WEP to protecting the credibility of wave power as a valid alternative to 
nuclear power.  It would perhaps to be too ambitious to claim that, at the time, Salter had a 
sense that the energy TIC would ensure the failure of renewable energy technology by 
forcing the pace of development towards unrealistic targets; although this is certainly a 
view that he reached later.
111 
 
  What  damage,  if  any,  did  the  SEA  project  do  to  the  UK  WEP?  The  evidence 
suggests that the Heathrow Conference was a major watershed in wave energy in the UK. 
Chapter  4  showed  that  the  cost  estimates  and  technical  challenges  unveiled  at  the 
conference did lasting harm to the image of wave energy, and began a gradual process of 
retreat culminating in the closure of the WEP in March 1982. Before Heathrow, the Salter 
Duck  was  the  leading  wave  energy  device,  attracting  much  of  the  funding  and  media 
interest in renewable energy. The disappointing results from the widely publicised Loch 
Ness  trials  served  to  emphasise  the  unexpected  scale  of  the  challenges  that  faced  the 
programme and, as such, harmed the future of UK wave energy development. In this, 
Salter’s anxiety over the damage that premature 1:10 scale testing could inflict was proved 
correct. 
 
  Previous  chapters  refer  to  the  ‘hubris’  of  the  wave  energy  community  prior  to 
Heathrow. This boundless confidence in the potential for wave energy among developers 
and  those  close  to  the  WEP  was  encouraged  before  1979  by  consistently  positive 
statements on wave energy from within the government and the CEGB. I would argue that 
this led many developers towards the perfectly understandable belief that the DoEn would 
remain committed to wave power in the medium to long term whatever the challenges. 
Consequently,  this  belief  encouraged  leading  developers  such  as  SEA  and  Cockerell’s 
Wavepower Ltd, to push forward to larger-scale sea trials without due consideration of the 
potentially damaging impact of short-term failures; a risk that Salter alone had recognised. 
In Power from the Waves Ross argues that despite drawbacks there was some merit in this 
approach, as it allowed developers an opportunity to uncover some of the challenges of 
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larger-scale  power  generation.
112  However,  this  overlooks  the  lasting  damage  that 
perceptions of failure had on the wider wave energy programme.  
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Chapter 6 
Rising Wind 
‘Variability, unpredictability and high capital costs make [wind] a non-runner’
1 
 
This chapter will consider the gradual evolution of the UK wind energy programme from 
its inception in 1978 until the privatisation of the electricity industry in 1989. Despite the 
surprisingly  vast  numbers  of  wave  energy  patents  mentioned  in  previous  chapters,  the 
technology of wind energy was much more firmly established by the 1970s than that of 
wave  energy.  Various  projects  from  the  late  nineteenth  century  and  throughout  the 
twentieth century, most notably in the US and Denmark, had advanced the development of 
efficient and effective wind turbines.
2 Perhaps owing to this the technical challenges of 
wind power generation were significantly less than for wave power: a fact emphasised 
starkly for wave by the proceedings of the Heathrow Conference.  
 
  The previous two chapters dealt primarily with the evolution and eventual closure 
of the UK wave energy programme (WEP) between 1974 and 1982. It was seen that during 
the early years of the WEP, wave energy was routinely considered by the DoEn as the 
front-runner among the potential renewable energy technologies in the UK. Chapters 4 & 5 
showed how this position of preeminence began to shift after the abortive Heathrow Wave 
Energy Conference of November 1978. Prior to this, as the quotation above illustrates, 
wind energy had been given a much lower priority and effectively discounted within the 
government’s  wider  renewable  energy  programme.  However,  the  cost  estimates  and 
technical challenges for wave energy revealed at Heathrow, plus a substantial wind energy 
programme in the US, placed wind energy in a much more favoured position from 1979 
onwards. 
 
  In a sense, the appeal of wave energy had lain in the scale and uniqueness of the 
technological challenge that it presented to the UK government. In this way it resembled 
the early nuclear programme. Edgerton and others have argued that the nuclear programme 
was driven by the enthusiasm and specialist technical expertise of engineers. Politicians 
could not be expected to fully understand nuclear technology and therefore the UKAEA 
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developed as a uniquely powerful and autonomous organisation within the UK energy 
scene.
3  Wave  energy  presented  a  similar  array  of  complex  technical  challenges  (only 
understood fully by a limited number of ‘engineers’) which required a similarly huge and 
long-term  capital  investment.  However,  with  nuclear  energy  continuing  to  represent, 
however uncertainly, the UK’s energy future the government was ultimately not prepared 
to gamble on another speculative and expensive energy technology. This chapter shows 
that wind power soon came to be seen as a much safer and perhaps cheaper renewables 
option for the UK.  
 
The UK Wind Energy Programme 
In the early years of the UK renewables programme the development of wind energy was 
routinely rejected. This was despite the fact that the original ETSU objectives included 
wind energy (and not wave) as a primary area for R&D (see chapter 3).
4 However, as 
previously discussed, the weight of the 1974 CPRS recommendation strongly influenced 
the initial shape of the UK renewables effort in this regard.  This was not helped by the fact 
that the influential Lord Rothschild was also quoted as being sceptical about the prospects 
for wind energy in the UK.
5  It was not until 1978, four years after the creation of ETSU 
that a Wind Energy Steering Committee (WISC) was set up. How can this initial hesitation 
to explore the potential of wind energy in the UK - arguably the most ‘conventional’ of the 
alternative energy sources - be more fully explained? 
 
  Some explanation for the initial reluctance to invest in wind energy in the UK can 
be traced back to the attitude of ACORD before 1978. At a meeting in December 1975 the 
council considered an early ETSU report on ‘The Prospects for Wind Energy in the UK’.
6 
The  report  had  considered  only  ‘large  machines’  and  the  council  noted  that  the 
accompanying ‘Wind-maps’ showed that the areas of ‘greatest wind’ were ‘away from the 
areas of greatest demand’. More pointedly ACORD observed that periods of calm meant 
that wind could not be considered a ‘firm power source’. This was despite the fact that 
wave energy shared both of these characteristics. The council though appeared to accept 
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that a suggested capital investment of between £2m - £5m would ‘save’ one million tonnes 
of oil per annum, or the equivalent of ‘one or two’ coal fired power stations. However, 
further objections were raised which perhaps better explain the delayed investment in wind 
energy  development  in  the  UK.  First,  the  council  anticipated  that  the  ‘environmental 
aspects’  of  erecting  10,000  ‘of  these  machines’  would  create  ‘intense  opposition’.
7  
Second, the meeting noted that the US was proposing to spend $30m on wind technology 
over 5 years and it might be better to await the outcome and ‘buy in’ US technology.  
Although the council observed that it might be unacceptable to the IEA ‘if the UK put in 
no  effort’  rather  interestingly  it  noted  that  ‘wave  power  work  might  be  offered  in 
exchange’.
8  The  meeting  concluded  that  there  was  no  need  to  establish  a  steering 
committee  for  wind  energy  ‘until  more  accurate  cost  estimates  were  available  which 
indicated a valid option’.
9  
 
  Clearly, the minutes of the 1975 meeting show that ACORD had little interest in 
the  development  of  wind  energy,  and  ETSU  appeared  to  do  little  to  encourage  its 
development  in  the  UK.  Interestingly  many  of  ACORD’s  objections  could  be  applied 
equally to wave energy but the momentum created by Lord Rothschild had forced wave 
energy  into  the  renewable  energy  spotlight.  Indeed  many  of  their  key  objections  on 
location,  intermittency,  and  uncertain  costs  were  perhaps  even  more  telling  for  wave 
energy than for wind: though this may have been intended as a thinly veiled criticism of all 
renewable energy sources from ACORD. Despite this, perhaps as a stalling tactic within 
the wider UK renewables programme, ACORD asked that ETSU revise their proposals for 
wind energy.  
 
  By April 1976 an ad-hoc group led by ETSU, and including representation from the 
Energy  Technology  Unit  (ENT)  at  the  DoEn,  produced  a  report  titled  ‘A  Strategy  for 
Energy R&D in the UK’.
10 ETSU had been established for two years by this time and took 
the opportunity to reflect on its initial experience, and to develop a wider energy R&D plan 
for the medium term in conjunction with the DoEn. It was a comprehensive and lengthy 
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report which covered all UK energy sources, and included an overview of the renewable 
sources. The section on wind energy immediately followed a positive assessment of the 
potential of wave power; ‘probably the most attractive naturally occurring energy source in 
the UK’.
11 The report suggests that the ‘upper limit’ for a UK wind energy programme 
would (again) be ‘10,000 generators each of 1MW rating’ (a figure derived from the earlier 
ETSU  study)  and  that  this  would  represent  an  annual  energy  saving  of  8  mtce.  This 
contrasts with the figures given for wave in the report which suggest an energy saving of 
15 mtce in 2000, rising to 50 mtce by 2025. However, the environmental aspects of wind 
energy were stressed once again and described as ‘considerable’. The report states that ‘a 
modern aerogenerator has more in common with an electricity transmission tower than 
with the picturesque, old-fashioned windmills.’
12 
 
  This report is a clear example of renewable energy sources set within the dominant 
UK energy problem frame. Wind and wave were considered in terms of their potential 
contribution to a national energy mix which contains a limited number of energy sources. 
Coal, oil, and nuclear energy were the main components in this mix, and the renewable 
sources were seen as insurance mainly against a so-called ‘Limit on Nuclear’ scenario. 
Therefore, their contribution had to be shown as significant and cost-effective (compared 
to nuclear) to be worthy of consideration. In the mid-1970s the uncertainty that surrounded 
wave energy helped to suggest that it had the potential to fulfill these conditions, whereas 
wind energy (where the technology was much better established) appeared initially to fall 
short of the requirements. This helps to explain both the initial rejection of wind energy 
and its eventual appearance in the UK renewables programme as the technical challenges 
of wave energy grew over the course of the Wave Energy Programme (WEP) described in 
chapter 4. 
 
  Despite the lack of enthusiasm for wind energy within ACORD and the DoEn, 
ETSU continued to investigate its potential and published what proved to be the seminal 
report on wind energy in the UK, Energy Paper 21, in June 1977 ‘The prospects for the 
generation  of  electricity  from  wind  energy  in  the  United  Kingdom’.
13  This  first 
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comprehensive study of the potential for wind energy overturned the earlier assumptions 
about its potential in the UK and concluded, 
 
Whilst no clear economic case can be made at the present time for utilising 
wind  energy  for  the  large  scale  generation  of  electricity,  the  potential 
contribution from this source has a significance that is too large to ignore. 
Further, aerogenerators can produce energy in its most useful and high grade 
form,  namely  a.c.  electricity:  in  which  form  it  is  readily  and  efficiently 
transmitted  and  converted  to  light,  heat  and  motive  power.  Also,  it  is 
compatible with the existing distribution system fed by conventional power 
plant.
14  
 
  The report stopped short of recommending what it called ‘a large development 
programme’ but did suggest that in addition to continued support for ongoing wind energy 
research at the university level, the DoEN should support the commercial development of 
‘medium size aerogenerators of around 100kW’. ETSU noted that this would ‘ensure a 
British presence in the potential home and export markets for this form of energy saving 
equipment.’
15 Energy Paper 21 represented the first detailed consideration of the potential 
of wind energy in the UK and led directly to the first commercial wind energy proposal. 
 
Hawker Siddeley Dynamics proposal: 1977 
Prior to publication of Energy Paper 21, ACORD had considered and approved a draft of 
the  ETSU  report  in  its  meeting  of  November  1976  and  the  conditions  for  industrial 
participation  were  established.
16  In  January  1977  an  ‘independently  formed  industrial 
group’  led  by  the  British  multinational  Hawker  Siddeley  Dynamics  Ltd  submitted  a 
proposal to the DoEn which sought to ‘resolve’ some of the ‘uncertainties’ surrounding the 
exploitation  of  wind  energy  in  the  UK.
17  The  consortium  included  leading  industrial 
partners, Electrical Research Association Ltd, Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Co. Ltd, 
and Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd. Also included was a small contribution totalling 
£10,000 from the South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) and the North of Scotland 
Hydro-Electric Board (NSHEB). The proposal did not aim to produce a prototype turbine, 
but rather to seek the ‘configuration and cost of a machine optimised for minimum energy 
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cost’  and  the  ‘total  costs  associated  with  site  construction  and  grid  connection  of  an 
installation  at  several  representative  sites’.  The  costs  of  the  study  were  estimated  at 
£160,000  (including  the  contribution  from  the  Boards)  and  government  funding  of 
£75,000,  matching  the  total  contribution  of  the  industrial  partners,  was  requested.  The 
proposal  from  the  consortium  firmly  rejected  the  earlier  ACORD  notion  that  the  UK 
should simply wait for the US developments in wind turbine technology. It suggested that 
American developments were ‘over-sophisticated’ and their manufacture in the UK would 
involve ‘high capital expenditure’. Furthermore it stated vaguely that US machines were 
‘not suitable for optimum exploitation of the highest merit sites available in the UK and 
overseas’, before making the rather more salient and persuasive political point that a ‘home 
initiative  will  maximise  employment  of  the  required  skills  that  already  exist  in  UK 
industry’.
18  
 
  The February 1977 meeting of ACORD considered the consortium’s proposal.
19 
Despite the appearance that wind energy was gaining official support in this period, the 
November  1976  meeting  had  given  ETSU  the  rather  negative  task  of  defining  ‘the 
minimum  Department  of  Energy  programme  to  ensure  that  its  overall  position  on  the 
subject was defensible’.
20 Advice to ACORD further illustrated the tokenistic nature of the 
initiative. The Chairman of the ACORD Programme Committee pointed out that it had 
already been established that wind energy ‘may be economic on a few remote sites’, but 
emphasised that this was ‘still a long way from any thought of series ordering which must 
be the option of interest to the Department.’ However, in accordance with the ‘defensible’ 
position desired by the DoEn the advice recommended that ACORD should ‘welcome the 
active participation of industry, including commitment of finance, in a small on-going 
programme without any commitment whatsoever to prototype construction.’ 
21 
 
  ACORD followed this advice closely and supported the Hawker Siddeley proposal, 
albeit in overwhelmingly negative terms. The council echoed the view that the study would 
add little to that which was already known about wind energy on ‘prime sites’ and would 
not  ‘demonstrate  whether  or  not  wind  energy  could  be  economic  on  a  more  general 
basis…’.  Moreover  it  re-stated  the  view  that  the  environmental  impact  of  ‘the  large 
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Research and Development for Fuel and Power, Minutes of meeting, 8 February 1977.  
20 TNA 16/118, FPRD(77) 12. My italics 
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numbers  of  machines  required  to  make  any  significant  contribution...would  in  all 
probability  prevent  wind  power  exploitation.’ 
22  Walter  Marshall  added  the  typically 
trenchant  observation  that  ‘He,  himself,  doubted  that  wind  power  could  be  proved  an 
economic option’ but conceded that ‘it was important to assess its economic viability in an 
objective and responsible manner’.
23 Perhaps, he could also have added ‘defensible’ to this 
list.  
 
  By  early  1978  the  consortium  had  completed  its  feasibility  study.  During  1977 
Hawker Siddeley Dynamics had been nationalised as a leading part of the new British 
Aerospace under the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977 following a manifesto 
commitment by the Labour Government in 1974. Despite earlier reluctance to move to a 
prototype, the study recommended that as a next stage in the investigation of wind energy 
a  demonstration  turbine  should  be  constructed  on an  appropriate  site  in  Scotland.  The 
suggested prototype was a massive 3.7 MW turbine with a blade diameter spanning 60 
metres, at a time when the largest successfully demonstrated machines (such as in the 
Netherlands) spanned around 23 metres. Clearly the scale of this prototype did not daunt 
the DoEn and a further 12-month study costing £341,000 was funded to refine the design 
of the turbine and to investigate potential sites. Evidently, the enthusiasm for wind power 
was increasing during 1978 as the DoEn also commissioned a further study of the potential 
for offshore wind. How can this shift in attitudes be understood? 
 
  There  are  perhaps  a  number  of  key  factors  that  help  to  explain  the  increasing 
attention paid to wind energy in the UK at the end of the 1970s. First, and perhaps most 
important, was the example of the US wind energy R&D programme. From 1974 the US 
had committed millions of dollars to developing reliable onshore wind technology. As 
noted above, ACORD was aware of the scale of the US programme and was initially 
tempted to allow the Americans to bear the cost, and some of the potential first-mover 
advantages, of wind energy development. However, pressures from influential industrial 
partners such as Hawker Siddeley over the impact on British technology jobs forced the 
DoEn  to  reconsider  its  position.  Also  the  apparent  commitment  in  the  US  to  develop 
domestic wind energy capacity, and the introduction of legislation favourable to renewable 
                                            
22 TNA, EG 16/118, ET 4/1/021, FPRD(77)  
23 Ibid. 165 
energy sources, offered a valuable export opportunity to UK industry at a time of serious 
balance of payments pressures.
24  
 
  Second,  the  interest  and  involvement  of  the  Electricity  Boards  encouraged  the 
DoEn to reconsider the potential of wind energy. As well as the commitment of the SSEB 
and  the  NSHEB  to  the  initial  Hawker  Siddeley  study,  the  CEGB  also  began  actively 
pursuing  the  feasibility  of  onshore  and  offshore  wind  energy  during  this  period.  The 
electricity  boards  were  attracted  by  the  advanced  technological  development  of  wind 
turbines, and by the examples of its exploitation by electricity providers in other countries. 
Closely  related  to  this  for  the  Scottish  Boards  was  the  involvement  of  leading  UK 
industrial  firms  in  wind  energy.  The  interest  and  financial  commitment  of  leading 
companies  such  as  Hawker  Siddeley  Dynamics  and  Taylor  Woodrow  in  wind  energy 
encouraged confidence among the Boards for the potential of wind energy.  
 
  Third, as previous chapters have shown, was the growing realisation that wave 
energy development would take longer and prove more costly than originally envisaged. 
The  impetus  for  wave  energy  advocated  by  the  CPRS  recommendation  in  1974  and 
Salter’s groundbreaking work coincided serendipitously to create an initial enthusiasm for 
this  exciting  new  energy  source.  Staggering  conversion  efficiencies  demonstrated  by 
Salter, and confirmed by the CEGB among others, suggested that by scaling up a wave 
device tremendous amounts of electricity could be captured. However technical challenges 
were emerging that cast some doubt on the economic feasibility of wave energy which 
were  fully  revealed  at  the  Heathrow  Wave  Energy  Conference  in  1978.  Wind  energy 
technology  was  on  the  other  hand  much  less  technically  challenging  and  therefore  a 
cheaper option. Whilst Britain pioneered the development of wave energy (and bore the 
costs of this) wind energy had been developed internationally and the UK could benefit 
from this established expertise. 
 
  Set  against  these  factors  for  the  development  of  wind  energy  was  the  repeated 
concern over the environmental impact of large-scale deployment of wind turbines. After 
the  initial  temptation  to  allow  the  US  to  do  the  ‘donkey  work’  on  wind  power  was 
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overturned, the only consistent argument against wind energy in the UK was focused on its 
environmental  impact  and  the  potential  reaction  of  the  public  to  this  visual  intrusion. 
Among countless examples, Freddie Clarke, Research Director at Harwell (and subsequent 
Chairman of the Wind Energy Steering Committee) stated,   
 
It will be noticed that [windy sites] do not generally coincide with the areas 
of maximum industrial or domestic demand for electricity. Indeed they tend 
to lie in the more remote areas of natural beauty. 
25  
 
 
Glyn  England,  the  CEGB  chairman,  doubted  whether  ‘the  public  would  welcome  the 
intrusion  of  these  gaunt,  massive  structures  into  the  landscape’.
26  Official  government 
assessments of renewable energy also routinely cited environmental factors as a primary 
impediment to wind energy.  
 
Wind Energy Steering Committee 
In June 1978 the Wind Energy Steering Committee (WISC) was set up at Harwell. Despite 
the earlier reluctance on the part of ACORD to establish a steering committee for wind 
energy, the increased activity following the recommendations of Energy Paper 21 and the 
subsequent Hawker Siddeley study eventually sealed the case for its creation.
27 Although 
perhaps the removal of the wind-sceptical Walter Marshall as Chief Scientist at the DoEn 
(and chairman of ACORD) in 1977 and his replacement in both roles with the arguably 
more  sympathetic  Sir  Herman  Bondi  also  had  some  impact.  As  a  reflection  of  the 
importance of the new committee, Harwell’s research director, Freddie Clarke, took up the 
role of WISC chairman. The committee initially was comprised of representatives from 
ETSU, Government departments and the CEGB, but WISC signalled at the first meeting 
that it was anxious to have representatives from industry join the committee as soon as 
possible.
28 The main functions of the committee were similar to those of the previously 
established Wave Energy Steering Committee (WESC) and its main role was, 
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26 England, G., ‘Renewable Sources of Energy - The Prospects for Electricity’, ATOM, 264, October 1978, 
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To  advise  upon  the  formulation  and  management  of  a  Government 
Programme on wind energy and to consider and make recommendations for 
support on individual proposals. 
29 
 
  The minutes of the early meetings of WISC reveal a vigour that was perhaps absent 
when considering the deliberations of WESC at a similar stage. The focus of WESC had 
been, and largely remained, on the identification of the most appropriate wave energy 
device to take forward to the demonstration phase. For WISC the more advanced state of 
experience with the technology and the reduced scale of technical challenges placed the 
committee much closer to demonstration of wind energy. The earlier Hawker Siddeley 
study  had  already  produced  a  single  reference  design  and  two  further  tranches  of 
Government funding had also been approved for further work on the construction of a 
3.7MW turbine. In many senses WISC was simply taking up the reins of a programme 
which already had a significant degree of momentum.  
 
  As stated above the first task of the committee was to formulate a ‘Government 
Programme’  for  wind  energy  in  similar  terms  to  the  earlier  Wave  Energy  Programme 
(WEP) described in chapter 4.  While work by the industrial consortium
30 on the design, 
construction and siting of the 3.7MW demonstration turbine continued through 1979, the 
committee regularly reviewed the progress of the study. By February 1979 ACORD had 
agreed the detailed strategy for the wind energy programme which was set within the 
overall aim, 
 
...to  establish  the  total  feasibility  of  both  land  based  and  offshore  sited 
aerogenerators, and the nature and size of the contribution they might make 
to the UK energy supply. 
31 
 
  During 1979 there was a marked increase in activity on wind energy in the UK. 
WISC added selected industrial partners to the steering committee, and in December 1979 
appointed a full-time wind energy programme manager, Len Bedford from Harwell. The 
committee reported to ACORD in March 1980 that ‘In the UK, during the past year, there 
has  been  an  increasing  level  of  optimism  regarding  the  prospects  for  wind  energy 
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Ltd.  
31 TNA, EG 16/305, FPRD (80) 7, Department of Energy, Advisory Council on Research and Development 
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becoming a viable alternative source of energy.’
32 Perhaps this was partly as a result of the 
disappointment surrounding the discussions at the Heathrow Wave Energy Conference, but 
it is also explained by the total abandonment of the earlier ACORD notion that the UK 
should  allow  other  nations  to  take  the  lead  in  wind  energy  development.  The  WISC 
progress report for 1979/80 described a range of DoEn-funded wind energy studies set in 
progress during the year.
33 
 
  The main thrust of the new Wind Energy Programme (WEG) remained focused on 
the reference design for a 3.7MW turbine recommended by the earlier Hawker Siddeley 
study. Although the new report had not yet been completed, the preliminary conclusion 
suggested that the ‘report will largely confirm the conclusions reached by the feasibility 
study.’  Moreover,  a  suitable  site  for  the  demonstration  turbine  had  been  identified  at 
Bennan Hill in Ayrshire, Scotland.
34  Also as a further indication of serious intent, during 
1979 WISC had appointed W.S. Atkins and Partners as technical consultants to the wind 
programme, and through 1980 Atkins prepared an assessment of the consortium’s overall 
turbine design.   
 
  In  addition  to  this,  the  DoEn  were  now  funding  a  range  of  other  wind  energy 
initiatives. Although the horizontal axis wind turbine (HAWT) favoured by the consortium 
was  coming  to  dominate  wind  energy  development  both  in  the  UK  and  abroad,  there 
remained a significant interest in the alternative design of the vertical axis wind turbine 
(VAWT). Peter Musgrove, an important pioneer of UK wind energy in the 1970s, was an 
advocate  of  the  VAWT  and  the  DoEn  was  funding  a  study  led  (again)  by  British 
Aerospace  and  Taylor  Woodrow  Ltd  (key  members  of  the  3.7MW  HAWT  turbine 
consortium) into the potential of the VAWT, with Musgrove acting as a consultant.  
 
  The  verdict  on  the  Musgrove  study  has  some  interesting  parallels  with  the 
development of wave energy. The 1980 WISC report stated that despite some promising 
wind tunnel results, the Musgrove turbine was ‘a new concept originating from the UK’. 
This  was  clearly  seen  as  a  negative  assessment.  Given  the  ‘considerable  amount  of 
experience’ already gained with the HAWT and the ‘knowledge that MW size machines 
were already planned or under construction in other countries’  WISC were hesitant about 
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funding  a  megawatt-sized  Musgrove  turbine.  Instead  they  recommended  that  an 
‘intermediate size machine of about 25 to 30m diameter, and 100 to 250kW rated output, 
should be taken to the reference design stage.’ 
35 Clearly in the case of the VAWT, as with 
wave energy devices, innovation in renewable energy sources was seen as too great a risk 
for the DoEn.  
 
CEGB 
A further important stimulus to wind energy in the UK in the late 1970s was the active 
interest of the CEGB.
36 As was seen in previous chapters, the CEGB had also taken an 
early interest in wave energy. Don Swift-Hook from the CEGB was a very early visitor to 
Salter’s workshop in Edinburgh and the CEGB had invested time and money into wave 
energy R&D from 1975 onwards. This was not entirely surprising as both wave and wind 
were primary electricity-producing renewable technologies. And although the CEGB, like 
the Government, retained an abiding faith in the nuclear option it was seen as sensible to 
investigate  the  long-term  potential  of  the  renewable  options.  Indeed  it  may  well  have 
appeared  attractive  to  the  CEGB  to  have  some  control  over  ‘fuels’  after  decades  of 
wrestling with the government, the NCB, and the UKAEA over supply. Certainly the early 
estimates  of  renewable  energy  potential  seemed  to  offer  some  encouragement  to  the 
CEGB, demonstrated most famously in the speech of the CEGB chairman, Glyn England, 
at Fawley Power Station in 1978. He said,  
 
...in planning how to meet any future shortage of fossil fuels for electricity 
generation, we are not nailing our colours to the nuclear mast alone. We 
expect that, in time, nuclear power will be augmented by energy from some 
of the renewable sources. 
37 
 
  Although  in  the  same  speech  England  described  wave  energy  ‘as  the  most 
promising  of  the  renewable  energy  sources’  and  promised  that  the  CEGB  were  ‘not 
daunted’ by the technical challenges, as already discussed the scale of these challenges was 
beginning to dent enthusiasm for wave energy. 
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  During 1979, no doubt in part encouraged by government activity in wind energy 
and perhaps equally discouraged by the disappointment of wave energy at Heathrow, the 
CEGB began its own studies of both onshore and offshore wind energy and collaborated 
with many of the other government programmes. Swift-Hook who had worked on earlier 
studies of wave energy now switched his focus to wind technology.
38 The CEGB worked 
on a number of different aspects of wind energy during this period. One of these was 
offshore siting, which many regarded as the best response to the widely discussed and 
imagined  environmental  problems  of  onshore  wind.  This  study  was  conducted  in 
collaboration  with  Taywood  Engineering  Ltd,  ERA  Technology  Ltd,  and  Newcastle 
University. Musgrove also acted as a consultant on this element of the programme. The 
initial results of this study were very encouraging and the report considered offshore siting 
was ‘feasible for a 60m diameter machine’. The study also confirmed earlier estimates that 
a total 200 TWh/year, at a cost of around 4p per kWh, could be generated from offshore 
wind. The cost in particular contrasts very favourably with the wave energy estimates from 
Heathrow which were in the ‘very high range’ of 20-50p per kWh (see chapter 4).
39  
 
  In addition to the work on offshore wind, the CEGB also examined other important 
aspects of wind energy development. In particular, this was focused on two important 
areas; turbine cluster spacing and perhaps most crucially, integration into the National 
Grid. A central theme of this thesis is the techno-institutional barrier that existed in the UK 
and constrained the development and deployment of renewable energy technologies during 
the period. The primary technical barrier discussed was the National Grid and its historical 
creation on a model of large, centrally located power stations. I have suggested that this 
served to create a dominant energy problem-frame that discouraged innovation in small to 
medium scale energy sources in the UK, due in part to the perceived technical challenges, 
and perhaps the lack of will, in connecting these sources to the National Grid. The nature 
of the CEGB’s involvement in wind energy addresses some of these claims.  
 
   It is clear that the research into wind energy carried out by the CEGB after 1979 
recognised that integration into the Grid would be a key issue for this new technology. The 
accepted scale of the resource, and the low projected generating costs, encouraged a ‘next 
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stage’ study of Grid integration that had been absent in wave energy. And WISC reported 
that  the  CEGB  had  concluded  that  it  would  be  ‘unlikely’  for  there  to  be  any  ‘major 
operational difficulties in incorporating aerogenerator capacity’ into the Grid. This was, of 
course, greatly encouraging for all of the renewable technologies, but the favourable cost 
estimates for wind energy had by this time shifted the focus firmly towards wind power.  
 
  Although,  as  has  been  seen,  wider  research  activity  in  wind  energy  intensified 
through  1979,  the  ‘main  plank’  of  the  UK  Wind  Energy  Programme  remained  the 
construction of the 3.7MW reference design turbine at an initial estimated cost of £5.4m. 
Relative to other elements within the wider UK renewables programme this represented a 
significant investment by the government in a single demonstration project; by 1980 a total 
of around £17m had been spent on the entire programme since inception. This provides 
further evidence of the extent of the DoEn’s newly-discovered faith in wind energy at the 
time. Moreover, as the new Conservative Government took up office in May 1979 with a 
pledge to make cuts in public expenditure, it makes the subsequent decision to cut the 
wave energy programme appear inevitable.  
 
  In 1979, the DoEn’s ‘Briefs for Incoming Ministers’ were telling for the fate of the 
renewable  energy  programme.
40  Reflecting  Thatcher’s  stated  intentions  for  the  new 
government,  a  ‘Tory  version’  of  a  key  document  titled  ‘The  scope  for  cuts  in  public 
expenditure’ outlined the possible areas where savings could be made.
41 For the major 
element  of  its  expenditure,  the  DoEn  rejected  the  idea  that  any  possible  ‘good 
housekeeping cuts’ could be made to the nuclear programme without the requirement for 
‘explicit  policy  decisions  on  major  programmes.’  Similarly,  other  key  elements  of  the 
DoEn budget were seen as yielding little in the way of savings. The exception highlighted 
in  the  brief  is  ‘non-nuclear  research  and  development’  and  ‘energy  conservation’.  For 
conservation  the  DoEn  estimated  that  £7m  could  be  saved  by  1982/83  ‘if  the  entire 
programme were terminated’.  Whilst in ‘non-nuclear’ (the renewable energy programme) 
the brief stated that there could be ‘small savings in early years, rising to about £18 million 
by 1982/83 if programmes are sacrificed.’
42  
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  Accompanying  the  ‘Briefs  for  Incoming  Ministers’  at  the  DoEn  was  the  paper 
‘Energy Technologies for the United Kingdom’ which would be published that same year 
as Energy Paper 39, which was prepared by ETSU.  Following a similar publication from 
ETSU in 1976, Energy Paper 11, this represented a major appraisal of the UK’s ‘R, D & D 
planning’, and it gives some insight into the shift in focus from wave energy to wind 
energy which had accelerated by 1979. The renewable technologies were categorised in the 
report in terms of their likely contribution to the UK’s energy future. They were described 
as  either  being  a  ‘supplementary  technology’  to  those  needs,  or  falling  into  the  more 
familiar and less important ‘insurance technology’ category.  The document reflects the 
disappointment over wave energy development and quoting figures produced at Heathrow 
it concluded that hopes for a ‘near full-scale prototype operating by the mid 1980s are […] 
unlikely  to  be  realised.’  Wave  energy  was  accordingly  classified  as  an  ‘insurance 
technology’.  
 
  By contrast, wind energy, largely dismissed in Energy Paper 11, was described in 
the newer report in much more positive terms. The estimated costs for wind turbines (£320 
- £380 per kW of installed capacity including maintenance and transmission costs) were in 
stark contrast to the frighteningly high costs for wave devices (estimated at Heathrow at a 
staggering £4000 - £9000 per kW installed capacity, without including maintenance and 
transmission). Furthermore, the report made clear that wind turbine technology was at a 
much more advanced stage than many of the other renewable energy technologies, and the 
3.7MW demonstration machine ‘suitable for mass production’ would be constructed within 
‘the next few years’.  
 
Orkney Turbine: ‘the star attraction’ 
43 
In January 1981, the Secretary of State for Energy, David Howell, formally announced the 
government’s  plan  to  build  ‘a  60  meter  blade  diameter’  wind  turbine  ‘of  about  3 
megawatts’  at  Burgar  Hill,  Orkney.  The  government  hoped  to  have  the  machine  in 
operation and connected to the island’s electricity supply by 1983-84. Financial support of 
up to £4.6m would be provided by the government, with a further £1m (and the provision 
of the site) coming from the NSHEB.  Howell also confirmed that a smaller 20-metre 
machine (250kW) would ‘share the site’ and was expected to be in operation by October 
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1981.
44 Since the completion of the first Hawker Siddeley study in 1978, the proposed site 
for the demonstration turbine had been Bennan Hill in Ayrshire. Through 1979 and 1980 
detailed site investigations had been carried out and negotiations with the relevant Board 
(SSEB) had been ongoing. What explains this change to a more remote island site after 
nearly two years of planning for another location, and what does this tell us about the 
development of wind energy in the UK?  
 
  Two main factors came into play which caused a last minute change to the site of 
the proposed demonstration turbine. Most important of these was the rapidly accelerating 
development of wind energy in the United States and in Europe. By late 1979 WISC noted 
that ‘the US wind energy RD&D programme is 4 to 5 years ahead of the UK programme.
45 
WISC  member,  Dr  R. H .  Taylor  (CEGB)  had  visited  a  US  wind  energy  workshop  in 
October 1979 and returned to report the scale of the US programme to the committee. He 
stated  that  the  US  Department  of  Energy  was  spending  $56.9m  on  the  wind  power 
programme alone in 1979, and had budgeted for $63.4m in 1980. His breakdown of the 
figures  showed  that  the  bulk  of  US  spending  in  1979  would  be  on  ‘Engineering 
development’,  but  that  in  1980  this  would  shift  significantly  in  favour  of  ‘Capital 
equipment and construction’. Taylor went on to report President Carter’s announcement 
that a target of 20% of US energy should be provided by ‘solar energy’ by 2000.
46 He 
noted that this had caused the US wind power programme to accelerate and there was a 
plan  to  achieve  500MW  of  installed  capacity  by  1986,  which  would  require  a  $1bn 
programme.
47  
 
  During his stay, Taylor had also visited two leading US companies involved in the 
US wind power programme; GEC and Westinghouse. GEC had submitted evidence to the 
US  Government  that  the  target  should  be  much  higher,  at  750MW.  Whilst  two  other 
leading  aerospace  firms  interested  in  wind  energy,  Boeing  and  Hamilton  Standard, 
suggested even higher targets of 1000MW and 1500MW respectively.
48 Similar to the UK, 
it is notable that leading industrial firms were expressing interest and spending money on 
wind energy development in the period. Similar too, but perhaps unsurprising, is that these 
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firms were concentrated in the aerospace and electrical engineering sectors of industry. 
What  is  more  unexpected  is  the  ambitious  scale  of  their  hopes  for  wind  energy 
development. WISC noted that this initiative would ‘bring down the unit cost of wind 
power and will demonstrate to US utilities that machines can operate reliably in the grid.’
49 
These developments in the US caused the wider energy community in the UK to take 
serious notice of wind energy.  
 
  Closely  related  to  the  scale  and  rapid  development  of  the  US  wind  power 
programme  was  the  reaction  it  created  among  the  electricity  Boards  in  the  UK. 
Significantly it had been the CEGB representative on WISC who had made the trip to the 
US,  and  the  Scottish  Boards  also  began  to  take  notice  of  the  increasing  interest  and 
participation of US utilities in wind energy. For the CEGB, with its greater resources and 
facilities, this acted as a catalyst for its expansion of wind energy RD&D in the UK. In 
addition to its representation on WISC and its involvement in some of the DoEn sponsored 
studies,  the  CEGB  also  made  plans  to  construct  its  own  demonstration  turbine, 
independently of the UK Wind Energy Programme. The Scottish Boards could not match 
the resource base of the CEGB in this regard, and therefore pressed the DoEn to forge 
ahead with wind energy developments. In particular, the NSHEB had been active since 
1977 in examining the potential of wind energy for remote island sites.  
 
  The Scottish islands relied mainly on diesel oil for electricity generation, and were 
therefore a notable casualty of the high oil prices that prevailed during the 1970s. This 
problem had been recognised by the DoEn and there were several mentions throughout the 
period about the particular energy ‘problems’ of remote island sites. In 1978 the Chief 
Scientist  advised  that  despite  the  DoEn  not  having  ‘primary  responsibility’  for  energy 
supply to the Scottish islands, ‘it would probably be to the Department’s advantage to be 
able to claim the interest in the social advantage that development of better energy supplies 
could bring to small communities.’
50 The NSHEB were understandably even more acutely 
aware of the problem and this caused their early involvement in the potential of wind 
energy.  
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  The consortium had recommended the site for a demonstration turbine at Bennan 
Hill on the Scottish mainland (and within the SSEB area) based both on an assessment of 
its  position  (a  windy  hilltop  site)  and  its  accessibility,  and  WISC  had  accepted  this 
advice.
51  The  choice  made  sound  economic  sense  as  it  would  keep  construction  and 
transport  costs  down.  However  the  NSHEB  were  determined  that  the  demonstration 
turbine  should  be  built  on  Orkney.  Through  1980,  as  WISC  ironed  out  plans  for  the 
construction at Bennan Hill, Alex Murray, Chief Engineer at the NSHEB keep constant 
pressure on the DoEn (supported by the consortium
52) to reconsider its decision; eventually 
threatening  to  buy  wind  turbines  from  abroad  to  fulfill  its  requirements.  The  pressure 
worked and WISC began to hesitate over its initial choice of site. At a meeting in 1980 the 
NSHEB was described as ‘a real customer’ and WISC looked more closely at Orkney as a 
potential site for the 3.7MW turbine. The SSEB on the other hand had access to a range of 
conventional  power  stations  within  its  area  including  the  nuclear  power  station  at 
Hunterston. This meant that the SSEB had a less pressing need to explore alternatives.  
 
  Meetings of WISC through 1980 considered closely the proposals to relocate the 
demonstration  turbine  on  Orkney.  Although  their  discussions  were  finely  balanced 
between  the  ‘definite  requirement  for  the  machine  on  Orkney  to  solve  an  immediate 
economic problem’ and the ‘greater difficulties for the construction, commissioning and 
operation of a prototype machine’, the committee made the decision to recommend to 
ACORD that the 3.7MW demonstration turbine should still be built at Bennan Hill in 
Ayrshire.
53 In the meantime the NSHEB had formed its own plans to construct a smaller 
250kW turbine on Orkney in collaboration with Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd at a 
proposed cost of £1m. WISC had recommended that the DoEn should fund 30% of the cost 
of this smaller machine.
54 In 1980 ACORD considered the WISC recommendations for the 
3.7MW turbine as ‘the major item’ of its October meeting.
55 Although WISC favoured the 
plan to build the 3.7MW at Bennan Hill and the 250kW machine on Orkney, reflecting the 
fine balance within its deliberations it also offered the alternative proposal to ACORD that 
both machines could be built on Orkney. WISC estimated that the additional costs of siting 
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the 3.7MW on Orkney could amount to an estimated £225,000, where the total cost of each 
option offered by WISC ranged around a figure of £7m.  
 
  This was a difficult decision for ACORD and its new chairman (and also newly 
appointed  Chief  Scientist),  Dr  Anthony  Challis.  The  briefing  note  for  the  chairman 
highlights two aspects of the proposals in particular. First, on a positive level was the 
confidence of the DoEn in the new wind energy consortium led by Taylor Woodrow, 
which the note suggested was ‘likely to perform much more satisfactorily’ than earlier 
‘insufficiently  well  directed  industrial  partners’.  Second  was  the  ‘sheer  size  of  the 
programme’ in terms of cost. This would mean ‘juggling the spend profile to accommodate 
this and all our other projects in the R&D budget’.
56 This clearly had direct implications 
for the Wave Energy Programme among others. ACORD made the decision to recommend 
to the DoEn that the wind energy programme should go ahead with the construction of 
both machines on Orkney. The most immediate concern for ACORD in deciding against 
Bennan Hill and the SSEB was the recognition that ‘the Consortium would gain valuable 
experience through being involved with a customer (NSHEB) that needed the electricity 
generated…’.
57  The  suggestion  from  the  NSHEB  that  they  ‘might  eventually  order  a 
further 5-10 large aerogenerators’ also helped to convince ACORD.
58 
 
  The  ACORD  decision  to  construct  the  DoEn’s  large  demonstration  turbine  on 
Orkney was also driven by a variety of wider considerations. The emergence of a strong 
industrial consortium and the perceived ‘failure’ of the Wave Energy Programme were 
important in this regard. Arguably more crucial though to the progress of wind energy in 
the  UK  were  the  dual  impact  of  the  US  wind  energy  programme  and  the  probable 
emergence of an international market for wind turbines. Vast amounts of spending on wind 
energy  development  in  the  US  appeared  to  convince  the  DoEn  that  it  was  the  most 
promising of the renewable energy technologies in the period. The strong support for wind 
energy development by the NSHEB and the CEGB seemed to confirm this view. This 
signalled a change in the direction of the UK renewable energy programme. In part this 
was undoubtedly ideologically-driven by a new Conservative Government committed to a 
move away from publicly-funded energy R&D, but I would argue that it also demonstrates 
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a fundamental lack of confidence in British innovation. It was widely acknowledged within 
the DoEn that the UK occupied the lead position in wave energy, whilst it remained ‘4 to 5 
years’  behind  the  US  lead  in  wind  technology.  Despite  this  advantage  the  DoEn  was 
daunted by the scale of the investment required to develop wave energy. The enthusiastic 
participation of a range of leading industrial partners in wind energy, the existence of ‘real 
customers’ in the NSHEB and possibly the CEGB, and the prospects for export swayed the 
DoEn towards the safer option of wind energy. 
 
‘Large Scale Wind Power Comes of Age on Orkney’ 
59 
In  November  1987,  almost  ten  years  after  the  initial  reference  design  for  a  3.7MW 
demonstration turbine was formulated, the Secretary of State for Energy, Cecil Parkinson, 
finally  ‘inaugurated  the  UK’s  largest  wind  turbine’  on  Orkney.  Changes  to  the  design 
meant that that the two-bladed 60m turbine now had an output of 3MW - ‘enough power 
for 2000 homes’.
60 However, during the ten years between conception and construction the 
international wind energy scene had gone through some crucial changes, and in many 
senses the Orkney turbine had become passé even before its blades started to turn. The 
United  States,  the  main  external  driver  for  Britain’s  wind  energy  programme,  had 
experienced a frenzy of activity between 1980-85. In particular, changes to legislation and 
the introduction of financial incentives for wind energy developers in California had seen a 
flurry of new ‘wind farms’ appearing after 1980 in a ‘Californian wind rush’. But at the 
end of December 1985 the financial incentives were greatly reduced and caused an almost 
immediate drop-off in wind development in the United States. Suddenly the prime export 
market for UK wind turbines largely disappeared.
61 Furthermore, technical problems on 
many of the US wind-farms cast some doubts over the economics and reliability of wind 
energy. Just as the US wind energy industry went into a decline, the DoEn unveiled its 
‘star attraction’.  
 
  Following  David  Howell’s  announcement  in  February  1980  negotiations  began 
between the DoEn, NSHEB, and the consortium of Taylor Woodrow, British Aerospace, 
and GEC (soon after the consortium formed a new enterprise for the project called the 
Wind Energy Group). Relations became fraught at times as the NSHEB grew impatient 
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with the pace of the project, threatening at one point to withdraw from the agreement and 
instead  buy  its  wind  turbines  from  Sweden.
62  Some  of  the  initial  delay  was  due  to 
contractual disputes between the DoEn and the Wind Energy Group (WEG) over funding 
and ownership issues. WEG was very keen to place limits on their liability on Orkney, and 
pressed the DoEn to offer guarantees that all of their costs (including profit) would be 
reimbursed by the government. The DoEn resisted the idea that WEG should have a ‘risk-
free’ part in the project, and negotiations slowed accordingly.  
 
  An essential element of the Orkney project was the construction of the smaller 20 
metre 250kW turbine prior to the larger machine. This contract had already been agreed 
separately between NSHEB, WEG and the DoEn, but it now came to be included in the 
overall project. Whilst the DoEn and NHSEB were funding the cost of the larger machine 
(the DoEn were contributing £4.6m, whilst the NSHEB contribution was £1m) the smaller 
machine included a financial commitment from WEG. This 20-metre machine was now 
estimated at £1.1m, with a WEG contribution of £225,000. WEG now emphasised the 
importance of the 20m turbine to the successful construction of the larger turbine, and they 
argued that this constituted a financial commitment to the success of the overall project. 
Eventually, after WEG refused to proceed with the 20-metre turbine until guarantees were 
forthcoming for the 60 metre machine, the DoEn was persuaded and the Government took 
on the bulk of the risks associated with the project. Finally in August 1982, after nearly 
two years of negotiations, the contracts were signed and final design and installation work 
could begin.
63 
 
Other Developments (I): CEGB 
Whilst the DoEn was locked in the protracted contractual negotiations over the Orkney 
project, other developments in wind energy were taking place in the UK. Around the same 
time as the Orkney announcement was made the CEGB announced that it intended to build 
its own demonstration wind turbine in the UK.  This came as a complete surprise to WISC 
and the DoEn, and caused some degree of annoyance as the CEGB was a key member of 
WISC (it was Dr Taylor of the CEGB that had travelled to the US in 1977 to assess the 
developments in wind energy for WISC). WISC had repeatedly asked the CEGB to clarify 
its position on wind energy R&D in recent years, but they had always been non-committal, 
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or at least low-key, about any plans to develop their own wind programme. The CEGB 
chairman  denied  to  the  Chief  Scientist  that  they  had  any  firm  plans  to  develop  wind 
turbines, but in fact site investigations had been taking place from the end of 1980.
64 
   
         Throughout the early wind energy programme the CEGB had remained an interested, 
and often active, participant in the DoEn developments. It had contributed to the earlier 
DoEn sponsored studies on offshore siting and carried out important research on clustering 
and  Grid  connection  at  its  Leatherhead  laboratory  (under  the  direction  of  Don  Swift-
Hook). Dr Taylor was a founding member of WISC, but the CEGB took no part in the 
flagship 3.7MW demonstration turbine project, other than its role within WISC. During an 
earlier  energy  crisis,  in  the  early  1950s,  the  CEGB  had  attempted  to  construct  a 
demonstration  wind  turbine  on  the  Lleyn  Peninsula  in  Wales.  This  was  eventually 
overturned  by  ‘intense  local  opposition’  on  environmental  grounds  by  the  affected 
community.
65 Now the CEGB planned to resurrect its plans for a demonstration turbine 
outwith the DoEn programme. By January 1981 a site was chosen next to its existing 
Carmarthen Bay power station in Wales.
66 Rather than developing their own design the 
CEGB  made  the  decision  to  ‘buy  a  proven  commercial  design  when  such  machines 
become available’.
67 It was proposed by the CEGB Chairman, Glyn England that an initial 
‘medium sized generator’ would lead to the development of wind turbine installations at 
other CEGB sites in the UK; and they named three possible sites for their first wind farm.
68 
The tendering process considered five proposals and the CEGB settled on an American-
designed 24 metre 200kW HAWT turbine to be manufactured in the UK by the Glasgow 
engineering firm, James Howden Ltd., at an estimated cost of £500,000.
69 In contrast to the 
protracted and ongoing negotiations over the Orkney project, the CEGB’s wind turbine 
was constructed quickly and was ‘switched on’ by November 1982. Ironically, it was the 
recently  installed  CEGB  Chairman,  (now)  Sir  Walter  Marshall  accompanied  by  Lady 
Marshall, who carried out the ceremonial duty. He said of the experimental turbine, 
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It will enable us to gain valuable experience of operation and maintenance 
and help us to find out how a much greater amount of wind energy could be 
integrated into the public electricity supply system. [ …] If our economic 
targets can be met, and if our programme has public support, wind energy 
on lowland sites could begin to make some contribution to public electricity 
supplies in the 1990s, with a progressively greater contribution thereafter. 
70 
 
            Marshall also stressed that the CEGB was not ‘exclusively preoccupied with coal 
and nuclear energy, but was interested in all forms of energy which showed promise of 
producing economical supplies of electricity’.  In the event the Carmarthen Bay turbine 
was an unsuccessful experiment although this did not deter the CEGB from announcing in 
May 1983 that it intended to press ahead with a much larger turbine.
71 Blade problems 
with the American-designed machine (first revealed in the US) meant that it only operated 
for a total of 400 hours between November 1982 and January the following year. Despite 
this, Marshall announced plans to build a massive 90-metre 4MW machine at the chosen 
site of Richborough in Kent with the possibility that ‘a cluster of up to ten large wind 
turbines of proven design’ could follow.
72  
 
                What does the role of the CEGB tell us about the development of wind energy in 
the UK during this period? There are two aspects that are perhaps worth highlighting. First, 
the  independence  of  the  CEGB  initiative  can  be  explained  most  simply  by  its  limited 
access to suitably windy sites. It had been well established since the most rudimentary 
wind maps were produced that the best sites for wind energy in the UK, and therefore the 
most economical, were located in Scotland. This meant that the DoEn wind programme 
was  formed  around  the  development  of  hilltop  sites  that  would  be  of  little  use  to  the 
CEGB. This forced the CEGB to investigate the potential of lowland sites. Second, was the 
determination of the CEGB to press ahead with wind energy development using large-
scale machines despite the failure of its experimental turbine at Carmarthen Bay. On the 
one hand, this again illustrated the influence of developments elsewhere (particularly in the 
US) where wind energy was fast gaining acceptance as a viable alternative energy source. 
Moreover, it also emphasised the continuing influence in the UK of the dominant energy 
problem-frame, which required large-scale solutions to energy needs. The CEGB plan to 
construct huge wind turbines, of a size far greater than anything currently operating, shows 
an understanding of energy sources based entirely on the conventional power systems. The 
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proposal  for  Richborough  was  that  10  turbines  could  provide  400MW  of  electricity  - 
comparable to coal-fired power station. Though admittedly some of this push towards this 
early model of wind farms was driven by the anticipated environmental objections to their 
construction, the CEGB approach (in common with the Orkney Project) emphasises the 
mistaken assumption that ‘size mattered’ in the development of wind energy in the UK.  
 
Other Developments (II): James Howden Ltd.  
Also  operating  largely  outwith  the  DoEn  wind  programme  through  the  1980s  was  the 
Glasgow engineering firm, James Howden Ltd.
73 During the 1970s Howden had enjoyed a 
very profitable spell working on a range of engineering projects (including nuclear power) 
and it was keen to explore lucrative new avenues in developing its range of engineering 
activities. After a meeting with the NSHEB in the winter of 1979, and no doubt intrigued 
by the involvement of other leading UK engineering firms in the potential of wind energy, 
from  around  1980  Howden  began  to  examine  the  possibilities  of  involvement  in  this 
emerging  new  sector.  The  initial  plan  was  for  Howden  to  buy  out  an  existing  turbine 
manufacturer  but  enquiries  revealed  that  only  one  private  firm  in  the  UK,  Sir  Henry 
Lawson-Tancred, had developed a working wind turbine (a 100kW machine) with any 
immediate commercial potential. After a visit by two of its senior engineers Howden made 
an attempt to buy out the company.  
 
  When the independent-minded Sir Henry resisted this Howden shifted its attention 
abroad and bought out the US company, Wind Technology Generation (WTG) who had 
designed  and  manufactured  a  300kW  HWAT.  Unfortunately  for  Howden,  the  WTG 
turbine design of large steel blades had major weaknesses due to stress, which were only 
revealed after installation. It was this machine design that the CEGB commissioned from 
Howden at Carmarthen Bay, which failed soon after it went into operation. After this 
initially  unhappy  experience  Howden  were  undeterred  and  made  an  approach  to  the 
NSHEB to construct and test out an amended design of its HAWT on Orkney. Using its 
own expertise in engineering design a team of four engineers from Howden soon produced 
an alternative turbine blade from scratch, manufactured from a wood polymer. As the 
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DoEn/WEG negotiations ground on, Howden successfully installed and tested their new 
22m 300kW turbine on Orkney during 1983.
74  
 
  Perhaps realising the glacial pace of progress in wind energy development in the 
UK,  particularly  when  compared  to  the  US,  Howden  began  to  make  approaches  to 
American  wind  farm  developers  in  California  to  exploit  the  growing  opportunities 
becoming available. Danish turbine manufacturers had already made significant progress 
in  the  US  and  Howden  also  saw  the  chance  for  a  lucrative  new  export  market.  The 
breakthrough came in 1984 with a single machine built for Southern Californian Edison. 
This 26m 330kW machine led directly to a massive order for the major US wind farm 
development at Altamont Pass in California, where Howden secured a deal for seventy-
five 330kW turbines, ten 15m 60kW rated machines, and a further single 45m 750kW 
turbine.
75 In 1985 the price of blades was roughly £10 per kilo, making the cost of a single 
Howden blade around £10,000. The Altamont deal amounted to 225 blades making this a 
significant job for Howden.
76  
 
  Unfortunately  the  blades  experienced  problems  right  from  testing.  These  were 
technical issues related to inadequate quality control which eventually resulted in all of the 
Howden/Edison blades breaking. Musgrove estimates that the total cost of this breakdown, 
including loss of electricity sales and the redesign and replacement of the blades, totaled 
more than £13m.
77 As a result, in 1986-87 Howden made a loss on its new wind energy 
division.    Howden  blamed  the  subcontractors  but  Peter  Jamieson  (who  had  helped  to 
design  the  blades  and  was  closely  involved  with  the  Altamont  job)  thought  that  the 
problems  originated  in  Howden’s  rush  to  complete  this  major  order  without  adequate 
testing. The new system of US tax credits for wind farms was due to terminate at the end 
of 1985 and was unlikely to be renewed. Just as in the UK a change of government in the 
US signalled a shift in attitudes towards public subsidies and this directly affected the 
renewable energy programmes. Awareness of the looming deadline caused Howden and 
others to reconsider their participation in the disappearing US wind energy market.  
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  This change of mood, and the experience of heavy losses, signalled the demise of 
Howden’s interest in wind energy. They constructed three more turbines (750Kw HAWTs) 
over the next couple of years - one of these for the CEGB at their new site at Richborough 
-  before  in  April  1989  withdrawing  completely  from  the  wind  energy  business.  Peter 
Jamieson, who had been closely involved with wind energy at Howden from the outset, 
cites the lack of any real support from the government for wind energy development in the 
UK  as  a  key  factor  in  Howden’s  decision.  He  compared  the  UK  unfavourably  with 
Denmark  where  he  claimed  there  existed  a  concept  of  growing  a  new  wind  energy 
industry.  The  reliance  on  what  he  termed  ‘the  purist  free  market  agenda’  severely 
constrained any prospect of developing a viable wind energy sector in the UK. 
 
Conclusions   
The inauguration of the Orkney turbine in 1987 proved to be the conclusion of the UK 
government’s  involvement  in  wind  energy  and  was  the  last  act  of  the  UK  renewable 
energy  programme.  As  its  blades  began  to  rotate  slowly  in  the  Orcadian  wind  the 
government  announced  its  plans  for  electricity  privatisation.  From  1989  onwards 
renewable energy would cease to receive any direct government funding and would instead 
be encouraged through the new Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO). By this time Danish 
turbine manufactures had demonstrated that any immediate potential for wind energy lay 
in  machines  somewhat  smaller  than  the  massive  3MW  WEG  machine,  which  quickly 
transformed into an elegant white elephant. By this time, Howden, the UK’s only viable 
commercial manufacturer of wind turbines had pulled out of the industry after its unhappy 
experience in the US. However, the CEGB retained some faith in the future for wind 
energy  in  the  UK.  Howden’s  final  involvement  in  wind  energy  (following  its 
announcement to withdraw from the industry) was to complete the turbine at Richborough 
for the CEGB, and in February 1988, one month after privatisation was announced, Walter 
Marshall unveiled plans to build three wind farms in the UK. The CEGB plan was for each 
wind farm to comprise 25 turbines with a capacity of about 8MW. In the event only one of 
these, at Cold Northcott in Cornwall, was ever built.
78 
 
  The UK’s involvement with wind energy was radically different from its earlier 
interest in the development of wave energy. From the outset this more mature technology 
provided an opportunity for the UK to exploit its own vast wind resource and to encourage 
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the development of manufacturing capability which could take advantage of the export 
opportunities provide by the burgeoning US market. Relative to other countries in Europe 
such as Denmark, Germany, and Sweden, the UK made a late start on its wind energy 
programme.  Recognition  of  this  fact  forced  the  DoEn  to  ditch  other  renewables 
programmes, most controversially wave, in order that resources could be concentrated on 
wind  energy.  However,  rather  than  recognising  that  the  commercial  potential  lay  in 
machines  rated  1MW  and  less  the  UK  concentrated  its  attention  on  the  huge  3MW 
demonstration  machine  on  Orkney.  Moreover,  as  had  been  seen,  extended  contractual 
difficulties meant that it took the government more than five years to construct the Orkney 
turbine. During this time Howden had entered the industry, designed and developed its 
own machine, and sold and built its machines in the US. Also the CEGB had built and 
tested its own machine at Carmarthen Bay.  
 
  Energy Paper 55 ‘Renewable Energy in the UK: The Way Forward’ set out the 
government’s  new  approach  to  renewable  energy  in  the  UK.
79  The  Non-Fossil  Fuel 
Obligation (NFFO) would be used to encourage commercial exploitation of renewable 
energy in the UK and government involvement (and expenditure) would gradually decline. 
However for wind energy the decision of Howden makes it clear that industry was not 
attracted to the commercial potential. Despite the CEGB announcement to build three wind 
farms the interest of industry was practically non-existent. Only WEG (the consortium of 
Taylor Woodrow, British Aerospace, and GEC) would continue its involvement in wind 
energy.  Indeed it is arguable that wind energy and renewables more generally would have 
disappeared at the end of the 1980s were it not for the discovery of the science of climate 
change. The imperatives of rising oil prices, security of supply, and dwindling fossil fuel 
reserves that had driven renewable energy since 1974 were increasing replaced after 1989 
with the new incentive of reducing carbon emissions.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Some economic aspects of the UK Renewable Energy 
Programme 
 
  This account of the development of renewable energy sources in the UK in the 
period following the first global oil crisis presented in the foregoing chapters has focused 
on the political and social aspects of the story.  This is explained with reference to the 
primary assumption of this thesis that it was these two factors that combined to create, 
maintain,  and  ultimately  end  the  UK  renewable  energy  programme.    Throughout  this 
account  this  thesis  has  sought  to  emphasise  how  social  movements  and  political 
imperatives  dominated  energy  debates  in  the  UK  during  the  1970s  and  how  these 
profoundly influenced the impact of economic assessment of renewable energy sources in 
particular. It is also central to the hypothesis proposed here that socio-political factors took 
precedence  over  economic  considerations  in  government  policy  on  renewable  energy 
sources.  However,  it  important  to  the  development  of  this  thesis  that  the  economic 
elements  of  the  period  are  considered  and  this  chapter  will  explore  some  of  the  key 
economic aspects of the development of renewable energy sources during the period 1974-
88. It is not a suggestion of this thesis that costs were unimportant. This chapter will show 
that the estimated generating costs for renewable energy (in particular wave energy) were 
constantly used to appraise the programme. Rather, it is advanced that during this time it 
was widely accepted that energy prices were generally unreliable as a guide in UK energy 
policy. 
 
Although many of the central economic issues appear in the main body of this 
thesis,  this  chapter  will  gather  this  information  together  and  consider  the  wider  socio-
economic conditions against which the programme operated during the period. This will 
include the role of the UK government in R&D and in creating prices during this period. 
The  chapter  will  begin  by  revisiting  the  theme  of  government  intervention  in  energy 
matters and the constructed nature of fuel pricing explored elsewhere in this thesis. It will 
continue with a general discussion of the role that economics played in the evolution of 
renewable energy programmes during the period before moving on to highlight many of 
the key issues using a case study of the economics of wave energy during the 1970s. Some 
consideration will also be give to the impact of externalities that play such a large part in 186 
current economic assessments of renewable energy.  Through the use of a case study of the 
WEP  this  chapter  will  focus  on  the  challenges  that  confronted  those  involved  in  the 
development of renewable energy when it came to calculations of estimated cost. The huge 
variation in estimates between groups and the over time will give some insight into the 
limits and politics of economic evaluation during the period. This will also go some way to 
explaining the rationale behind the focus of this thesis on socio-political factors.  
 
As I have shown in Chapter 3 the UK government’s renewable energy programme 
was created in large part as a reaction to the increased price of oil after 1973. The key 
element  of  that  programme,  the  Wave  Energy  Programme  (WEP),  was  constantly 
evaluated in economic terms in what seemed to be an objective measure: the price per kWh 
of generating electricity. The ‘objective measure’, however, proved contentious. In 1978 
the Heathrow Conference revealed the findings of the consultants RPT. These dealt with 
the technical and economic challenges that faced wave energy – and as was shown the 
estimated costs caused the government to back away from wave energy. Later, after the 
WEP was closed down, Stephen Salter consistently challenged the government’s estimated 
costs, offering revised versions of the cost per kWh. Following the WEP, the wind energy 
programme again was focused on cost throughout its short-lived existence prior to the 
privatisation of electricity in the late 1980s.  
   
  So in many respects the history of this period of the development of renewable 
energy in the UK could be regarded as a quite simple tale of economic imperatives.  The 
narrative could go something like this: The government experimented with the development 
of  alternative  forms  of  energy  following  the  oil  crisis,  but  these  proved  too  costly. 
However, this thesis has rejected this view of the period and regards it as (to use a phrase 
of  Salter’s)  simplistic  rather  than  simple.
1  This  deterministic  view  might  be  more 
acceptable if we accepted that decisions about energy were based entirely on cost; however 
I hope to have shown in the foregoing that this was not the case in the UK during the 
twentieth century. Chick wrote that national energy policy not always ‘a matter of rational 
economic  calculation’  and  as  this  quote  from  a  1970s  Energy  Commission  paper 
demonstrates energy prices were a product of a rather more complex set of circumstances.
2  
 
                                            
1 See p.147. DoEn, ETSU R9, ‘Wave Energy Steering Committee, Proceedings of a workshop on wave 
energy, Maidenhead, 16-18 December, 1979’.  
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Current  energy  prices  are  the  product  of  the  varying  circumstances  and 
histories  of  the  individual  industries….Coal,  gas  and  electricity  are  not 
internationally traded to the same extent as oil. There is greater freedom of 
manoeuvre  to  determine,  in  the  context  of  energy  policy,  the  principles 
which should underlie their pricing…The general principle of relating price 
to the costs of supply […] may be difficult to apply in practice.
3  
 
The  fact  that  fuel  prices  are  created  by  more  than  their  related  costs  of  discovery, 
extraction,  transport  and  conversion  is  not  surprising.  It  was  widely  accepted  that  the 
‘market’ for energy in the UK as something less than efficient. Michael Posner stated that 
fuel policy was ‘tendentious’ and went on to claim that,  
 
…all  the  energy  industries  were  operating  in  a  market  of  which  the 
characteristics were, in part, artificially determined not just by the permanent 
elements of imperfect competition, but by government trying to play God in 
the system without having divine knowledge or divine power.
4 
 
 
This was a view echoed by the governments own White Paper on Energy in 1967:  
 
National fuel policy is presumably meant to overcome the deficiencies of an 
imperfect  market  by  imposing  on  its  dominant  institutions  decisions  that 
serve the public interest better than those they would otherwise make.   The 
record makes it appear doubtful whether that purpose was either achieved or 
achievable.
5 
 
In addition the fact that electricity prices are further complicated by government choices 
over generation methods is equally widely known (see chapter 3). These conclusions over 
the uncertain relationship between energy costs and energy prices for mature fuels such as 
oil, gas and coal suggest that it would be challenging to integrate a ‘new’ fuel into this 
complex network of ‘varying circumstances and histories’.
6 This thesis suggests that this 
was indeed the case for renewable resources in general during the period 1974-88, and 
certainly for wave energy during the 1970s.  
 
The central contention here is that the development of renewable energy resources 
after 1973, partially instigated through social movements, was maintained and encouraged 
by social and political imperatives. This was explored in detail in Chapter 2 and is echoed 
                                            
3 Energy Commission, Working Document on Energy Policy, Paper Number 1. Annex 4, ‘Instruments for 
implementing energy policy’, pp.79-80  
4 Quoted in Ashworth, Coal, p.55 
5 Ashworth, Coal, p.58 
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throughout  this  thesis.  ‘Disrupters  of  institutionalised  arrangements’  kept  continual 
pressure on the government to explore alternative sources of energy, based mainly on an 
opposition to nuclear energy.
7 Throughout the post-war period the UK government made 
largely political decisions on fuel and energy policy.  The most obvious example of this, 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, was the UK nuclear industry. Based on a perceived need for 
energy security and a post-war thirst for big science, the government created a succession 
of  highly  expensive  nuclear  programmes  in  the  UK.  Scholars  have  agreed  that  this 
programme was not driven by its economic attractions, but rather by political goals.
8 This 
political nature of energy decisions applied equally to the renewables programme after 
1973 and explains the overwhelming focus on these issues in this thesis.  
 
Externalities 
It is difficult, from the viewpoint of the twenty-first century, to think of renewable energy 
resources  separately  from  climate  change.  Much,  if  not  all,  of  the  enthusiasm  for 
renewable sources of energy appear to emanate from concern about the impact of carbon 
emissions. This close relationship has certainly encouraged the subsequent development of 
renewables through post-privatisation instruments such as the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation 
(NFFO) and the later Renewables Obligation (RO). As discussed at length in Chapter 2 the 
1970s was the period when the ‘environment’ began to creep into the consciousness of the 
developed world through the appearance of landmark publications such as The Limits to 
Growth (LTG) and the first UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. Important 
social movements such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace were created during the 
1970s and all campaigned hard on environmental issues. As discussed, energy did appear 
at the margins of this debate but did not occupy the key role that it has for these same 
groups  today.  Energy-related  environmental  concerns  during  the  1970s  were  instead 
focused on one main issue: depletion.  Emanating from the LTG thesis of rapid depletion 
of  fossil  fuels  the  focus  of  environmental  concern  was  on  renewable  energy  as  an 
inexhaustible energy supply, rather than (necessarily) a clean supply. During the 1970s the 
science of climate change was developing. Below is an early, and highly unusual, mention 
in an official government publication of carbon emissions but this made little impact on 
thinking about renewable energy resources until later in the 1980s: 
                                            
7 Sine and Lee, ‘Tilting’, p.124 
8 Williams, Nuclear Power Decisions; Patterson, Nuclear Power: Patterson, Critical  
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…concern  about  the  effects  of  increasing  levels  of  carbon  dioxide  in  the 
world’s atmosphere could lead to limits being set on fossil fuel combustion 
well within a 50 year time horizon.
9  
 
 
  During  the  1970s  environmental  groups  were  preoccupied  with  the  impact  of 
pollution. This was a direct result of the publication at the beginning of the 1960s of 
Rachel Carson’s seminal Silent Spring.  Throughout the 1970s environmental groups and 
publications such as The Ecologist magazine in the UK concentrated on issues such as acid 
rain  and  air  pollution.  The  link  to  energy  was  not  well  developed  other  than  through 
attention to the pollution emitted by the coal-burning power stations. The other key area of 
concern for environmental groups at this time (and still today) was nuclear energy. The 
harmful effects of radiation and the problems of waste disposal were key concerns of many 
environmentalists from the outset and, as discussed in Chapter 2, these issues encouraged 
both  the  creation  and  development  of  many  social  movements  from  the  1950s.  These 
concerns about nuclear energy encouraged support for clean renewable energy sources 
from  environmental  groups  during  the  1970s.  This  added  to  the  social  and  political 
pressure for renewable energy, rather than being included in any economic assessment.  
 
The Wave Energy Programme 
As mentioned above, from its inception in 1974 until well after its closure in 1982, the cost 
of the new technology (defined as the cost of producing electricity from wave energy) 
within  the  Wave  Energy  Programme  (WEP)  was  continually  scrutinised  by  the 
government, mainly through ACORD (as described in chapter 4). This formed a key part 
of the general assessment process which all the renewables programmes were subject to in 
‘Phase 1’ of the governments plan.
10  Although the plan appears in Energy Paper 55 as a 
rather neat and ordered programme of ‘research, development and demonstration’ from the 
UK  government  it  was  in  fact  devised  roughly  two-thirds  of  the  way  through  that 
programme. Phase 1 (Mid 70s to mid 80s) which focused on wave energy was described 
thus: 
The programme identified feasible technologies, their costs, their technical 
potential as contributors to UK energy supply and the possible timescale of 
                                            
9 Department of Energy, Energy Technologies for the United Kingdom, Energy Paper 39 (London: HMSO, 
1979) 
10 Department of Energy, Renewable Energy in the UK: The Way Forward, Energy Paper 55 (London: 
HMSO, 1988), Phase 1 – Mid 70s to mid 80s. p.2 190 
that  contribution.  This  phase  was  conducted  mainly  by  analysis  and 
experiment without heavy financial commitment to technology development 
at  full  scale.  Further  expenditure  on  those  technologies  unlikely  to 
contribute significantly in the UK was curtailed and increased effort focused 
on the more promising ones. 
11 
 
Therefore  alongside  cost,  the  other  early  considerations  for  the  government  were  the 
technical potential of the resource and the state of the technology. Of course both of these 
additional elements for investigation were in fact very much related to cost. The scale of 
the potential resource and its location and accessibility would have a direct impact on cost, 
as would the developmental stage of wave technology. Therefore each of these elements, 
expressed as disparate issues by the government, could all be measured by cost. It is no 
surprise then that cost (in terms of electricity generation) was central to both the initial 
enthusiasm and the eventual gloom of the WEP, although it was a ‘cost’ that as both 
constructed and contested.  
 
  From before the creation of the WEP, economics featured strongly in the dialogue 
surrounding wave energy. Gordon Goodwin made several mentions during his very first 
visit to Salter’s workshop of his view that… 
 
…any  major  undertaking  has  to  fit  in  with  existing  economic  structure, 
must be costed on a totally comprehensive basis, and has to compete with 
other dominant calls upon National [sic] resources. 
12 
 
Although Salter was completely absorbed by the technical challenges of wave energy he 
had a clear understanding that wave energy must be ‘economic’ in order that it be adopted 
more widely.
13 The challenge for developers and for the government in a very uncertain 
environment was to make an accurate assessment of what the costs might be  
 
The calculation of the cost of wave energy 
Although he does not appear in the period during which decisions were made initially, an 
important figure in the development of accurate costs estimates for wave energy was Tom 
Thorpe. Thorpe was a senior scientist at ETSU and he produced two lengthy reports on 
wave energy during the 1990s; one in 1992 and the other in 1999.  These reports were 
                                            
11 Ibid 
12 TNA, EG 16/13, Note for the file, ‘Wave Power’ 
13 SA, First Year Interim Report on Edinburgh Wave Power Project “Study of Mechanisms for Extracting 
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commissioned by the government (through the DTI) in response to the increasing evidence 
of the existence and impact of climate change and growing pressure from environmental 
groups and Select Committees to reconsider the potential of wave energy.
14 Thorpe had the 
benefit of being some distance from the controversy surrounding the closure on the WEP 
on economic grounds in 1982, so was able to take a detached and clinical look at such facts 
that were available. His 1999 report summarises all of the officially generated costs for 
wave  energy  from  1983  onwards  and  gives  a  useful  insight  into  the  challenges  of 
calculating the costs of new and uncertain technology.
15 As Thorpe himself put it in his 
1992 report. 
 
…until the technology matures, estimates of the cost of power from wave 
energy devices represent a snapshot of the status and costs of the designs at 
(the current) stages of their development.
16 
 
In 1999 he was still keen to emphasise the ‘considerable uncertainty’ associated with his 
cost estimates and went on to suggest that predicted generating costs ‘could vary by up to 
±20%’.
17 
 
   The  ‘cost’  of  the  early  wave  energy  schemes  was  calculated  on  the  relatively 
simple basis of capital costs (annuitized over the lifetime of the plant), fuel costs, and the 
operation  and  maintenance  (O&M)  costs,  essentially  the  same  kinds  of  cost  estimates 
deployed for more traditional sources of energy from fossil fuels. More recent and helpful 
concepts  such  as  energy  coefficients  were  absent  in  these  simplified  calculations.  As 
already mentioned in the introduction this approach caused a number of challenges for 
wave  energy.  Firstly,  although  the  energy  in  the  waves  is  free,  the  capital  costs  of 
establishing  very  uncertain  technology  can  be  difficult  or  impossible  to  calculate 
accurately. As Thorpe noted above these were never more than a ‘snapshot’ during periods 
of rapid technological progress in the 1970s. For mature technologies the elements of the 
calculation  were  well  established  and  reasonably  predictable.  To  further  complicate 
matters, as mentioned above, the established energy industries drew on a range of subsidies 
that obscured the true cost of fossil fuels.  
 
                                            
14 Ross, D., ‘Scuppering’ p.16  
15 Thorpe, T. W., ‘A Review of Wave Energy’, ETSU Report number R-120 for the DTI (May 1999) 
16 Thorpe, T. W., ‘A Review of Wave Energy’, Vols. 1 and 2, ETSU Report number R-72 (December 1992)  
17 Thorpe, ‘Wave Energy’, (May 1999). Executive summary p.iv 
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Discount rates 
An  important  element  of  the  calculations  was  the  discount  rates  applied  and  the 
concomitant estimated plant life. Although an important element of any calculation of cost, 
in the period it was less of an issue for wave energy. Although arguable, plant life for wave 
devices was estimated to be similar than that for fossil fuel plants at 25-30 years.  Of more 
importance to the fate of wave energy was the discount rate that was applied. Over the 
period this was the same for wave as for fossil fuels – varying from 8% (public sector) to 
15% (commercial rates) over the period. Small changes in the discount rate can have a 
major impact on total cost – and marginal differences in the base cost can be magnified 
over time. However the major challenge for renewables in general and wave energy in 
particular is that by far the largest proportion of total cost for a ‘free’ fuel resides in the 
capital plant and the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs. The benefit of free fuel can 
be swamped by larger capital costs discounted over the life of the plant.  This was a 
particularly so as the impact of hugely uncertain prices over time for fossil fuels in the 
calculations should have allowed a tremendous advantage to renewable energy sources. 
Therefore the need to arrive at as accurate a figure as possible for construction of the 
physical plant is crucial to the perceived cost-effectiveness of renewables. Unsurprisingly 
it was in this area that most of the disagreements between the wave device developers and 
the government appeared.   
 
  Ross provided some examples of the disputes that arose with the government over 
capital costs.  
It was assumed that a non-return valve in a wind turbine would fail once in a 
million hours while the same valve in a wave energy device would fail 68 
times  during  the  same  period.  The  cost  of  the  steel  canister  and  concrete 
casing  of  the  Duck  caused  extraordinary  diversity.  Salter’s  team  obtained 
estimates of £208 per tonne. The RPT figure was £10,000 per tonne. The 
difference added up top £2.7 million per Duck.  RPT calculated the ‘average’ 
cost of wave power by comparing all the devices, including those assessed as 
the most expensive. So if one device was costed at 4p and the most expensive 
at  12p,  then  the  average  would  automatically  be  8p.  But  if  someone 
introduced a spendthrift invention costed at, say, 24p, then the average would 
automatically  have  gone  up  to  14p.  Salter  was  not  the  only  protester. 
Professor  Michael  French  of  Lancaster  University,  who  had  invented  an 
inflatable air bag to generate wave-electricity, proposed to use scrap iron as 
ballast. The official estimate put it at £3,000 a tonne. The normal price was 
£100.
18  
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For  wave  energy  these  uncertainties  and  disputes  over  the  factors  involved  in  the 
estimation  of  generating  costs  remained  (and  still  remain?)  problematic.  The  vast 
complexity  of  variables  led  to  some  very  imprecise  calculations,  which  was  prevalent 
throughout the 1970s. Furthermore, the general unreliability of these figures was widely 
acknowledged at the time. However, what was beyond dispute was the fact that, even 
allowing for wide variations in estimates, the cost of wave energy was significantly above 
that of the cheapest generating fuel – coal. At the time of the Heathrow Conference coal 
averaged 2p/kWh compared to the 20p-50p/kWh estimated for wave.  
 
Thorpe (1999) and the Edinburgh Duck 
This subsection examines a much later assessment of wave energy. The intention is that 
this will illustrate two facts about wave energy relevant to this thesis. First, it will show the 
huge challenges that the developers and the government faced in determining an accurate 
indication of the generating cost for wave energy. Second, it will show the dramatic fall in 
generating costs as the technology developed over a 15-year period. The evidence here 
would suggest that the cost estimates for wave energy during the 1970s were subject to 
even greater inaccuracy and variation. This then leads back to a central contention of this 
thesis  that  estimated  generating  costs  formed  only  one  element  of  the  process  in  the 
decision to close down the wave programme. Developers and the government (through 
ACORD, ETSU, and the consultants RPT) knew that estimates of generating costs were as 
Thorpe late put it ‘snapshots’ of the technology.  More relevant to the government at the 
time was the scale of its commitment to an uncertain new technology. Wave energy clearly 
had many years of development ahead – a point Salter was always anxious to make (see 
Chapter 5). Faced with cuts to the energy R&D budget, ACORD made the understandable 
decision to invest in wind energy, a much more mature renewable technology. However, 
this thesis argues that this was not based on finely balanced economic estimates, but rather 
on much broader numbers. A clear example of this was in Energy Paper 3, prepared by 
ETSU,  which  showed  low  estimated  costs  of  £320-£380  per  kW  of  installed  capacity 
(including operation and maintenance) for wind.
19  This contrasted sharply with the figures 
for wave presented at Heathrow of £4000-£9000 per kW of installed capacity (excluding 
operation  and  maintenance).  This  vast  gulf  in  the  cost  of  installed  capacity  and  the 
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investment of time and money needed to develop wave that it suggested were arguably 
more pertinent than the accepted unreliability of generation cost estimates.  
 
In 1999 Tom Thorpe produced his second report on wave energy within 10 years 
for the DTI.  In the report he summarised the current state of wave energy development 
and offered some assessment of the economic and technical potential of the resource.  His 
1992 report concluded that ‘optimistic expectations for the original wave energy devices 
were unfounded’, but by 1999 ‘the same review methodology now indicates that wave 
energy could become a useful source of energy’.
20 As this later date falls outside the focus 
of  my  research  it  is  somewhat  of  a  moot  point.  What  is  useful  to  this  thesis  is  the 
methodology that Thorpe adopts to calculate the generating costs of wave energy.  The 
complexity of his calculations reveals the challenges that faced developers and consultants 
in the 1970s. This is further emphasised by the margin for error referred to above (±20%).  
 
  Under a heading ‘Economic Assessment’ Thorpe builds a model of the variables 
that  make  up  the  capital  cost  estimates  for  wave  energy.  These  divide  into  two  main 
categories  as  shown  in  Table  7.1.  The  table  expresses  the  complexity  involved  in 
estimating  generation  costs  for  wave  energy.  The  range  of  variables  in  the  table  is 
concentrated  on  the  issues  of  site  selection  and  the  device  itself.  For  each  of  these 
categories a further list of variables was added. The challenges were increased in the case 
of the Duck, ‘which would exploit the maximum amount of wave energy resource in deep 
water’. As Thorpe pointed out, 
 
This required the Duck to operate under more energetic wave regimes, which 
would place great technical demands on the device. The Edinburgh team has 
acknowledged that the Duck would require a long R&D programme…
21 
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Table 7.1 Methodology for Economic appraisal 
 
Wave Power resource ⇒  Power levels in the sea 
                   ⇓ 
⇒ 
Site Selection  
                                          ⇒  Directionality factor ⇒  Available wave power 
                   ⇓ 
  Capture efficiency ⇒  Captured wave power 
                   ⇓ 
Power chain efficiency ⇒  Maximum annual output 
                   ⇓ 
Availability  ⇒ 
          ⇓ 
Actual annual output 
                   ⇓ 
O&M costs ⇒       
                                ⇓ 
Cost of electricity 
           ⇑  Annual cost 
           ⇑                   ⇑ 
Capital costs ⇒ 
                                          ⇒ 
 
                                          ⇒ 
Device selection 
                                          ⇒ 
 
 
                                          ⇒ 
  
 
Source: Thorpe, ‘Wave Energy’ (May 1999) 
 
 
In his 1999 report Thorpe looked at three versions of the Duck: the 1983, the 1991, 
and the 1998 version. He charted the technical improvements that the Edinburgh team had 
made over nearly three decades of development and provided a summary of the dramatic 
reductions in estimated generating costs. This variation over fifteen years from a high of 
83p/kWh in 1983 to a figure of 5.3p/kWh in 1998 gave some indication of the effects of 
the ‘long R&D programme’ that the Edinburgh team had always envisaged (see Table 7.2). 
Interestingly the 1998 figure of 5.3p/kWh was the target that ACORD had set for wave 
energy in 1982 prior to closure (see p.120).  
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Table 7.2  
 Costs of Generating Electricity for the Edinburgh Duck, 1983-98. 
                                 Generating Costs  
  8% discount rate  15% discount rate  
1983 Duck  57p/kWh  83p/kWh  
1991 Duck  17p/kWh  26p/kWh 
1998 Duck   5.3p/kWh  8p/kWh  
Source: Thorpe, ‘Wave Energy’ (May 1999) 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
This  chapter  has  explored  some  of  the  economic  issues  of  the  renewable  energy 
programme in the period 1974-88. It has shown how energy prices in the UK were subject 
to ‘varying circumstances’ and that the link between cost and price was not always clear. 
For renewable energy this may have offered an opportunity to enter an energy market that 
was less concerned with costs (at least initially). In theory the government could have 
taken a decision to set a low price for wave energy as a route to rapid development.  This 
thesis has shown that prior to the Heathrow Conference in 1978 this may have been a 
possibility  amid  the  unbounded  enthusiasm  for  wave  energy.    However  following 
Heathrow  it  was  clear  that  the  estimated  generating  costs  for  wave  energy  were 
frighteningly high, which undermined any thought of short-term subsidy. Estimates (that 
Thorpe showed later were actually hugely optimistic) of 20p-50p/kWh – ten to twenty-five 
times the average generation cost of the time - scuppered any enthusiasm for wave energy. 
The emergence of a more reliable and mature renewable energy technology - wind – in the 
early 1980s sealed the fate of wave energy.  Wind had better short-term prospects and 
much lower capital costs at the time, and it had the added appeal of being promoted in the 
United States.  This gave the UK government more faith in the technology and relieved it 
of the pressure of ‘going it alone’ on wave energy. 
 
  This thesis has argued that the development of renewable energy after 1974 was the 
result of a range of factors. Energy security was a key aspect.  Chapter 1 discussed the 
response to the Suez crisis in 1957 with a trebling of the UK nuclear programme at the 
time. It was suggested that this was repeated after the 1973 oil crisis, both in the United 
States (with Project Independence) and the UK.  Official reports, from Rothschild’s CPRS 197 
onwards, repeatedly emphasised the need to move away form a reliance on imports of 
foreign oil.  Clearly for the government the main solution to this challenge was as it had 
been in 1957 - the UK’s nuclear programme.  This thesis has shown how the renewables 
programme was consistently regarded by the government as an ‘insurance option’ and it 
was  generally  compared  in  any  official  economic  assessments  with  nuclear  energy.
22 
Given the heavily subsidised nature of nuclear energy and the uncertainty over the costs of 
wave  energy  discussed  above  this  was  a  rather  troublesome  financial  comparison. 
Therefore this suggests that the decisions on wave energy were taken as they were in other 
areas of energy policy at the time – on mainly social and political grounds.  
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Conclusions 
 
The central hypothesis examined in this thesis is the idea that decisions on renewable 
energy sources taken by the UK government are driven largely by socio-political factors – 
with economic issues playing a more minor role than might be expected. It was suggested 
in the introduction that the period 1974-88 was clear evidence of the early evolution of this 
approach with the Wave Energy Programme (WEP) providing a useful case-study of an 
R&D programme which was created, maintained, and eventually closed by socio-political 
policymaking. It was made clear in the introduction that this task would be achieved within 
a broadly based historical narrative and analysis of some of the key political, economic and 
social events of the programme, thus avoiding the narrower debates on technology and 
politics that have characterised the subject so far. Therefore what is put forward here is an 
account  of  renewable  energy  that  considers  the  key  social  and  political  factors  for  its 
creation and some of the reasons for its demise which cuts across the existing technical and 
political literature. In doing so it has explored a central theme, first suggested by Langdon 
Winner, that artifacts have politics.
1  
 
  It has examined the evolution of renewable energy in the UK in terms of the social 
and  political  imperatives  that  in  some  cases  drove  change  and  in  others  encouraged 
continuity.  Central  to  this  has  a  been  a  new  consideration  of  the  role  of  the  ‘new 
environmentalism’ in pressing for the development of alternative, and benign, sources of 
energy. In their role as what Sine and Lee have described as ‘disrupters of institutions’, 
environmental organisations and publications continually nagged at the government during 
the early 1970s to look at alternatives to traditional energy sources and, in particular, to 
nuclear energy.
2 This largely informal social pressure acted to alert the government to the 
potential of renewable energy, and as I have shown, provided ideological inspiration to 
innovators  such  as  Stephen  Salter  in  seeking  to  create  alternatives  to  nuclear  power.  
Although  a  natural  link  between  environmentalism  and  renewable  energy  is  often 
(wrongly) assumed, this thesis has shown, in particular by a close analysis of the content of 
The Ecologist magazine during the period, just how environmentalism began to embrace 
the debates on energy during the early 1970s.  
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  As the vast majority of renewable sources are used directly to produce electricity, 
this analysis began with a brief consideration of the historical development of electricity 
networks  in  the  UK.  This  addressed  the  first  of  the  major  themes  of  this  thesis  – 
government involvement and intervention in energy matters in the UK.
3 Since the early 
days  of  electricity  supply  in  the  UK,  government  and  municipalities  recognised  its 
importance for economic and social development and largely took control of the fledgling 
industry. The eventual result was the creation of a national distribution grid in the 1930s 
and  the  subsequent  nationalisation  of  the  electricity  industry  in  1948.  One  important 
consequence of this was that thereafter the evolution of energy technology in the UK was 
overwhelmingly  dictated  by  the  socio-political  demands  of  the  postwar  era,  and  this 
influence continued through to the UK renewables programme of the 1970s and 1980s.  
After nationalisation all of the UK’s energy industries became integrated monopolies and 
the market remained distant from energy in the UK until a series of privatisations in the 
later 1980s. As Helm put it, 
 
The  nationalised  coal  industry  dug  coal  primarily  for  the  nationalised 
electricity  industry,  which  built  enough  power  stations  to  secure  supply. 
Customers, with nowhere else to go, paid the costs.  When North Sea oil and 
gas  were  discovered,  the  Gas  Council  (and  the  British  Gas  Corporation, 
BGC, at it became known) built the National Transmission System (NTS), 
converted households to natural gas and signed long-term contracts for gas 
to flow through its planned network. The British National Oil Company 
(BNOC) completed the picture, set up in 1976 to give the state a direct hand 
in the North Sea, complementing the oil interests of British Gas.
4  
 
  When the Government did intervene on energy it was often on what it perceived as 
matters  of  national  security,  such  as  during  the  Suez  crisis  when  its  motivations  were 
overtly political. Chick described this as the ‘patriotic cloak’ of national energy security, 
when  alongside  the  infamous  trebling  of  the  UK’s  nuclear  programme,  the  crisis  also 
pushed  the  country  away  from  cheap  oil  imports  towards  protectionism  for  the  coal 
industry, as domestic employment triumphed over cheap energy.
5 Despite these occasional 
interventions, during the two decades following the Second World War, energy forecasting 
and planning was largely left to the nationalised giants of the CEGB, the NCB, and the 
UKAEA,  and  as  Hannah  pointed  out,  within  these  organisations  the  ‘engineers’ 
                                            
3 Introduction. pp.17-1p 
4 Helm, Energy, p.14  
5 Chick, Electricity.  200 
dominated.
6 Within the framework of statutory monopoly and integration inhabited by the 
nationalised energy industries during the period this was to lead to an approach to energy 
that was dominated by a constrained technological development (mainly in nuclear) and 
which paid little attention to the cost of electricity.  
 
  Bound up in the general disregard of cost to the electricity consumer during this 
period were the political decisions over fuel choice, which were a more central concern of 
this  thesis.  The  CEGB  remained  throughout  the  postwar  period  the  most  important 
customer for coal, and as the quote from Helm (above) illustrates, its decisions over fuel 
were always dictated by the needs of at least one other nationalised energy industry - 
usually coal. In the postwar golden age of increasing prosperity, domestic consumers were 
keen to switch from ‘dirty’ coal heating to electric heating and the survival of the coal 
industry depended entirely on the CEGB’s decision to burn coal to provide that electricity.
7 
This,  exacerbated  by  the  Government’s  concerns  over  energy  security  following  Suez, 
further  restricted  the  opportunity  for  the  CEGB  to  take  advantage  of  cheaper  oil-fired 
power stations. This situation was made worse by the troubled development of nuclear 
energy in the UK. Once more, energy security and the dominance of the engineers in 
energy supply meant that the huge costs of nuclear power development were absorbed by 
the cost per therm to the consumer, as the UK repeatedly tried, and largely failed, to 
establish a dependable nuclear programme. This approach resulted in what Baumgartner 
and Midttun termed the ‘haphazard’ UK policy before 1974, during which there was ‘no 
serious attempt to explore the longer term energy future of the UK’.
8  
   
  In 1973 the global oil crisis shook the UK government’s complacency on energy 
policy.  It  responded  immediately  by  creating  a  Department  of  Energy  and  turning  its 
attention  to  energy  forecasting  and  attempted  for  the  first  time  to  create  plans  for  the 
medium  and  long  term  energy  needs  of  the  UK.  For  the  next  fifteen  years,  until 
privatisation, the UK Government made various attempts to formulate an energy policy. 
This was a unique period in UK energy policy during the twentieth century when the 
Government attempted to directly control and guide the development of energy planning in 
the  UK.  Although  focused  on  the  traditional  fuels  of  coal  and  nuclear,  as  well  as  the 
                                            
6 Hannah, Engineers.  
7 Ashworth, Coal : Volume 5,  p.43 
8 Baumgartner, T., and Midttun, A. (eds.), The Politics of Energy Forecasting: A Comparative Study of 
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‘newer’ North Sea oil and gas, this new attempt at formulating a UK energy policy also 
extended  to  energy  conservation  and  renewable  energy  sources.  With  the  sensational 
publication of Limits to Growth and the growing profile of the new environmentalist lobby 
in the UK, the Government was alerted to the potential of the ‘alternative’ sources within 
its wider energy strategy.   
 
  Another  theme  examined  in  this  thesis  was  the  idea  of  energy  morality.  This 
described  a  new  social  interest  in  matters  relating  to  energy  taken  up  by  the  newly 
emerging environmental groups of the 1970s. The influence of the new environmental 
movement was crucial in advancing the case for renewable energy sources during the early 
part  of  the  1970s.  Emerging  from  the  swirl  of  anti-establishment,  anti-capitalist,  anti-
industrialist counter culture of the late 1960s, the UK environmental movement advocated 
the development of alternative energy sources, mainly as an alternative to nuclear energy. 
Through  influential  publications  such  as  The  Ecologist  and  the  newly  formed,  more 
radical,  environmental  organisations  such  as  Friends  of  the  Earth  UK  (FoEUK)  the 
ideological case for renewable energy was pushed into the mainstream. This thesis has 
shown that this not only attracted the attention of developers, but it also prompted the 
government to respond in some way. As several recent accounts of the 1970s have shown, 
during this period the government was keenly aware of the growth and perceived dangers 
of radical thought.
9 Turner and others have shown in detail how the government became 
fixated on responding to these threats to the established order, and how the ‘muesli-eaters, 
ecology  freaks,  loony  leftists  and  other  nutters’  in  many  ways  typified  these  new  and 
dangerous  elements  in  British  society  during  the  period.
10  This  indicates  that  the  new 
environmental movement had gathered sufficient momentum to represent a threat to the 
government,  and  that  the  UK  renewables  programme  can  be  seen  in  some  ways  as  a 
response, and a token, for this new section of society. 
 
  Alongside  the  social  pressure  created  by  the  formation  and  growth  of  the  new 
environmental movement was the important political influence of Lord Rothschild and his 
Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS).  This thesis has shown how during 1974 Rothschild 
and the CPRS occupied, albeit temporarily, a vacuum in UK energy policy following the 
                                            
9 Beckett, A., When the Lights Went Out: What Really Happened to Britain in the Seventies (London: Faber 
and Faber, 2009); Turner, A. W., Crisis? What Crisis? Britain in the 1970s (London: Aurum Press, 2008); 
Wheen, F., Strange Days Indeed: The Golden Age of Paranoia (London: Fourth Estate, 2009) 
10 Turner, Crisis, p. 50 202 
oil crisis. Amid political upheaval, which included two UK general elections in that year, 
Rothschild’s views on energy arguably set the tone for UK energy policy at least until the 
new Conservative Government of 1979, and perhaps even until privatisation in 1989.  His 
overall  strategy  of  attention  to  coal,  nuclear  and  conservation  (known  as  CoCoNuke), 
included a key recommendation on wave energy. This specific recommendation had arisen 
following a study carried out by an official in the Department of Industry, who then used 
Rothschild’s high profile report to advance the case for a detailed R&D programme on 
wave energy. The serendipity continued as Stephen Salter’s early work on wave energy 
provided  a  startling  example  of  the  potential  for  wave  power.    Therefore,  renewable 
energy, beginning with wave energy, emerged, almost from nowhere, to form a key part of 
the Government’s new energy policy after 1974.  
 
  The need for diversification in nuclear energy R&D helped to encourage the UK 
renewable energy programme. This was explained by the efforts, led by Keith Dawson of 
the UKAEA, to establish an energy technology centre at its Harwell R&D facility. This 
was part of a larger effort by Harwell director, Walter Marshall, to ensure the survival of 
Harwell  through  the  1960s  when  research  on  nuclear  energy  was  scaled  back  as  the 
technology matured. From 1972 Dawson had been submitting plans to establish a new unit 
at  Harwell,  and  the  oil  crisis  (and  the  intervention  of  Rothschild)  provided  the  final 
impetus to the Government to agree the creation of a new unit, to be called the Energy 
Technology Support Unit (ETSU).  Working within the new Department of Energy, ETSU 
became the central coordinating body for the UK renewable energy programme. Although 
the location of ETSU at Harwell was eventually to draw some understandable criticism, it 
was clear that the motivation for the unit was based on the needs of the UKAEA rather 
than as a direct response to any exogenous growth in renewable energy technology.  This 
provides  some  evidence  for  the  conclusions  of  this  thesis  that  renewable  energy 
development  in  the  UK  during  this  period  is  also  partly  explained  by  a  greater 
understanding of the needs of the UKAEA, and the wider political imperatives of the UK 
government.  The influential demands of the UKAEA during this time leads to one of the 
themes examined in this thesis, the domination of energy policy by key energy institutions 
through an energy techno-institutional complex (TIC). 
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  Within the analysis of social and political pressure on the course of technological 
development this thesis has explored the theme, suggested by the work of Laird for the US, 
of an energy techno-institutional (TIC) complex in the UK. One effect of the energy TIC 
was the existence of powerful interest groups within the UK energy scene, chiefly created 
through nationalisation as discussed above. This included the monopolies of the National 
Coal Board, the British Gas Council and the Central Electricity Generating Board which 
combined to dominate energy policy in the UK.  However, the attention of this thesis has 
been drawn to a close analysis of the role of one powerful group in particular, the UK 
Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). From the time of its creation in the early 1950s, the 
UKAEA  represented  a  key  element  of  UK  energy  planning.  During  this  period  the 
technological promise of nuclear energy was bound up in complexity and mystery. Nuclear 
technology represented a weapon for postwar Governments, both in the military sense and 
as a method of ensuring self-sufficiency in energy terms.  The military aspects of the 
project allowed nuclear energy to simultaneously hide behind a veil of national security 
and  to  attract  huge  amounts  of  Government  funding  with  little  public  accountability.  
Nuclear energy was ‘big science’ and the UKAEA grew quickly to dominate UK energy 
R&D. Thereafter, ‘new’ energy technology came to be mediated through the UKAEA, and 
this  was  shown  in  Chapter  4  in  the  negotiations  to  establish  the  Energy  Technology 
Support Unit (ETSU) and the subsequent control of renewable energy R&D by the nuclear 
establishment at Harwell.  
 
  A defining characteristic of the UK energy TIC was the representation of energy 
policy in the UK through a dominant energy paradigm. This paradigm understood energy 
in specific terms. First, it accepted the false notion of the historical energy transitions of 
industrialisation.  These were understood as the great energy revolutions from water to 
coal at the beginning of the nineteenth century; coal to oil in the first half of the twentieth 
century; and then, most probably, oil to nuclear in the future. This was despite the evidence 
to the contrary which this thesis has emphasised. For each of these ‘transitions’ the reality 
was  much  less  ‘historic’.  It  has  been  shown  that  in  the  textile  industry  water  power 
lingered well into the twentieth century; that coal remains to the present day the major 
source of the world’s primary energy supply; and that the latter transition to nuclear energy 
remains unfulfilled.  However, this paradigm had a direct impact on the renewable energy 
programme in the UK. This thesis has shown that renewable energy sources were routinely 
judged by their capacity to replace existing fuels, and the economic measure for renewable 204 
energy  was  an  unreliable  comparison  with  the  cost  per  kWh  of  nuclear  energy.  This 
revealed  an  essential  misunderstanding  of  the  nature  of  renewable  energy  sources  that 
could only result in the failure of its development. Now we understand renewable energy 
as complementary to fossil fuel and nuclear as part of a much wider energy mix. The 
dominant energy paradigm of the period had a much narrower conception of this mix 
derived from an essentially Whiggish belief in energy transitions.  
 
  Set  within  the  dominant  energy  paradigm  this  historical  analysis  of  the  UK 
renewables programme has suggested that the programme was characterised mainly by 
fundamentally mistaken assumptions and the consequently misguided programmes. The 
rationale for launching a renewable energy R&D programme during the early 1970s was 
based almost entirely on social and political pressure. The government, through the DoEn, 
was too readily convinced by the advocates of alternatives in the period that renewable 
sources  could  make  a  significant  contribution  to  the  UK’s  energy  mix  in  the  short  to 
medium term.  However, although conceived in a socio-political vacuum, the programme 
came to be judged, ostensibly, on economic and technical grounds. Very quickly, initially 
through the Wave Energy Programme, the huge technical challenges that confronted the 
developers became plain as the tantalising initial estimates for the potential contribution of 
renewables receded into myth. It became clear to the Government that both significant 
amounts of time and money would be needed to realise this potential. The much more 
tangible and shorter term solutions of North Sea oil and gas, and to some extent nuclear 
power, were clearly of far more relevance to UK energy policy at this time. Setting out 
from  a  position  of  mistaken  assumptions,  the  UK  renewables  programmes  were  soon 
assailed  by  a  series  of  retreats  and  ill-timed  changes  in  direction.  As  this  thesis  has 
described,  the  Wave  Energy  Programme  was  halted  just  as  it  began  to  achieve  the 
ambitious  and  continually  revised  targets  on  cost,  and  a  wholesale  shift  towards  wind 
energy replaced it as the centre-piece of the UK renewables programme.  
 
  In conclusion, although this thesis has focused on a UK renewables programme that 
extended until the end of the 1980s and ended with the advent of privatisation in the 
energy  industries,  it  is  in  many  senses  a  story  of  the  1970s.  The  programme  was 
established by a Labour government amid the particular social and political context of the 
1970s,  which  was  undergoing  the  slow  transition  from  postwar  consensus  to  the  free 
market  ideology  encapsulated  by  the  Thatcher  government  after  1979.  The  new 205 
government inherited the renewables programme, and has been seen, set about reducing 
expenditure  on  renewable  energy  R&D.  It  can  also  be  seen  that  the  wind  energy 
programme was conducted with a somewhat different approach than its predecessor in 
wave  energy.  The  attempted  commercialisation  of  wind  power,  and  the  inclusion  of 
industrial partners, was much more of a priority for wind power.  In contrast, in wave 
energy industrial partnerships were viewed with an element of unfamiliarity, and even 
suspicion. In a sense therefore, this thesis represents an analysis of the long 1970s, rather 
than the 1980s.  
 
   Further historical research which focuses on the transition in renewable energy at 
the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s would be useful in examining the shift from 
directly funded R&D to the provision of incentives for renewables development. After 
1990  the  UK  government  introduced  a  scheme  that  obliged  electricity  suppliers  to 
purchase a percentage of their generation from ‘non-fossil fuel’ sources. Commentators 
have pointed out how this careful definition allowed the inclusion of nuclear energy as a 
‘non-fossil fuel’ and the negative impact that this had on the development of renewable 
energy. Eventually, this criticism resulted in the later introduction of a new scheme of   
specific Renewables Obligations (ROs) in the UK. Again, an historical account based on 
archival sources would be important in examining this crucial change in approach in the 
development of renewables in Britain. 
 
  This  thesis  has  examined  one  aspect  of  the  UK  government’s  relatively  brief 
flirtation with energy policy during the twentieth century, and has focused on the UK 
renewables programme when the imperatives of state and society temporarily quashed the 
economic and technological rationality of the period. The detailed analysis of this period 
showed that social pressure from the emergent environmental movement in the UK, the 
survival instincts of the UKAEA at Harwell, the influence of several key individuals at the 
heart  of  government,  and  the  lead  of  the  United  States  in  ‘alternative  energy’  R&D 
encouraged the UK government to suspend disbelief in the potential of renewable energy 
and then to fund a wide-ranging programme. This thesis has therefore presented the UK 
renewables programme as an essentially tokenistic gesture by the Government, keen to be 
seen as reflecting both the mood of society and also acting responsibly in exploring the 
potential  of  ‘alternatives’  in  pursuit  of  wider  energy  security.  Government  studies 
produced in the early 1970s showed clearly that despite the widely fluctuating estimates 206 
for the overall potential of renewable energy sources in the UK the economic and technical 
challenges were considerable. The failure to engage widespread commercial interest in 
renewable energy and the lukewarm attitude of its main customer, the CEGB, reflected the 
limits to the development of renewable energy in the period.   207 
Appendix I 
 
Primary and Secondary Energy Sources 
 
It is important to emphasise the important distinction between primary and secondary 
energy sources. Primary sources of energy are those which ‘contain’ energy- the original 
source - and consequently they are the most important element of any energy system. In 
modern energy systems fossil fuels - coal, oil, and natural gas - are the most commonly 
used primary energy sources. However, this category also includes biofuels such as wood, 
straw, and dried dung which even today constitute the key source of energy (mainly for 
heating  and  cooking)  for  many  parts  of  the  world.
1  Also  included  among  the  primary 
energy sources is nuclear energy, created from uranium. All forms of renewable energy 
also represent primary energy sources. The sun, the waves, the action of the tides, and the 
wind are the most commonly utilised sources of primary renewable energy. Ramage and 
Everett highlight the ‘rather arbitrary nature of the definition’ of primary energy giving the 
example  of  solar  energy,  which  is  only  ‘counted’  if  it  is  used  in  solar  panels  or 
photovoltaic  cells.  This  overlooks  the  contribution  of  solar  energy  in  ‘warming  and 
illuminating our buildings.’ 
2  
 
  Secondary energy sources are those which use a primary source and convert that 
energy into an alternative, often more usable, form. This can take a number of different 
forms and examples include the conversion of coal to gas (town gas) and oil; gas to oil; 
and oil to gas. Although examples of secondary energy sources these are essentially the 
conversion of one primary fuel to another primary fuel driven by demand and availability. 
The most recognisable and dominant secondary source of energy is electricity. Since the 
development of mains electricity in the 1880s it has come to dominate our energy needs.  
Strictly speaking, electricity is not in fact an energy source but a method for converting 
primary  energy  into  a  source  of  power.  Indeed  Patterson,  whose  work  exposes  our 
common  misunderstandings  of  energy,  claims  that  ‘for  more  than  a  century  we  have 
treated electricity as though it were a fuel’.
3 In many respects this has served to conceal the 
                                            
1 The persistence of ‘old’ technologies in many parts of the world is emphasised most recently in, Edgerton, 
D., The Shock of the Old: Technology and global history since 1900 (London: Profile Books, 2006)  
2 Ramage, J. and Everett, B., ‘Primary Energy’ in Boyle, G., Everett,B., and Ramage, J. (eds.) Energy 
Systems and Sustainability: Power for a Sustainable Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 57  
3 Patterson, Keeping, p.55 208 
actual fuels that feed our power stations. Electrical output is delivered in measurable and 
controllable quantities known as watts which further suggests the view of electricity as a 
commodity  or  ‘substance’.
4  Its  rapid  success  was  due  to  its  clear  advantages  over  the 
incumbent energy technologies, most notably town gas. As Everett observed, ‘It could 
supply  lighting  with  less  smell  than  town  gas,  drive  electric  motors  that  were  more 
convenient than steam, gas or petrol engines and could be used in the steadily developing 
world-wide telegraph network.’
5
                                            
4 Ibid. 
5 Everett, B., ‘Electricity’ in Boyle et al (eds.), Energy Systems, p.333 209 
Appendix II 
 
Renewable and Non-Renewable Energy Sources 
 
A further key distinction demanded in the interests of clarity is the fundamental difference 
between  renewable  and  non-renewable  primary  energy  sources.  This  is  particularly 
crucial to this thesis as it forms the basis of the entire debate over renewable energy. 
Energy is described as ‘renewable’ if it is ‘continuously replenished by natural systems’.
1  
Thus, it provides an endless and unlimited flow of primary energy. However, no effective 
means have yet been devised that can store this continuous flow of renewable energy.
2 
Renewable energy sources include solar energy, wind power, wave power, bioenergy, tidal 
energy, and geothermal energy. Non-renewable primary energy sources are, on the other 
hand, a form of highly concentrated stored energy. These sources, such as coal, oil, gas, 
and uranium will not be replenished on a continuous basis. Mostly (with the exception of 
uranium)  they  have  been  formed  by  natural  processes  of  fossilisation  occurring  over 
millions of years. Ultimately they too will be replenished, but only after the passage of 
many millennia. Therefore, this means that the fossil fuels - coal, oil, and gas - are finite 
sources of primary energy. Over time the reserves will be depleted - and this applies also to 
uranium, the mineral that is the primary energy source for nuclear power.  
 
  This ultimate weakness of fossil fuel as a primary energy source also represents its 
greatest strength and accounts for its dominance in modern energy systems.  It means that 
it can be used where and when it is needed and for as long as it is needed (notwithstanding 
its eventual depletion). It can effectively be turned on and off at will. It is transportable, 
predictable  and  flexible,  and  as  energy  technology  has  developed  over  the  twentieth 
century the uses of its by-products are also multifarious. As well as providing the energy 
source that this thesis examines, it also has a myriad of other applications from transport to 
chemicals.  Coal,  and  more  particularly  oil,  are  fundamental  ingredients  in  the  modern 
world, particularly in plastics. However, it is the nature of fossil fuels as a stored form of 
energy that makes them most irresistible. Renewable sources of primary energy are by 
definition not stored - as stated above; they are continuous flows of energy. Therefore they 
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2 There are however ongoing developments in battery technology in this area. See, Ter-Gazarian, A. Energy 
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cannot be turned on and off at will, and they are not generally predictable in any reliable 
sense.  Furthermore, renewable energy provides nothing but the energy itself: it has no 
useful  by-product.  In  fact,  renewable  energy  is  the  purest  form  of  primary  energy. 
Arguably,  fossil  fuels  are  the  repository  of  energy  rather  than  primary  sources  in 
themselves. The energy has already been naturally converted into a fuel, deep under the 
earth in a process taking millions of years. With renewables that first stage of conversion 
to a usable form has not taken place and the energy remains to be harnessed. Therefore the 
problems  of  storage  remain  to  be  solved.  Much  effort  has  been  put  into  battery  and 
hydrogen  storage  technology  in  an  attempt  to  address  this  fundamental  feature  of 
renewable energy, but the innovation remains well short of the massive requirements of 
modern energy systems. The only renewable energy resource that confronts this issue is 
hydropower, where the energy can be ‘stored’ in reservoirs and used when required. This 
also helps to explain the success of hydropower when compared with the other renewable 
energy sources.  211 
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